Abstract
Building on Chap. 4, which examined how Édouard Le Roy and Pierre Rousselot assimilated Bergsonian and Blondelian insights in their attempts to renew theological teachings concerning dogma and the act of faith, Chap. 5 shows how their employment of these insights anticipated and prepared for the various applications and appraisals of Husserlian phenomenology by the subsequent generation of French-speaking religious thinkers. In 1926, Protestant theologian Jean Hering published his thesis on phenomenology and religious philosophy, marking the first attempt by a French religious thinker to employ the phenomenological approaches of Husserl and Scheler to establishing epistemological foundations for an ontology of divinity. Meanwhile, Catholic apologist Gaston Rabeau likewise began using phenomenology along with other contemporary philosophical methods to bolster traditional arguments for the existence of God. The reception of Husserl among French neo-Thomists is also considered, beginning with the influential theories of the Belgian Jesuit Joseph Maréchal for a post-Kantian critical approach to Thomist epistemology, including his suggestion that it might profit from a fusion of Husserlian phenomenology with Blondelian dynamism. The first annual Journée d’études (day of studies) organized by the Société thomiste in 1932, which took for its theme Thomism and contemporary German phenomenology, is discussed in detail, as well as the appraisals of phenomenology by other French neo-Thomists , notably Jacques Maritain . The final section of the chapter attempts to explain why interest in phenomenology among religious thinkers gradually increased during the late 1920s and early 1930s but declined sharply in the mid-1930s, particularly among neo-Thomists .
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Notes
- 1.
Between 1870 and 1918 the University of Strasbourg was administered by German authorities who tried to model the institution after other German universities, albeit with only moderate success. See Craig (1984).
- 2.
See Spiegelberg (1982, 168). Spiegelberg also notes that the Göttingen Philosophische Gesellschaft served as a sounding board for Max Scheler , who was without an academic position at the time.
- 3.
See Hering (1959a, 28): “…Nous n’oublierons pas non plus la grande amabilité avec laquelle, en revenant de ses conférences à la Sorbonne en 1928 [sic.], il voulut bien consacrer quelques jours de son temps précieux aux Strasbourgeois, auxquels il donna une conférence très suivie et accorda plusieurs entretiens à un petit groupe de philosophes, parmi lesquels nous vîmes apparaître le vénérable E. Goblot retiré à Strasbourg , ainsi que le professeur E. Baudin de la Faculté de Théologie Catholique, savant compréhensif et sagace qui se lia d’amitié au philosophe de Fribourg.”
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
Cf. Scheler (1921, 376–379).
- 9.
Cf. Le Roy (1901, 138–153).
- 10.
“pas de ‘réduire’ et d’‘expliquer,’ mais de ‘conduire’ et d’‘explorer.’” Hering here quotes and translates Reinach (1921, 384): “Deskriptive Psychologie [which Hering notes is presented as an example of science that employs the phenomenological method] soll nicht erklären und zurückführen, sondern sie will aufklären und hinführen.”
- 11.
Note that although he does not say so directly, Hering describes an Aristotelian approach to science.
- 12.
We may be reminded that for Husserl, the notion of Sachverhalten, or states of affairs, is crucial for his theory of judgment; cf. Husserl (1931, §94; 272–276).
- 13.
Hering anticipates here his observations concerning the relevance of the phenomenology of essences for the philosophy of religion, which follow in the next section.
- 14.
- 15.
In a letter to Otto dated March 5, 1919, Husserl writes, as quoted by Almond (1984, 87): “It is a first beginning for a phenomenology of religion…this book will retain an abiding place in the history of genuine philosophy of religion, or rather phenomenology of religion” (emphasis in the original).
- 16.
Husserl (1931, “Note” following §51; 157); cf. Hering (1926, 100–101): “Il faut donc qu’il y ait dans le flux de la conscience avec ses aspects infinis, encore d’autres espèces de manifestations d’entités transcendantes, que la constitution des entités réiformes en tant qu’unités de phénomènes concordants; et enfin ces manifestations seraient d’ordre intuitif; la pensée s’adaptera à elles, de manière à pouvoir, en les suivant intelligemment, faire comprendre une action d’ensemble du principe théologique supposé.”
- 17.
- 18.
One may argue that in making the preceding claim, Hering unfairly extrapolates Husserl’s intention. After all, in §58 of Ideas Husserl (1931, 173) explicitly suspends the transcendence of God: “After abandoning the natural world, we strike in our course another transcendence, which is not given like the pure Ego immediately united to consciousness in its reduced state, but comes to knowledge in a highly mediated form, standing over against the transcendence of the world as if it were its polar opposite. We refer to the transcendence of God.” Nevertheless, if the God worshipped by religion has no place in a rigorously phenomenological investigation, there does seem to be room for an absolute of another kind. The question of teleology is not eliminated by the bracketing of natural laws. “On the contrary,” Husserl remarks, “the transition to pure consciousness through the method of the transcendental reduction leads necessarily to the question concerning the ground of what now presents itself as the intuitable actuality [Faktizität] of the corresponding constituting consciousness” (174). Husserl never associates this ground with the God of any positive religion, however. We must therefore conclude that for Husserl there remains perhaps the possibility for a phenomenological philosophy of religion but not a religious philosophy, at least not according to Hering ’s definition of the term.
