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Legal Argumentation and the Normativity of Legal Norms

  • Carlos BernalEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Law and Philosophy Library book series (LAPS, volume 102)

Abstract

Legal argumentation has differing relations with the concept of normativity. On the one hand, normativity plays an important role in legal argumentation. This is because legal norms are elements of the arguments which go together to make up legal discourse. On the other hand, legal argumentation also plays a relevant role in grounding the normativity of legal norms. The normativity of legal norms is not only based on authority, but also on correctness, and correctness is achieved, at least in part, by compliance to rules governing legal argumentation. The aim of this paper is to analyse the most significant relationships between normativity and legal argumentation. To achieve this aim, the paper will consider four aspects: the normativity of the different kinds of legal norms, the rules of legal argumentation, the role played by the rules of legal argumentation in grounding the normativity of legal norms, and the role played by legal norms in legal argumentation.

Keywords

Legal Consequence Legal Norm Argumentation Structure Legal Argumentation Deductive Logic 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht. 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Macquarie Law SchoolSydneyAustralia

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