Labour Law in Canada as a Site of Legal Pluralism

Vallée, Guylaine

doi:10.1007/978-94-007-4710-4_7

Labour Law in Canada as a Site of Legal Pluralism

Guylaine Vallée³

Chapter
First Online: 01 January 2012

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Part of the book series: Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice ((IUSGENT,volume 17))

Abstract

The law that applies to paid work includes a plurality of rules, including a plurality of stated-based laws (i.e. labour law statutes, civil law, human rights protections) and rules emanating from social actors in the workplace (rules found in collective agreements, individual contracts of employment, corporate policies, workplaces practices and customs). The specificity of labour law is derived in large part from the ways in which these diverse sources of law co-exist and interact. At the same time, labour law has historically affirmed legal pluralism, according special legitimacy to rules created by workers and employers through the processes of collective negotiation. From a human rights perspective, labour law can be understood as part of a global movement towards the affirmation of economic and social rights of workers. As such, it endeavours to secure rights that are collective and diverge from the traditional individual rights of liberal legalism. In this chapter, these themes are explored by examining two areas where adjudicators have confronted the intersection of the plurality of sources that constitute labour law. The first area reviews the approach of labour arbitrators regarding the interface of state-based human rights guarantees and the resolution of grievances in the workplace; the second concerns judicial assessments of the interface of state-based laws and collective agreements, focusing on cases implicating protections for the rights of vulnerable workers.

The present chapter is a translation of an updated version of a text that first appeared in French in 2006 in honour of the great professor and sociologist of law Guy Rocher: Guylaine VALLÉE, “Le droit du travail comme lieu de pluralisme juridique”, in C. SAINT-PIERRE and J.P. WARREN, Sociologie et société québécoise. Présences de Guy Rocher, Montréal, Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 2006, p. 241. The author would like to thank the McGill Centre for Human Rights and Legal Pluralism and Dia Dabby, with the collaboration of Colleen Sheppard for the translation of this paper.