- 19.
In these respects, Hering asserts that phenomenology can help to reinforce the observations of the religious psychologist Henri Bois; cf. Bois (1908).
- 20.
- 21.
- 22.
Rabeau (1926); see especially Part II on the method of theology (117–161). It is worth noting, perhaps, that while Rabeau does defend the traditional view of theology as queen of the sciences, he arrives at that conclusion in a rather original way by using John Stuart Mill’s method of collocation. For criticism of this application of Mill, but praise for the work as a whole, see Gardeil (1926). For further discussion of this point, see also Chenu (1927).
- 23.
Cf. Engert (1926, 427–428).
- 24.
See Rabeau (1927a, 199); cf. Engert (1926, 428–440) and Scheler (1961, 161ff.). Actually, the difficult lies in Scheler ’s text. At the beginning of the division on “The Essential Phenomenology of Religion,” Scheler list the branches of study as follows: “1) the essential nature of the divine; 2) the study of the forms of revelation in which the divine intimates and manifests itself to man; 3) the study of the religious act through which man prepares himself to receive the content of revelation, and through which he takes it to himself in faith.” There are headings in the text corresponding to the first and last of these branches, but no heading clearly indicating where Scheler discusses the forms of revelation as such, which makes it all the more curious why Rabeau considered them to be the centerpiece of Scheler ’s philosophy of religion.
- 25.
Ever revealing his apologetical bent, Rabeau here cites a remark by Frau Förster, the Protestant moralist: “Against the tremendous pressure with which the centralization, the density and the division of labor among new societies burdens the mind, the interior life, to remain alive, needs an authority to defend it, it needs the Catholic church.”
- 26.
In a footnote on p. 236, Rabeau recognizes that, “Ces vérités étaient familières aux savants catholiques, mais Scheler les a systématisées et mises en valeur d’un point de vue purement philosophique. D’où l’intérêt spécial de son oeuvre.”
- 27.
Although Scheler disagrees with Otto ’s postulate that the essential forms of religious experience correspond to a priori epistemological structures, he often praises Otto ’s description of the holy; cf. Scheler (1961, 145, 154, 169ff., 285ff., 306, and 315).
- 28.
Cf. Scheler (1961, 194).
- 29.
“Mais sa réussite si rapide semble bien montrer aussi qu’elle satisfaisait les besoins et les préoccupations de l’âme allemande après la guerre: l’objectivisme absolu correspondait à cette constatation que la pensée avait mis en oeuvre de brutales forces irrationnelles qui s’opposent à elle et l’écrasent. L’inquiétude poussée jusqu’à l’angoisse, conçue comme le contenu essentiel de l’existence (Heidegger ), manifeste l’horrible désarroi du germanisme vaincu, ruiné, accablé par ses propres erreurs.”
- 30.
When he wrote this article, Rabeau evidently had not detected the trajectory linking Gurvitch ’s series of essays that we pointed out in Chap. 3, namely the movement to restore German Idealism as epitomized by the later Fichte . Yet, in his subsequent review of Husserl’s Formal and Transcendental Logic , Rabeau does note that Gurvitch links phenomenology to the tradition of Fichtean idealism (see below).
- 31.
- 32.
See, for example, Husserl (1969, Introduction, §27, and §67; 11, 86, 171). See also Bachelard (1968). In the preface and introduction to her commentary, Bachelard offers an extensive comparison of Husserl’s aims in the Logical Investigations and Formal and Transcendental Logic , especially with respect to the issue of psychologism .
- 33.
In a footnote Rabeau corrects the translation of Husserl’s Gegenständlichkeiten [objectivities]. In the Méditations cartésiennes, Levinas and Pfeiffer use entités instead of objectivités, which is more literal. Rabeau , however, chooses to follow the usage of the Méditations cartésiennes in the body of his essay.
- 34.
It is curious that Rabeau does not here again refer to Delbos , who makes the same point at the end of his essay on the Logical Investigations ; cf. Delbos (1911, 698).
- 35.
Here Rabeau only makes implicit reference to the Logical Investigations .
- 36.
While not a direct quotation of Husserl, it captures well enough the conclusion to Formal and Transcendental Logic , Part II, Chap. 5 (§93): “Thus, having been led from knowledge and science to logic as the theory of science, and led onward from the actual grounding of logic to a theory of logical or scientific reason, we now face the all-embracing problem of transcendental philosophy—of transcendental philosophy in its only pure and radical form, that of a transcendental phenomenology” (Husserl 1969, 231, emphasis Husserl’s).
- 37.
