Abstract
The mechanical (or corpuscular philosophy) has been well-established as a historiographical category for some years now. While it certainly began as an actor’s category, it has slipped into being something else, a kind of broad catch-all category that is taken to include most of those who opposed the Aristotelian philosophy of the schools throughout the entire seventeenth century, part of a broad master narrative about the demise of the scholastic Aristotelian philosophy of the schools and the rise of modern mathematical and experimental science, the titanic intellectual clash that gave birth to modernity.
I am deeply indebted to the many audiences on whom I tried out various versions of these ideas, some more than once, but especially to Sophie Roux, and to Dana Jalobeanu, Vlad Alexandrescu, and the participants of various versions of the Bucharest-Princeton Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy, our annual Transylvanian seminar.
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Notes
- 1.
The two names “mechanical philosophy” and “corpuscular philosophy” are interchangeable, according to Boyle, who introduced the terms, as I shall later show. Among contemporaries, the two names are also virtually synonymous. The Oxford English Dictionary (q.v. mechanical) cites John Harris’s Lexicon Technicum (1704) on this question: “Mechanical Philosophy, is the same with the Corpuscular, which endeavours to explicate the Phenomena of Nature from Mechanical Principles.” Robert Boyle seems to identify the two in his Of the excellency and grounds of the corpuscular or mechanical philosophy (1674). Calling it “corpuscular” emphasizes that the manifest properties of bodies are to be explained in terms of their smaller parts, and calling it “mechanical” emphasizes that the principles used in explanation are broadly mechanical. However, I will give precedence to the mechanical aspect rather than the corpuscular. In the figures who have been emphasized in the literature, corpuscles enter into explanations largely as a way of working out mechanical explanations. There are other traditions of corpuscularianism, though, in which corpuscles have inherent alchemical and non-mechanical properties. On this tradition, see especially Newman, Atoms and Alchemy, who focuses there on Daniel Sennert. In this essay, I shall not be dealing with such views.
- 2.
Dijksterhuis, Mechanization of the World Picture, p. 3.
- 3.
- 4.
“Of all the mechanical constructions whose characteristics might serve as a model for the natural world, it was the clock more than any other that appealed to many early modern natural philosophers. Indeed, to follow the clock metaphor for nature through the culture of early modern Europe is to trace the main contours of the mechanical philosophy, and therefore of much of what has been traditionally construed as central to the Scientific Revolution” (Shapin, Scientific Revolution, p. 32). See also Dear, Revolutionizing the Sciences, chap. 5, and Intelligibility of Nature, chap. 1.
- 5.
For an excellent account of the history of the mechanical philosophy, see Sophie Roux, La philosophie mécanique. My own thought on this question has been much influenced by Roux’s work.
- 6.
See More, The Immortality of the Soul, Preface, [b6r], [b8r], et passim. See Gabbey, “Philosophia Cartesiana Triumphata,” p. 221 and “What was ‘Mechanical’ about ‘The Mechanical Philosophy’?” p. 14. Gabbey also notes an earlier passage in Descartes, which might mistakenly be interpreted as attributing the use of the term ‘mechanical philosophy’ to Descartes.
- 7.
This is a point that Ursula Goldenbaum has repeatedly emphasized to me in conversation. See Hunter and Davis’s remarks on the impact of the Origin of Forms and Qualities, Boyle’s manifesto for the mechanical philosophy, in their introduction to the text, in Boyle, Works, vol. V, pp. xxx–xxxi. In the literature, it is Locke who is usually cited as having been influenced by Boyle’s conception of the mechanical philosophy. See, e.g., Mandelbaum, Philosophy, Science and Sense Perception, chaps. 1 and 2; Alexander, Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles; and Sargent, The Diffident Naturalist, pp. 103–108. Occasionally Leibniz as well, though it is difficult to relate Leibniz directly to Boyle on the question of the mechanical philosophy. See Clericuzio, Elements, Principles and Corpuscles, pp. 104f. Roux, La philosophie mécanique, chap. 5 shows how Leibniz adopted at least Boyle’s language in talking about the mechanical and corpuscular philosophy. But outside of that, I know of no study that traces Boyle’s influence on later conceptions of the mechanical philosophy.
- 8.
See Boyle, Works, vol. II, pp. 87f. On the origin and early uses of the term, see Roux, La philosophie mécanique, pp. 19–26. She cites Boyle as having coined the term.
- 9.
The text can be found in Boyle, Works, vol. V, pp. 281–491.