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Notes

1.
Guy ROCHER, “Les fondements de la société libérale, les relations industrielles et les Chartes”, in R. BLOUIN, G. FERLAND, G. LAFLAMME, A. LAROCQUE and C. RONDEAU, Les Chartes des droits et les relations industrielles, Québec, Département des relations industrielles, Université Laval, Les Presses de l’Université Laval, 1988, p. 12.
2.
Guy ROCHER, “Les avenues de la déréglementation” in M. BROSSARD (ed.), La déréglementation des relations du travail. Le pour et le contre, Montréal, École de relations industrielles, Université de Montréal, 1987, p. 150.
3.
Guy ROCHER, “Pour une sociologie des ordres juridiques”, (1988) 29 Les Cahiers de droit 91–120.
4.
Pierre VERGE and Guylaine VALLÉE, Un droit du travail? Essai sur la spécificité du droit du travail, coll. “Le droit aussi”, Cowansville, Éditions Yvon Blais, 1997, p. 26–30. The practise of labour law reflects this distinctiveness. For example, university research and teaching in labour law take place as much as in the faculties of law as in the schools of industrial relations. The practitioners of labour law and in particular the people sitting within the various specialized labour tribunals or those who plead before them, are not obligatorily members of the Bar.
5.
Marie-France BICH, “Droit du travail québécois : genèse et génération”, in H.P. GLENN (ed.), Droit québécois et droit français : communauté, autonomie, concordance, Cowansville, Éditions Yvon Blais, 1993, p. 520–531.
6.
Guylaine VALLÉE and Julie BOURGAULT, “Cadre juridique de la convention collective”, in P. JALETTE and G. TRUDEAU (eds), La convention collective au Québec, 2^e ed., Montréal, Gaëtan Morin Éditeur, 2011, p. 18–20.
7.
Guy ROCHER, supra, note 1, p. 7.
8.
Ibid, p. 7–8 [our translation]. The original, in French: “ont pour but d’assurer à chaque citoyen et citoyenne des conditions de vie qui soient relativement bonnes, une certaine sécurité, la protection contre les imprévus de la vie”
9.
Ibid, p. 8.
10.
Alain SUPIOT, “Pourquoi un droit du travail?” (1990) Droit social, p. 485, 487–489.
11.
Paul DAVIES and Mark FREEDLAND, Kahn-Freund’s Labour and the Law, 3e éd., London, Stevens & Sons, 1983, p. 18 cited in Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038, 1052.
12.
Hugo SINZHEIMER, “La théorie des sources et le droit ouvrier”, dans Le problème des sources en droit positif, (1934). Annuaire de l’Institut international de philosophie du droit et de sociologie juridique, p. 73–74; P. VERGE and G. VALLÉE, supra, note 4, p. 27.
13.
On the “negative” then “positive” recognition of unionism by the state law, see: Robert P. GAGNON, L. LEBEL and Pierre VERGE, Droit du travail. 2^e éd. Sainte-Foy, 1991, Les Presses de l’Université Laval, p. 17–29.
14.
Judy FUDGE and Eric TUCKER, Labour Before the Law: The Regulation of Workers’ Collective Action in Canada, 1900–1948, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 1–15.
15.
Katherine VAN WEZEL STONE, “The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension between Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective Bargaining System”, (1999) 59 The University of Chicago Law Review 575, 623: “The industrial pluralist vision is not merely a neutral description of the workplace. It is a description with a normative message about how collective bargaining should be structured. The picture of the workplace as an autonomous, self-sufficient, democratic realm suggests that the conditions inside the workplace are fair and just. The normative message is that all is well, and that outsiders, such as legislatures, should not intervene”.
16.
Ulrich ZACHERT, “La légitimité des rapports juridiques de travail. À propos de la conception de la légitimité chez Max Weber et Hugo Sinzheimer”, dans M. COUTU and G. ROCHER (eds.), La légitimité de l’État et du droit. Autour de Max Weber, coll. “Pensée allemande et européenne”, Québec, Presses de l’Université Laval, 2005, p. 301, 313 [our translation]. The original, in French: “au travailleur la possibilité d’opposer une puissance correspondante à celle de l’employeur”. Unlike other systems of industrial relations, it is at the heart of the enterprise and not at the sectorial or interprofessional level that this ideal of equality is sought in the North American industrial pluralism. [our translation]
17.
This finality of the regime of collective labour relations instituted in 1944 was particularly important in Canada: Daphne Gottlieb TARAS, “Collective Bargaining Regulation in Canada and the United States. Divergent Cultures, Divergent Outcomes”, in B. KAUFMAN (ed.), Government Regulation of the Employment Relationship, IRRA Series 1997, 50th Anniversary Volume, p. 295–341.