The longest chapter in Bachelard’s commentary, “Transcendental Phenomenology and Intentional Psychology. The Problem of Transcendental Psychologism,” is, for instance, devoted to the problem; see Bachelard (1968, 161–205).
- 38.
Husserl (1960, 157). The citation of Augustine is from De vera religione, 39.72.
- 39.
See Société thomiste (1932). The proceedings of the colloquy will be discussed in a subsequent section.
- 40.
Hoping, perhaps, that this more original volume would have particular appeal, Rabeau ’s publisher, Bloud & Gay, issued two sets of 400 numbered editions on fine paper for subscribers to the Bibliothèque catholique des sciences religieuses besides the inexpensive paperback edition it printed for the general public.
- 41.
In the footnote following this statement Rabeau writes, “Un des résultats importants des travaux de M. Edmund Husserl est d’avoir montré les significations d’abord ‘indiquées’ dans la conscience, puis ‘remplies’ par l’activité de l’esprit, ce ‘remplissage’ s’effectuant par ‘couches’ superposées. Un ‘sens’ est toujours constitué par une série de ‘strates’, dont l’une indique l’autre.” Rabeau (1927b, 118) makes brief reference to Husserl’s Logical Investigations as an example of the Platonic tendency to speak of an order of “logical facts” (faits logiques), but phenomenology as such does not play a role in the argument of this earlier work by Rabeau .
- 42.
- 43.
As will we observe below, Rabeau frequently tries to assimilate the tenets of Husserlian phenomenology to Aquinas ’s epistemology.
- 44.
Cf. Girgensohn (1930).
- 45.
- 46.
In a footnote to this remark, Rabeau notes that he was inspired by Husserl’s Logical Investigations , volume 1, Chap. 8 (a chapter which concerns psychological prejudices). He notes further that Husserl took up this question again at the beginning of the second part of Formal and Transcendental Logic .
- 47.
“Retour à l’immédiate” was a phrase used by Édouard Le Roy (1929–1930, 1:86–141) (cf. La pensée intuitive, 1: 86–141). Rabeau ’s description also recalls Husserl’s insistence upon the need to return to the immediate givens of experience.
- 48.
Rabeau gives a short critical exposition of Heidegger ’s philosophy on pp. 142–145.
- 49.
See also p. 165, where Rabeau suggest that there is certain similarity between the views of Bergson and Aquinas on the progress of conceptual knowledge: “… apercevoir des relations de plus en plus intelligemment, c’est les définir les unes par les autres jusqu’à ce qu’on arrive aux relations les plus aisées à débrouiller, jusqu’à ce qu’on arrive… à des éléments qui définissent sans être définis, aux définientia absolute considerata [sic] parmi lesquels est l’élément ontologique affirmé par le jugement d’existence.” On the other hand, Rabeau charges Bergson with not being able to describe the concrete without immediately shifting to abstractions (cf. 150n1).
- 50.
See Sertillanges (1941, 457).
- 51.
Criticizing Rabeau ’s interpretation of species and verbum, Lonergan (1967, 66n82) notes that Rabeau , “would urge that there must be a species intelligibilis of existence prior to its affirmation in judgment. His argument is that to affirm existence of essence one must first have the species of existence. It overlooks the fact that existence is the act, the exercise, of essence; that to know essence is to know its order to its act of existence; but, though potential knowledge of existence is contained in the grounds of existential judgment and so is prior to judgment, actual knowledge of the act of existence of any given essence cannot be had prior to the judgment; and there is no existence that is not the act of some essence. To put the point differently, M. Rabeau might argue that without a prior species of existence one would not know what one was affirming when one affirmed it; but this is to overlook the essentially reflective character of the act of judgment, which proceeds from a grasp of sufficient grounds for itself. A third line of consideration is the following dilemma: Is the species of existence one or is it many? If one what happens to the analogy of ens? If many, how do the many differ from the content ‘act of essence’ where act is analogous concept and essence is any or all essences we know?”
- 52.
Scheler ’s Von Ewigen in Menschen has yet to appear in French translation.
- 53.
Otto ’s famous work on the Holy appeared in 1917, but a French translation was not published until after the Second World War (Otto 1949).
- 54.
- 55.
Cf. Rabeau (1938b, 121).
- 56.
De Petter cites Rabeau (1938b, 7, 20, 41, 208).
- 57.
- 58.
Hayen (1950, 4–5) reproduces excerpts of a memoir from 1900 in which Maréchal explains the significance of biology with respect to experimental psychology as well as the significance of the latter for philosophy and apologetics.
- 59.
- 60.
See also Milet (1950a).
- 61.
Available in English as Maréchal (1927b).
- 62.
- 63.
A second edition of Cahier I had already appeared in 1927, but Maréchal revised it again and a third edition was released in 1944. Second editions of Cahiers II and III were meanwhile published in 1942, and third editions of each appeared in 1944. A second edition of Cahier V appeared posthumously in 1949.
- 64.
