Advertisement

Weighing and Balancing in the Light of Deliberation and Expression

  • Bruce AndersonEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Law and Philosophy Library book series (LAPS, volume 102)

Abstract

I begin by arguing that the key elements in any analysis of weighing and balancing are questions, insights, and judgments of value. This position is used to critique the role Marko Novak assigns to rationality in balancing and Robert Alexy’s idealized weight formula. Finally, by examining the relation between deliberation and expression I argue that a written legal decision represents the possibility of someone understanding and evaluating that decision. Expressions, in whatever form, do not justify legal decisions.

Keywords

Deliberate Formula Weight Legal Decision-making Process Eveline Feteris Insightful Reflections 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

References

  1. Alexy, R. 2003a. Constitutional rights, balancing, and rationality. Ratio Juris 16(2): 131–140.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Alexy, R. 2003b. On balancing and subsumption. A structural comparison. Ratio Juris 16(4): 443–449.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Anderson, B. 1996. Discovery in legal decision-making, Law and philosophy library, vol. 21, 131–170. London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.Google Scholar
  4. Barden, G. 1990. After principles. London: University of Notre Dame Press.Google Scholar
  5. Feteris, E. 2008. The rational reconstruction of weighing and balancing on the basis of teleological-evaluative considerations in the justification of judicial decisions. Ratio Juris 21(4): 481–495.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Lonergan, B. 1992. Insight: A study of human understanding. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.Google Scholar
  7. McShane, P. 1975. Wealth of self, wealth of nations. New York: Exposition Press.Google Scholar
  8. Novak, M. 2010. Three models of balancing (in constitutional review). Ratio Juris 23(1): 101–112.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Tversky, A., and D. Kahneman. 2004. Rational choice and the framing of decisions. In Preference, belief, and similarity: Selected writings of Amos Tversky, ed. E. Shafir, 593–619. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  10. Tversky, A., S. Sattath, and P. Slovic. 2004. Contingent weighing in judgment and choice. In Preference, belief, and similarity: Selected writings of Amos Tversky, ed. E. Shafir, 845–874. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht. 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Saint Mary’s UniversityHalifaxCanada

Personalised recommendations