18.
On the enterprise as legal order, see : G. ROCHER, supra, note 2, p.150 ; Jean Marcel LAPIERRE, Guy ROCHER and Guylaine VALLÉE, “Légitimités et légitimations de l’arbitrage de griefs et discrimination dans les milieux de travail syndiqués”, dans M. COUTU and G. ROCHER (eds.), La légitimité de l’État et du droit. Autour de Max Weber, collection “Pensée allemande et européenne”, Québec, Presses de l’Université Laval, 2005, p. 360–361.
19.
See the classical statements of this approach that constitute the founding postulates of the field of study of industrial relations and labour law: Neil W. CHAMBERLAIN, Collective Bargaining, First ed., New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1951, esp. p. 125–139; Allan FLANDERS, “Éléments pour une théorie de la négociation collective”, (1968) Sociologie du travail, p. 13–35; Harry W. ARTHURS, “Developing Industrial Citizenship: A Challenge for Canada’s Second Century”. (1967) The Canadian Bar Review 786. On the distinctive traits of the Canadian model of industrial citizenship, see : Judy FUDGE, “Au-delà de la citoyenneté industrielle : la citoyenneté marchande ou du travail ?” in COUTU and G. MURRAY (eds.), Travail et citoyenneté : quel avenir ?, Québec, Presses de l’Université Laval, 2010, p. 421.
20.
This is the case for stipulations subjecting the dismissal of an employee to a just and sufficient cause or imposing the taking into account of the seniority of an employee with regards to promotion, transfer, lay-off or termination of employment. These stipulations limit the employer’s discretionary power by imposing criteria that must be taken into account in the management of personnel.
21.
United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America, Local 527 in re Peterboro Lock Mfg. Co. Ltd., (1954) 4 L.A.C. 1499–1506, 1502, February 27 1954 (B. Laskin, adj.).
22.
Supra, notes 15–19.
23.
Syndicat catholique des employés de magasins de Québec Inc. v. La Cie Paquet Ltée, [1959] S.C.R. 206; McGavin Toastmaster Ltd v. Ainscough, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 718; St. Anne Nackawic Pulp & Paper v. CPU, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 704; CAIMAW v. Paccar of Canada Ltd., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 983; Hémond v. Coopérative fédérée du Québec, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 962; Noël v. Société d’énergie de la Baie James, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 207. It must be noted that the labour law doctrine in Québec is very divided on the opportunistic character of this approach: G. VALLÉE and J. BOURGAULT, supra, note 6, p. 40–45.
24.
Examples of this minority position: United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America, Local 527 in re Peterboro Lock Mfg. Co. Ltd., supra, note 21. See also Justice Wilson’s dissenting opinion in CAIMAW c. Paccar of Canada Ltd., supra, note 23, 1024, who wrote: “Must we conclude that in the absence of a specific provision in the Code the employer is free to do anything which he is not specifically prohibited from doing? This seems to be the underlying premise of the appellant’s position. Nothing in the Code, they say, prevents the employer from unilaterally imposing new terms. Or do we in filling the legislative vacuum take guidance from the legislative scheme? It seems to me that the latter must be the proper course.”
25.
For a presentation of these two approaches, that of implicit limitations and that of residual rights, see: G. VALLÉE and J. BOURGAULT, supra, note 6, p. 36–39. Moreover, the collective agreements routinely contain stipulations explicitly recognizing the employer’s power.
26.
Katherine VAN WEZEL STONE, “The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law”, (1981) 90: 7 The Yale Law Journal 1509, 1557.
27.
It is the case in Québec and in Canada, but also in the United States. See: Katherine VAN WEZEL STONE, supra, note 15, 631.
28.
On the subject of Québec législation, see: Christian DESILETS et Denis LEDOUX, Histoire des normes du travail au Québec de 1885 à 2005 : de l’Acte des manufactures à la Loi sur les normes du travail, Québec, Publications du Québec, 2006.
29.
Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., c. c-12.
30.
R.S.Q. c. N-1.1.
31.
R.S.Q., c. S-2.1.
32.
R.S.Q., c. A-3.001.
33.
S.Q. 1991, c. 64, art. 2085–2097.
34.