Upon his retirement from teaching, Maréchal stated that he planned to “rectifier l’idée inexacte qui s’est répandue chez nous et ailleurs au sujet de ce qu’on appelle ‘mon épistemologie’. De celle-ci, on croit trouver dans le Cahier V l’expression authentique et complète. En réalité, je n’ai jamais eu le moyen d’exposer, oralement ou par écrit, ma conception d’ensemble du problème de la connaissance. Le Cahier V pose encore ce problème dans les termes de Kant , qui gardent quelque chose d’artificiel, commandé par les antécédents historiques immédiats. Ma position définitive ne devait apparaître qu’à la fin du Cahier VI, dans lequel une étape nouvelle restait à franchir” (from an unpublished manuscript quoted by Hayen (1952, 13, emphasis in the original)).
- 65.
- 66.
See McCool (1989, 225, 229–230).
- 67.
The next several paragraphs tracing Maréchal ’s intellectual formation are based largely upon Milet (1940–1945).
- 68.
Jules Thirion, S.J. (1852–1918) was a physicist and an active collaborator for the Louvain journal Revue des questions scientifiques. Maréchal began reviewing books for the journal in 1901 and continued to do so every year through his retirement, sometimes as many as a dozen books a year.
- 69.
Hayen (1950, 12–13) reproduces a long excerpt from this document dating to 1935. Maréchal writes: “une longue familiarité avec saint Thomas—par la trempe d’esprit qu’elle confère et le parfait équilibre doctrinal qu’elle assure—est la meilleure introduction à une intelligence vraiment profonde de la philosophie moderne.”
- 70.
Joseph Maréchal , Letter to Blaise Romeyer, November 14, 1924, quoted in Hayen (1950, 8). Bernard Lonergan, who was one of the subsequent generation of neo-Thomists most profoundly marked by Maréchal ’s thought, has remarked, “After spending years reading up to the mind of Aquinas , I came to a two-fold conclusion. On the one hand, that reaching had changed me profoundly. On the other hand, that change was the essential benefit. For not only did it make me capable of grasping what, in the light of my conclusions, the vetera really were, but also it opened challenging vistas on what the nova could be” (Lonergan 1958, 748).
- 71.
Cf. Milet (1940–1945, 233).
- 72.
Milet (1940–1945, 240) cites in particular Maréchal (1912), in which he notes the following theses which Maréchal maintains in common with Bergson : the influence of the psychological past on sensation, the profound diversity of apparently identical phenomena, the radical insufficiency of empirical determinism, and the rejection of a passive associationism founded exclusively on physical causality. All of these themes may be found in Bergson ’s Matter and Memory (1911).
- 73.
Cf. Maréchal (1926a, 27n1): “Le point d’arrivée, dans l’évolution ‘dynamiste’ de la Critique moderne, se trouve être correspondant au point de départ de la Critique moderne d’Aristote : d’un côté l’intuition immanente du mouvement, de l’autre la donnée physique de la κινησιs (M. Bergson nous paraît s’exagérer un peu le caractère statique de ce concept chez Aristote). De part et d’autre, bien que par des voies diverses, ce que l’on postule au début, c’est la saisie pénétrante d’un ‘devenir’, soit subjectif soit objectif, et non d’une pure succession de phénomènes, la saisie donc de l’acte maîtrisant la puissance, c’est-à-dire de quelque chose d’absolu qui peut servir de thème initial à une métaphysique”; quoted by Milet (1940–1945, 239n42, emphasis Maréchal ’s).
- 74.
Milet (1940–1945, 241n48) cites a book review by Maréchal (1923a, 565) in which Maréchal calls Blondel ’s philosophy “une des oeuvres les plus vigoureuses et les plus hautement représentatives de la philosophie contemporaine.” Otherwise, direct citations in the Cahiers, for example, are infrequent and often refer to minor points of Blondel ’s argument (see, for instance, how Maréchal makes use of Blondel ’s refutation of skepticism in Maréchal (1922, 35–36)). On the other hand, Maréchal develops some of his key propositions in dialogue with Blondel even though he does not mention the latter by name (see, for example, Maréchal ’s account of the voluntarist stage of the critical proof of realism in Maréchal (1926a, 403–406)).
- 75.
See Maréchal (1957). According to Hayen (1950, 7), the manuscript on Blondel was to have constituted part of the third section of the third book of the third Cahier, whose theme would have been points of contact between scholasticism and post-Kantian philosophy. In the final plan for Le point de départ de la métaphysique, this topic would have been treated in the projected Cahier VI, which was never published.
- 76.
- 77.
Maréchal (1930). In his introduction to “Un texte inédit du P. Maréchal ,” Hayen remarks: “il est frappant de voir comment le mouvement premier de la pensée maréchalienne saisit la pensée de Maurice Blondel avec une étonnante pénétration et trouve d’emblée une expression plus sûre et plus fidèle, nous semble-t-il, que l’étude de 1930, marquée par l’influence paralysante des suspicions, des polémiques et des incompréhensions” (Maréchal 1957, 7).
