Abstract
Bayesianism is the opinion that probabilities are a matter of opinion. This is because they would only measure the strength of our beliefs (De Finetti 1972; Jeffreys 1975; Keynes 1957; Savage 1954). That view is generally known as Bayesianism because of its heavy reliance on a certain interpretation of Bayes’ theorem, a piece of pure mathematics that actually refers neither to the knowing subject nor to the real world.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
Bunge, Mario. 1951. What is chance? Science & Society 15: 209–231.
Bunge, Mario. 1955. Strife about complementarity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 6: 1–12: 6: 141–154.
Bunge, Mario. 1976. Possibility and probability. In Foundations of probability theory, statistical inference, and statistical theories of science, vol. 3, ed. W.L. Harper and C.A. Hooker, 17–34. Boston: D. Reidel.
Bunge, Mario. 1979 [1950]. Causality: The place of the causal principle in modern science. New York: Dover.
Bunge, Mario. 1981. Four concepts of probability. Applied Mathematical Modelling 5: 306–312.
Bunge, Mario. 1988. Two faces and three masks of probability. In Probability in the sciences, ed. E. Agazzi, 27–50. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Bunge, Mario. 2003. Emergence and convergence: qualitative novelty and the unity of science. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Bunge, Mario. 2006. Chasing reality: Strife over realism. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Bunge, Mario. 2008. Bayesianism: Science or pseudoscience? International Review of Victimology 15: 169–182.
Bunge, Mario. 2009. Political philosophy. New Brunswick: Transaction.
Bunge, Mario. 2010. Matter and mind, Boston studies in the philosophy of science, vol. 287. Dordrecht/Heidelberg/London/New York: Springer.
Carnap, Rudolf. 1950. Logical foundations of probability. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
De Finetti, Bruno. 1962. Does it make sense to speak of ‘good probability appraisers’? In The scientist speculates: an anthology of partly-baked ideas, ed. I.J. Good. London: Heinemann.
De Finetti, Bruno. 1972. Probability, induction, and statistics. New York: Wiley.
Eddy, Charles. 1982. Probabilistic reasoning in clinical medicine: Problems and opportunities. In Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases, ed. D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, and A. Tversky, 249–267. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Feller, William. 1968. An introduction to probability theory and its applications, vol. 1, 3rd ed. New York: Wiley.
Fréchet, Maurice. 1955 [1946]. Les definitions courantes de la probabilité. In Les mathématiques et le concret, pp. 157–204. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Hawkins, J. David (ed.). 1996. Delinquency and crime: Current theories. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Humphreys, Paul. 1985. Why propensities cannot be probabilities. Philosophical Review 94: 557–570.
Jeffreys, Harold. 1975 [1939]. Scientific inference, 3d ed. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Kahneman, Daniel, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky (eds.). 1982. Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristic and biases. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Keynes, John Maynard. 1957 [1921]. A treatise on probability. London: Macmillan.
Lahey, Benjamin B., Terrie E. Moffitt, and Avshalom Caspi (eds.). 2003. Causes of conduct disorder and juvenile delinquency, 118–148. New York: The Guilford Press.
Lindley, Dennis V. 1976. Bayesian statistics. In Foundations of probability theory, statistical inference, and statistical theories of science, vol. 2, ed. W.L. Harper and C.A. Hooker, 353–362. Dordrecht/Boston: D. Reidel.
Maguire, Mike, Rod Morgan, and Robert Reiner (eds.). 1994. The oxford handbook of criminology. Oxford: Clarendon.
Press, S. James. 1989. Bayesian statistics: Principles, models, and applications. New York: Wiley.
Robinson, Matthew B. 2004. Why crime? An integrated systems theory of antisocial behavior. Upper Saddle River: Pearson/Prentice Hall.
Savage, L. James. 1954. The foundations of statistics. New York: Wiley.
Venn, John. 1962 [1866]. The logic of chance. London: Chelsea Publications Co.
Wikström, Per-Olov, and Robert J. Sampson (eds.). 2006. Crime and Its explanation: Contexts, mechanisms and development. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2012 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Bunge, M. (2012). Subjective Probabilities: Admissible in Science?. In: Evaluating Philosophies. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, vol 295. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4408-0_11
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4408-0_11
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-007-4407-3
Online ISBN: 978-94-007-4408-0
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)