To resume this interesting typology employed by Diane VEILLEUX, “L’arbitre de grief face à une compétence renouvelée…”, (2004) 64 Revue du Barreau 217 [our translation]. The original types in French are: “droits individuels d’intérêt privé”, “droits individuels d’intérêts collectifs” and “droits individuels d’intérêt général”.
35.
The study was part of a greater study whose theme was the Implementation of the norm of equality in the workplace, human rights and collective labour relations (Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, 2000–2003, Guylaine VALLÉE, Michel COUTU and Guy ROCHER, Jean Marcel LAPIERRE and Jean Denis GAGNON).
36.
Labour Code, R.S.Q. c. C-27, art. 101.
37.
Ibid, art. 100.12 (a).
38.
McLeod v. Egan, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 517.
39.
Denis NADEAU, “L’arbitrage de griefs : vecteur d’intégration des droits de la personne dans les rapports collectifs du travail”, dans Tribunal des droits de la personne et Barreau du Québec, La Charte des droits et libertés de la personne : pour qui et jusqu’où?, Cowansville, Éditions Yvon Blais, 2005, p. 157 [our translation]. The original, in French: “marquait une rupture avec trente années d’un régime législatif reposant sur le principe quasi indélébile de l’autonomie contractuelle des parties”
40.
Ibid, p. 157 [our translation]. The original, in French: “remettait en cause la fibre foncièrement “conventionnelle” du monde des relations collectives du travail.”
41.
Supra, note 29.
42.
Guylaine VALLÉE, Michel COUTU and Marie-Christine HÉBERT, “La norme d’égalité en milieu de travail : étude empirique de la mise en œuvre de la norme d’égalité par le Tribunal des droits de la personne et les tribunaux d’arbitrage”, in G. VALLEE, M. COUTU, J. D. GAGNON, J.M. LAPIERRE AND G. ROCHER (eds.), Le droit à l’égalité : les tribunaux d’arbitrage et le Tribunal des droits de la personne, Montréal, éd. Thémis, 2001, p. 43–45. See a similar finding in D. NADEAU, supra, note 39, p. 161.
43.
G. VALLÉE, M. COUTU and M.-C. HÉBERT, supra, note 42.
44.
See also in this way: D. NADEAU, supra, note 39, p. 158.
45.
G. VALLEE, M. COUTU and M.-C. HÉBERT, supra, note 42, p. 21–28.
46.
See the contrasting reactions that these data produced in the following consolidated collection: G. VALLEE, M. COUTU, J. D. GAGNON, J.M. LAPIERRE and G. ROCHER (eds.), Le droit à l’égalité: les tribunaux d’arbitrage et le Tribunal des droits de la personne, Montréal, éd. Thémis, 2001.
47.
D. VEILLEUX, supra, note 34, p. 231–232.
48.
D. NADEAU, supra, note 39, p. 159–160.
49.
J.M. LAPIERRE, G. ROCHER and G. VALLÉE, supra, note 18.
50.
Ibid, p. 362–364; p. 369–370; p. 377. See also: D. NADEAU, supra, note 39, p. 159.
51.
J.M. LAPIERRE, G. ROCHER and G. VALLÉE, supra, note 18, p. 378.
52.
What we have called “relational logic”: Ibid, p. 370–374.
53.
What we have called “situational logic”: Ibid, p. 374–375.
54.
What we have called “legislative rule logic”: Ibid, p. 375–376.
55.
Supra, notes 15–20 and corresponding text.
56.
Parry Sound (District) Social Services Administration Board v. O.P.S.E.U., Local 324, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 157, 2003 SCC 42.
57.
Labour Relations Act, 1995, S.O. 1995, c. 1, Sch. A.
58.
R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, art 5 (1).
59.
Parry Sound (District) Social Services Administration Board v. O.P.S.E.U., Local 324, supra, note 56, par. 3.
60.
Labour Relations Act, supra, note 57, art. 48 (12) (j).
61.
Parry Sound (District) Social Services Administration Board v. O.P.S.E.U., Local 324, supra, note 56, par. 28 and 55.
62.
Ibid, par. 30 and 36.
63.
However, the expansion of this jurisdiction does not modify the essentially private nature of the functioning of the institution: Gilles TRUDEAU, “L’arbitrage des griefs au Canada : plaidoyer pour une réforme devenue nécessaire”, (2005) 84 La Revue du Barreau canadien 249, 253 and 265–274.
64.
Supra, note 15 and corresponding text.
65.
Parry Sound (District) Social Services Administration Board v. O.P.S.E.U., Local 324, supra, note 56, par. 51. The Court expressly draws on the analyses of Paul WEILER, important labour jurist embodying this perspective of industrial pluralism in Canada and the United States.
66.
Parry Sound (District) Social Services Administration Board v. O.P.S.E.U., Local 324, supra, note 56, par. 36. This solution makes it possible for unionized workers to benefit from individual State rights that have emerged in the last few years, contrary to the situation that prevailed in the American law, a solution strongly criticized by K. VAN WEZEL STONE, supra, note 15, esp. 593–620.