- 78.
Cf. Milet (1940–1945, 251–252).
- 79.
See Maréchal (1908–1909, 1:121n1); Maréchal (1927c, 101n81): “…We consider it superfluous to heap up references here, all the more as the dynamic nature of the intellection in the Thomist philosophy has been brilliantly brought to light in a recent book, to which we cannot do better than to refer our readers.”
- 80.
Cf. Milet (1940–1945, 248).
- 81.
- 82.
- 83.
- 84.
- 85.
- 86.
- 87.
- 88.
- 89.
- 90.
Maréchal (1908–1909, 1:165); Maréchal (1927c, 134, emphasis Maréchal ’s). It interesting to note that 4 years later in “Science empirique et psychologie religieuse,” Maréchal (1912, 7) recasts this same idea in similar wording: “nous reconnaîtrons volontiers la démarche propre de l’esprit humain, l’expression de sa nature intime, effectrice et affirmatrice d’unité, parce que foncièrement orientée vers l’unité de l’Être, son inaccessible objet et sa fin toujours fuyante.” In the later article, however, Maréchal includes a footnote referring the reader to Book III of Summa contra Gentiles and Rousselot ’s thesis on Aquinas ’s intellectualism.
- 91.
Cf. Husserl (1931, “The Principle of All Principles,” §24; 92).
- 92.
See especially the second of Husserl’s logical investigations, in which he critiques modern theories of abstraction (i.e., Locke and Hume ); Husserl (1970, 1:337–432).
- 93.
For a brief discussion the documents cited in this paragraph and the evolution of Le point de départ de la métaphysique, see Dirven (1965, 19–21).
- 94.
See Maréchal (1950b).
- 95.
See Maréchal (1950c, 288–298).
- 96.
- 97.
These two parts comprise respectively Books II and III of Cahier V. Book I briefly sets out the distinction between metaphysical and transcendental critiques.
- 98.
- 99.
- 100.
- 101.
- 102.
- 103.
- 104.
- 105.
- 106.
- 107.
- 108.
- 109.
- 110.
- 111.
Maréchal (1930, 382); Maréchal (1950d, 185). Maréchal refers here to Husserl’s “principles of all principles,” which he translates as follows: “Tout donné immédiat et primitif d’intuition fonde (proportionnellement) une valeur de connaissance; tout ce qui se présente directement, en son originalité vive (‘corporellement’: leibhaft), au sein d’une intuition, doit être accepté comme il se donne, ni plus ni moins.” Cf. Husserl (1931, §24; 92).
- 112.
- 113.
- 114.
- 115.
- 116.
- 117.
- 118.
Maréchal (1930, 387); Maréchal (1950d, 191). Cf. Husserl (1931, §46; 143–146, “Indubitability of Immanent, Dubitability of Transcendent Perception”), where Husserl asserts: “The thesis of my pure Ego and its personal life, which is ‘necessary’ and plainly indubitable, thus stands opposed to the thesis of the world which is ‘contingent’” (§46; 145, emphasis Husserl’s).
- 119.
- 120.
- 121.
- 122.
- 123.
- 124.
- 125.
- 126.
- 127.
- 128.
- 129.
- 130.
Maréchal (1930, 399); Maréchal (1950d, 206). In a footnote at the end of the essay, Maréchal mentions that he learned about Husserl’s Formal and Transcendental Logic too late to incorporate it into his proposal. Nevertheless, he thinks that its incorporation would not essentially alter it. Perhaps it would even allow him to state it with greater clarity and precision since Formal and Transcendental Logic ties the problem of knowledge more explicitly to the framework of transcendental philosophy. The question of metaphysics is meanwhile tied more explicitly to the problem of the absolute ego , the constituting subject. Still, Maréchal notes, despite this decided step toward ontology, Husserl links the notion of the absolute ego more closely to metaphysics, but he continues to refrain from concluding to its objective necessity because he persists in thinking that lived judgment raises a pretention to truth but does not touch its essence. Maréchal finds such reserve unfounded and refers the reader to his fifth Cahier, where he has treated this problem with respect to other post-Kantian critical philosophers.
- 131.
Maréchal intended the manuscript on Blondel discussed above for publication in Le point de départ de la métaphysique.
- 132.
- 133.
See, for example, Société thomiste (1932, 82).
- 134.
- 135.
- 136.
- 137.
Maurice Blondel , Letter to Joseph Maréchal , August 18, 1930, in Maréchal (1950d, 338).
- 138.
Joseph Maréchal , Letter to Maurice Blondel , August 28, 1930, in Maréchal (1950d, 341–343).
- 139.
