Abstract
The problem of separation between the context of discovery and the context of justification of legal decisions is one of the basic themes in legal argumentation theory. Whereas the context of discovery focuses on the process of reaching a legal decision, which concludes a decision-making process, the context of justification is concerned with justification of the legal decision through the application of relevant legal arguments. The majority of legal theorists interested in legal argumentation theory support the position that the mentioned two contextes are rigidly separated, in the framework of which the process of discovery is mainly studied by psychologists while the process of justification is the only area that should be relevant for legal argumentation theory. I oppose such a rigid separation between the two contextes and view it as a position that is too idealist. Instead, I support a more realistic position of their moderate separation, whereby I recognise the importance of the discovery context while still insisting on the major relevance of the justification context.
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Notes
- 1.
The discussion concerning the rationality and irrationality of law is not new among contemporary legal scholars. For a discussion about that in Slovenia, see Cerar (2001).
- 2.
The etymology of this English word is as follows: “ME [Medieval English] resound, fr. OF [Medieval Old French] raison, fr. L [Latin] ration-, ratio reason, computation, fr. reri to calculate, think; prob. akin to Goth rathjo account, explanation”(Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 1993: 974).
- 3.
Gr. practices pertaining to action, in contrast with theoretical (gr. theōria viewing; speculation; contemplation) which relates to thought (Mautner 2000: 440, 563).
- 4.
The etymology of these two words, i.e. intellect and intelligence, is as follows: “ME, fr. MF [Middle French] or L; MF, fr. L intellectus, fr. intellegere to understand”; and “ME, MF, fr. L intelligentia, fr. intelligent-, intelligens intelligent” (Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 1993: 608).
- 5.
I suggest that even in English we cease using the syntax “sense of justice” or “feeling of justice” but begin using the expression “intuition of justice,” which is the only right expression according to the understanding of psychological typology by Jung, Briggs and Myers.
- 6.
Cf. Alexy’s position that internal justification is concerned with whether the decision follows logically from the premises adduced as justifying it (Alexy 1989).
- 7.
Cf. Alexy’s perception of external justification by which he understands the defending of the acceptability of the premises by interpretative methods and arguments (Alexy 1989).
- 8.
Here I refer to MacCormick’s determination of a clear case instead of an easy case as he argued that in a complex society there are no easy cases (MacCormick 2005).
- 9.
Concerning the meaning of implicit text see Barak 2005: 104–106.
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Novak, M. (2013). The Argument from Psychological Typology for a Mild Separation Between the Context of Discovery and the Context of Justification. In: Dahlman, C., Feteris, E. (eds) Legal Argumentation Theory: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 102. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4670-1_10
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