67.
Isidore Garon ltée v. Tremblay; Fillion et Frères (1976) inc. v. Syndicat national des employés de garage du Québec, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 27, 2006 SCC 2.
68.
The Civil Code of Québec sets out that a party to a labour contract of indeterminate term “may terminate it by giving notice of termination to the other party […] [This notice] shall be given in reasonable time, taking into account, in particular, the nature of the employment, the special circumstances in which it is carried on and the duration of the period of work.” (Civil Code of Québec, supra, note 33, art. 2091) and that “[t]he employee may not renounce his right to obtain compensation for any injury he suffers where insufficient notice of termination is given…” (Ibid, art. 2092).
69.
In one of the two cases, the collective agreement simply set out that the Act Respecting Labour Standards was applicable in the case of a layoff that was for six or more consecutive months: Isidore Garon ltée v. Tremblay; Fillion et Frères (1976) inc. v. Syndicat national des employés de garage du Québec, supra, note 67, par. 67.
70.
An Act respecting Labour Standards, supra, note 30, art. 82.
71.
Isidore Garon ltée v. Tremblay; Fillion et Frères (1976) inc. v. Syndicat national des employés de garage du Québec, supra, note 67, par. 24 (for the judges of the majority) and par. 141–151 (for the judges of the minority).
72.
Ibid, par. 24–31 (for the judges of the majority) and par. 177–181 (for the judges of the minority).
73.
Ibid, par. 9 and 32–61.
74.
Ibid, par. 47.
75.
Ibid, par. 51 and 53.
76.
Ibid, par. 58.
77.
Ibid, par. 59.
78.
Ibid, par. 10–16 and 24. In doing so, it is considered that the freedom to contract is abrogated once a collective agreement is concluded (Ibid, par. 11 and 27) and that the individual labour contract does not constitute an active source of determination of working conditions when a collective agreement exists, even though it can subsist as the creator of the individual employment link (Ibid, par. 27). See also: Supra, note 23.
79.
Did this method affect all rights of State source or only those born from the Civil Code of Québec? The answer was far from clear. In fact, the method stated by the judges of the majority did not seem to be limited to common law, even if in the case at bar, it was applied to common law stipulations. Paragraph 24 of the decision states: “Parry Sound did not reverse Paquet, McGavin, Hémond or Noël. The principle that emerges from that case is that, if a rule is incompatible with the collective labour relations scheme, it cannot be incorporated and must be disregarded, as was the case in McGavin, Hémond and Noël. If the rule is found to be compatible and if it is a supplementary or mandatory norm, as in McLeod, Weber and Parry Sound, the arbitrator will have jurisdiction to apply it. […] Before determining whether the norm is supplementary or mandatory, its compatibility must be ascertained. How do we determine whether a provision or rule is compatible? What rights are supplanted by the collective scheme? Underlying the first line of cases is the desire to give precedence to collective bargaining for all conditions of employment. If the right claimed can be characterized as a condition of employment, it cannot be negotiated individually by the employer and the employee. The union alone performs this task, and it must do so for the employees collectively.” In accordance with this approach, Civil Code of Québec norms are not necessarily implicitly incorporated into the collective agreement; only those compatible will be (Ibid, par. 30).
80.
Ibid, par. 116–133. Justice LeBel deemed, as did the judges of the majority, that the principle of freedom of contract disappears when a union is certified in a enterprise (Ibid, par. 128 and 135) and that the effect of the collective agreement on the individual contract is “considerable”, though “there remains, at the very least, an individual act under which the employee is hired, and its effect, in any case, survives should the certification and the collective agreement cease to have effect.” (Ibid, par. 133). Justice LeBel also seems to see the survival of the individual employment contract as the foundation of certain obligations that employees and employers for which they still remain accountable (Ibid, par. 139, 140 and 165), even if he later affirms that these obligations are part of the implicit content of the collective agreement (Ibid, par. 167 and 175).
81.
Ibid, par. 181.
82.
Ibid, par. 181.
83.
Ibid, par. 179.