Maurice Blondel , Letter to Joseph Maréchal , May 13, 1931, in Maréchal (1950d, 349–350). Cf. Maurice Blondel , Letter to Joseph Maréchal , October 18, 1932, in Maréchal (1950d, 352), in which Blondel says of his own method: “…cette méthode concrète, réaliste, positive, permet de graduer, de concentrer les phases successives de l’enquête, d’abord en établissant qu’en fait, nul esprit crée ne saurait ni se passer d’une tendance congénitale à chercher, à désirer, à poursuivre Dieu, ni capter naturellement ce terme absolument transcendant à toute intelligence, à toute volonté, à toute fruition de la créature. En second lieu, si à cet état congénital et métaphysiquement nécessaire s’ajoute en fait une vocation gratuite, mais positive et impérative de Dieu, cette stimulation, sans se confondre avec le desiderium naturale, l’actionne d’une façon infiniment plus déterminante, crée en nous des obligations et prépare l’adhésion à l’ordre révélé qui devient ainsi la solution de problèmes où la philosophie métaphysique, morale et religieuse est tout entière engagée in concreto.”
- 140.
Boehm credits Christian Hermann with this observation.
- 141.
For more details on the philosophical thought of Edith Stein , see Guilead (1974). Guilead divides Stein ’s life into three periods: phenomenology, Christian philosophy, and mysticism.
- 142.
See Bulletin thomiste 1, no. 1 (1924): 1.
- 143.
See Bulletin thomiste 3, no. 3–4 (May–Jul., 1930): 70.
- 144.
See Bulletin thomiste 3, no. 3–4 (Jul.–Dec, 1932): 125.
- 145.
See Bulletin thomiste 3, no. 1 (Jan.–Mar., 1932): 372: “On reprend ensuite le projet, débattu déjà lors de la dernière Assemblée générale de réunions d’études. Une discussion animée le conduit à des précisions nouvelles intéressant et le sujet et la date de ces entretiens.” Cf. Bulletin thomiste 3, no. 4 (Oct., 1931): 316. Also at this general assembly the presidency passed from Mandonnet to Chenu while Maritain was reelected to another term as vice-president. Others present at the assembly who attended the 1932 Journée d’études included Henri-Marie Féret, Thomas Deman, and Albert Blanche.
- 146.
Bulletin thomiste 3, no. 3–4 (Jul.–Dec., 1932): 125.
- 147.
See Bulletin thomiste 3, no. 2 (Apr.–Jun., 1933): 822.
- 148.
See Guilead (1974).
- 149.
See Bulletin thomiste 3, no. 3–4 (Jul.–Dec., 1932): 560.
- 150.
See Société thomiste (1932, 11).
- 151.
- 152.
Stein and her colleagues from Germany offered their remarks in German. These appear in the published proceedings of the colloquy together with a French translation.
- 153.
See Fink (1930).
- 154.
For a discussion of Söhngen’s philosophy and critical evaluation of its relationship to phenomenology, see Van Riet (1946). At the beginning of his brief study, Van Riet remarks: “L’auteur prétend se servir de la méthode ‘phénoménologique’, mais, chez lui, cette méthode n’a vraiment rien d’originel: elle consiste simplement à examiner les problèmes avant les solutions qu’on y apporte et à considérer, avant les problèmes, les phénomènes de la connaissance tels qu’ils se présentent à nous” (572–573). Later, however, he affirms that although there is nothing distinctive in his methodology, the influence of phenomenology may be discerned “dans la signification particulière que revêtent certaines notions fondamentales: d’après l’auteur, l’existence est un donné opaque pour l’intellection, l’essence réelle est visée par l’intelligence sans être immédiatement vue ou saisie, l’intentionnel définit l’ordre de la connaissance.”
- 155.
Evidently, Kremer thought it more appropriate to refer to phenomenology as a school rather than as a movement on account of its diversity. Kremer repeats the expression “école phénoménologique” on p. 65.
- 156.
Cf. Husserl (1960, §2; 4–5): “When, with the beginning of modern times, religious belief was becoming more and more externalized as a lifeless convention, men of intellect were lifted by a new belief, their great belief in an autonomous philosophy and science. The whole of human culture was to be guided and illuminated by scientific insights and thus reformed, as new and autonomous.”
- 157.
Kremer excludes discussion of Heidegger from his presentation, but one senses here that he would have been persuaded by the latter’s argument that phenomenology must lead to ontology.
- 158.
The following statement makes this plain enough: “Lorsqu’il [i.e., St. Thomas] affirme que les essences physiques sont l’objet propre de l’intelligence humaine, il veut simplement dire que c’est vers les choses sensibles qu’elle est orientée et qu’elle les saisit suivant son mode propre, l’abstraction. D’où il suit qu’elle ne s’arrête pas à la réception passive d’impressions, de qualités sensibles; mais très souvent, le plus souvent même, la connaissance que nous avons des choses de la nature revient à dire qu’elles sont des êtres—c’est la quiddité—affectée de certaines déterminations accidentelles dont la constance est plus ou moins grande” (Société thomiste 1932, 68–69).
- 159.
Following Kremer ’s presentation and immediately preceding the afternoon discussion, letters from two invitees who were unable to attend at the last moment were read to the assembly. Because their remarks did not directly concern the relation of Thomism and phenomenology, they will be passed over here.
- 160.
In several cases these comments were edited into a fuller form by the participants for the published precedings.
- 161.
For a discussion of Forest’s analysis of the opposition between French idealism and Thomist realism, see Van Riet (1946).
- 162.
Here Forest cites Maréchal (1930, 393), who refers to Husserl’s epistemology as an “intuition statique, lumière froide que n’anime aucun dynamisme.”
- 163.
Stein thus responded negatively to the question she left open at the end of her note in the Bulletin thomiste of April, 1932, namely: “Considering things from the point of view of the philosophia perennis, one must ask whether it is possible to enter into the problems of phenomenological constitution without accepting in the process what has been called the transcendental idealism of phenomenology” (Stein 1932, 124).
- 164.
Bulletin thomiste 3, no. 3–4 (Jul.–Dec., 1932): 561–562.
- 165.
The following aspects of Forest’s intervention in the afternoon discussion period suggest that he was influenced by Gurvitch ’s introduction to the phenomenological movement: (1) his emphasis on the divergent tendencies within the movement, (2) his contrasting of the irrationalism of Heidegger with idealism of the later Husserl, (3) his criticism of Husserl’s penchant for analysis and his praise of the synthetic orientation of Thomist thought, and (4) his insistence that phenomenology must go beyond the transcendental epoché to grapple with the problem of the existence of the other.
- 166.
- 167.
Société thomiste (1932, 43). Since Husserl never proposed such a theory in any of his published or unpublished works, Feuling ’s remarks must have stemmed either from his own interpretation of Husserl or from his contact with Fink .
- 168.
- 169.
See Bulletin thomiste. Tables des tomes IV à VII (Années 1934–1946) (Paris: Le Saulchoir, 1946): 79.
- 170.
Except for some corrections and the addition of a few notes, the second edition, which appeared in 1934, is identical to the first, published in 1932. The most satisfactory English translation was prepared under the direction of Gerald B. Phelan from the fourth corrected edition. It was originally published by Charles Scribner’s Sons in 1959 and later reissued by the University of Notre Dame Press in 1995. All quotations of this work are drawn from this translation with page number references to the second French edition followed by a citation of Phelan’s translation from the Scribner’s edition.
- 171.
Maritain (1934a, 71–78); Maritian (1959, 35–38). In the first degree, the mind considers the object in its sensible reality with all of its empirically ascertainable knowledge abstracted from sensible being, the qualities of the object as it is perceived—what the ancients called physics. The second degree, corresponding to the science of mathematics, consists in the abstraction of the form of the object purified of sensible matter. In the third degree, the object is abstracted from all matter and is examined from the perspective of being. This last degree of abstraction defines the domain of metaphysics.
- 172.
Cf. Maritain (1934a, 166n1); Maritain (1959, 85n3). Explaining Husserl’s interpretation of intentionality, Gurvitch (1930, 47) writes in Les tendances actuelles de la philosophie allemande “In no way is consciousness a container: it is neither a circle nor a case, and it cannot have either an interior or an exterior. The intentional content is neither inside nor outside of consciousness” (emphasis Gurvitch ’s). Maritain agrees, and argues precisely for this reason that the object can exist both inside the mind and outside of it. Husserl, meanwhile, insists exclusively upon the immanence of objects to consciousness, rejecting the real existence of objects outside the mind, according to Maritain . Maritain derives his interpretation of Husserl on this point not only from Gurvitch but also from the Cartesian Meditations , which he cites elsewhere (see, for example, Maritain (1934a, 153n3); Maritain (1959, 79n5)).
- 173.
- 174.
- 175.
- 176.
- 177.
- 178.
- 179.
- 180.
Maritain (1934a, 152); Maritain (1959, 79). Cf. Maritain (1934a, 160n1); Maritain (1959, 82n2), where, referring to Husserl, Maritain comments: “It is a kind of singularly naïve credulity about the possibilities of philosophy to think that from the very outset it should be constituted by a ‘radical’ awareness of self, and built up step by step on the ‘fundamental basis of a full, entire and universal awareness of self.’ [cf. Husserl (1947, 131, 134)] The human mind will never achieve an awareness of self. For such a self-awareness presupposes a self above all else, and that holds for all degrees of knowing…If philosophy is to help the human mind gain a more and more profound awareness of self in any very effective way, it is on the condition that philosophy itself is first founded, and then built up step by step.”
- 181.
Maritain (1934a, 137–264); Maritain (1959, 71–135). See also the preface to the second edition of Maritain (1930, 57), available in English as Maritain (1955, 43): “Intellectualism, anti-intellectualism,—to be absolutely exact one should use these words only to designate two opposing errors. It is improperly and through reaction against the contemporary anti-intellectualist current that the thought of Saint Thomas has sometimes been called intellectualist…others in so designating it tended to displace its centre of gravity and in a way to transfer it into conditions of intellect in the pure state. The best way of designating it, in reality, would be rather as critical realism.”