84.
Ibid, par. 180.
85.
Syndicat de la fonction publique du Québec v. Québec (Attorney General), [2010] 2 SCR 61.
86.
Labour Code, supra, note 30, art. 100.
87.
Syndicat de la fonction publique du Québec v. Québec, supra, note 85, par. 39.
88.
The Québec Court of Appeal has applied this approach in: Syndicat des métallos, section locale 2843 (Métallurgistes unis d’Amérique, section locale 2843) v. 3539491 Canada Inc., 2011 QCCA 264.
89.
Denis Nadeau, “La perméabilité du droit au sein des rapport collectifs de travail et la compétence arbitrale : nouveau regard sur la valse hésitation de la Cour suprême du Canada” (2010) 69 Revue du Barreau 219, par. 33.
90.
Ibid, par. 36 [Our translation]. The original, in French: “l’essence contractuelle des rapports collectifs du travail à l’ensemble de l’ordonnancement juridique”
91.
Ibid, par. 32 [Our translation]. The original, in French: “la voie de la migration automatique et intégrale d’un corpus de normes extérieures vers la convention collective”
92.
Isidore Garon ltée v. Tremblay; Fillion et Frères (1976) inc. v. Syndicat national des employés de garage du Québec, supra, note 67, par. 59.
93.
The policy of judicial reserve with respect to the legal order constituted by collective labour relations is well expressed, in another context by Justice McIntyre who wrote in Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313, par. 182: “Labour law, as we have seen, is a fundamentally important as well as an extremely sensitive subject. It is based upon a political and economic compromise between organized labour – a very powerful socio-economic force – on the one hand, and the employers of labour – an equally powerful socio-economic force – on the other. The balance between the two forces is delicate and the public-at-large depends for its security and welfare upon the maintenance of that balance. One group concedes certain interests in exchange for concessions from the other. There is clearly no correct balance which may be struck giving permanent satisfaction to the two groups, as well as securing the public interest. The whole process is inherently dynamic and unstable. Care must be taken then in considering whether constitutional protection should be given to one aspect of this dynamic and evolving process…”
94.
In this way, individual and collective rights do not oppose each other. If the “tendency toward individualization […] can be analyzed as a loosening of the constraints that are exercised by the group on the individual”, it can also be seen as “the risk of a lessening in the protection of the individual by the group” (A. SUPIOT, supra, note 10, 490) [our translation]. The original, in French : “[Si] la tendance à l’individualisation […] peut être analysée comme la chance d’un desserrement des contraintes que le groupe exerce sur l’individu”, elle peut aussi être vue comme “le risque d’une réduction de la protection de l’individu par le groupe”.
95.
Simon DEAKIN, “L’évolution de la relation d’emploi”, in Peter AUER and Bernard GAZIER (eds.), L’avenir du travail, de l’emploi et de la protection sociale: dynamique du changement et protection des travailleurs, Genève, Institut international d’études sociales (B.I.T.), 2002, p. 224.
96.
See in this way: Parry Sound (District) Social Services Administration Board v. O.P.S.E.U., Local 324, supra, note 56, esp. par. 23 and 36.
97.
J.M. LAPIERRE, G. ROCHER and G. VALLÉE, supra, note 18, p. 379–382. More generally on the paradoxal effect of constitutionalization on the autonomy of labour law, see: Michel COUTU, “Le droit du travail comme ordre légitime”, dans M. COUTU and G. ROCHER (eds.), La légitimité de l’État et du droit. Autour de Max Weber, collection “Pensée allemande et européenne”, Québec, Presses de l’Université Laval, 2005, p. 353.
98.
Michel COUTU, “Crise du droit du travail, pluralisme juridique et souveraineté”, Lex Electronica, vol. 12 n°1 (Printemps / Spring 2007), in part. par. 13.

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Guylaine Vallée

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René Provost
, Faculty of Law, McGill University, Peel 3644, Montreal, H3A 1W9, Québec, Canada
Colleen Sheppard

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Vallée, G. (2013). Labour Law in Canada as a Site of Legal Pluralism. In: Provost, R., Sheppard, C. (eds) Dialogues on Human Rights and Legal Pluralism. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 17. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4710-4_7

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