- 182.
- 183.
- 184.
- 185.
It is instructive to note Maritain ’s critiques of Bergson and Blondel , for they are in some respects similar to his critique of phenomenology. In his collection of early polemical essays titled La philosophie bergsonienne, Maritain (1914) criticizes Bergson ’s concepts of intuition, evolution, and the intellect. Bergson , he charges, has abandoned intellect and being, replacing the first with an extra-intellectual intuition and the second with movement (cf. Maritain (1930, 64ff.)). Although he recognizes the need to affirm an intuitive faculty, he denies a priori that it could be found in the intellect and so ends up positing a distinct faculty, which he then opposes to the intellect. He is wrong, moreover, to assume that the intellect reduces movement to a series of successive states of rest. The intellect can know movement as such without ever having to observe objects from discrete vantage points because it can place itself within movement and grasp it intuitively (cf. Maritain (1934b, 54)). If Bergson ’s philosophy suffers from anti-intellectualism, then Blondel ’s is tainted by a kind of hyper-intellectualism. According to Maritain ’s critique of Blondel ’s epistemological treatise “Le procès de l’intelligence,” Blondel deserves praise for rejecting the anti-intellectualism of Bergson and Le Roy , but unfortunately he conflates practical reason with action. Maritain explains, “We do not reproach Blondel with neglecting intelligence to the exclusive benefit of action—such was never his intention—but rather for declaring that if intelligence excludes action and the will from its operation . . . if it does not attain things by a non-intellectual mode, it remains essentially insufficient with respect to its proper object” (Maritain 1932, 93–94). On the other hand, in trying to exalt speculative intelligence, Blondel goes too far and lifts it completely out of the human world where it belongs. He is not to be blamed for admitting that a consciousness superior to ratiocination exists but for declaring that it is indispensable to the ordinary functions of the intellect. Knowledge by inclination or connaturality, as Blondel (and one might add, Rousselot ) understands it, is not required for the natural activity of intelligence. Blondel is right to insist on the essential need of intelligence to grasp the real, but he misinterprets the realism intelligence requires. He defines it in terms of possession and appetite, when in fact the reality sought by the intellect is immaterial.
- 186.
- 187.
- 188.
Maritain (1934a, 199); Maritain (1959, 103). In a footnote, Maritain points out that both the phenomenologists and their critics honor Brentano with the discovery of intentionality when in fact it was the scholastics who discovered it. He also notes that certain aspects of phenomenology are derived from Scotus , particularly his theory of ideas and esse objectivum.
- 189.
- 190.
- 191.
Cf. Husserl (1931, §90; 262). Maritain ’s charge that Husserl has a materialistic concept of intentionality and that his philosophy follows other idealisms in their attempts to affirm the existence of extramental objects seems unfounded on the basis of statements such as the following: “‘In’ the reduced perception (in the phenomenologically pure experience) we find, as belonging to its essence indissolubly, the perceived as such, and under such titles as ‘material thing,’ ‘plant,’ ‘tree,’ and so forth. The inverted commas are clearly significant; they express that change of signature, the corresponding radical modification of the meaning of the words. The tree plain and simple, the thing in nature, is as different as can be from this perceived tree as such, which as perceptual meaning belongs to the perception, and that inseparably. The tree plain and simple can burn away, resolve itself into its chemical elements, and so forth. But the meaning—the meaning of this perception, something that belongs necessarily to its essence—cannot burn away; it has no chemical elements, no forces, no real properties” (Husserl 1931, §89; 260–261, emphasis Husserl’s).
- 192.
- 193.
- 194.
- 195.
- 196.
- 197.
- 198.
- 199.
In his opening remarks at the Journée d’études, Maritain had called for a “reciprocal understanding” between Thomism and phenomenology; see Société thomiste (1932, 12).
- 200.
“Quand M. Blondel écrivait: ‘j’agis’, il comprenait la pensée dans l’action; quand saint Thomas écrivait: ‘j’intellige’, il enfermait dans l’intellection à la fois le commencement et couronnement de l’action.” See also Blondel ’s entry on action in the supplement volume to the second edition (1928) of Lalande’s Vocabulaire: “Je n’admets pas le mot action désigne quelque chose d’extérieur, de définitivement réfractaire, d’essentiellement impénétrable à l’intelligence; j’admets que l’intelligence est intérieure à l’action, qu’elle cherche peu à peu à l’égaler, à l’expliciter, et qu’elle doit finir par l’orienter et la gouverner. Retournant donc la thèse intellectualiste, quant à la méthode sinon quant aux conclusions ultimes, je soutiens (contre M. Lapie par exemple) que le problème logique n’est qu’un aspect du problème de l’action” (Lalande 1928, 3, emphasis Blondel ’s).
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Dupont, C. (2014). Receptions of Husserlian Phenomenology in French Religious Thought, 1926–1939. In: Phenomenology in French Philosophy: Early Encounters. Phaenomenologica, vol 208. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4641-1_5
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