- 10.
Boyle, Works, vol. V, p. 302.
- 11.
Ibid., pp. 305–307.
- 12.
Ibid., pp. 309–315.
- 13.
Ibid., p. 292.
- 14.
Boyle, New Experiments Physico-Mechanical, Touching the Spring of the Air and its Effects, Works, vol. I, pp. 197f.
- 15.
Boyle, Works, vol. II, p. 87. Cf. the Advertisements to the History of Fluidity and Firmness, Works, vol. II, p. 117.
- 16.
On this, see Newman, Atoms and Alchemy, pp. 79–81. Newman is here addressing arguments by Clericuzio and Chalmers that there is a divide between the theoretical writings, which support the mechanical philosophy, and his chemical practice, which does not. On this see Clericuzio, “A Redefinition of Boyle’s Chemistry and Corpuscular Philosophy,” and Elements, Principles and Corpuscles, pp. 103–148; and Chalmers, “The Lack of Excellency of Boyle’s Mechanical Philosophy.”
- 17.
Boyle, Works, vol. II, p. 87.
- 18.
Boyle, Works, vol. I, pp. 197f. On Boyle and the question of the divisibility of matter, see Anstey, The Philosophy of Robert Boyle, pp. 43f. On the question of the existence of a true vacuum, see Shapin and Shaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump, pp. 45f.
- 19.
On early-modern mechanics and its relations with physics and the mechanical philosophy, see, e.g., Garber, “Descartes, Mechanics, and the Mechanical Philosophy”; Gabbey, “Between ars and philosophia naturalis”; Laird, “The Scope of Renaissance Mechanics.” This question is one of the central themes of Laird and Roux, Mechanics and Natural Philosophy.
- 20.
See Boyle, Works, vol. V, p. 295. Lucretius, Bacon, Gassendi, and “Des Cartes” need no explanation, of course. The van Helmont in question is the alchemist and physician Johann Baptista van Helmont, the elder van Helmont. Sebastian Basso (or Basson) is the author of Philosophiae naturalis adversus Aristotelem libri XII (1621). “The two Boots” are Arnold and Gerard Boate, who jointly authored Philosophia naturalis reformata, id est, Philosophae aristotelicae accurate examination ac solida confutatio et novae ac verioris introductio (1641). Johann Chrysostom Magnenus was the author of Democritus reviviscens: Sive de vita et philosophia Democriti (1646b). William Pemble is the author of De formarum origine … tractatus (1629).
- 21.
Westfall, The Construction of Modern Science, pp. 30f. It is interesting here that Westfall includes Hobbes, who is definitely not on Boyle’s list. Sophie Roux has suggested to me that Boyle excluded Hobbes, because he saw the objective of the mechanical philosophy as a defense of the Christian religion, and saw Hobbes as radically heterodox, if not atheist. This is certainly consistent with the general view of Hobbes by his contemporaries. Even if the mechanical philosophy was not as closely linked with the defense of Christianity as Roux suggests, many of his contemporaries actively distanced themselves from Hobbes on account of his suspect religious views. Furthermore, we have to remember that the moment when Boyle is articulating his mechanical philosophy is the exact moment when he is in open conflict with Hobbes over the air-pump experiments. Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that he would not want to endorse publicly Hobbes’s philosophical views. On this see Shapin and Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump (though I have some serious reservations about their treatment of Hobbes). That said, though, it is not inappropriate for Westfall to include him: Hobbes fits the conception of the mechanical philosopher as well as do Descartes and Gassendi.
- 22.
See Boas Hall, “The Establishment of the Mechanical Philosophy,” § IV, “Early Mechanical Philosophies.”
- 23.
In recent years, Bacon’s matter theory in particular has gotten considerable attention. Graham Rees has been especially important in unearthing Bacon’s views on the material world. See especially his introductions and commentaries in vols. VI and XIII of the Oxford Francis Bacon, and “Matter Theory: a Unifying Factor in Bacon’s Natural Philosophy.” See also Manzo, “Francis Bacon and Atomism”; Weeks, “Francis Bacon and the Art-Nature Distinction”; and the essay (Chap. 2) by Guido Giglioni in this volume.
- 24.
Bacon, Novum organum II 20.
- 25.
This, for example, is why Boas Hall puts Bacon among the early mechanists. See “The Establishment of the Mechanical Philosophy,” pp. 440f.
- 26.
Bacon, Novum organum I 66.
- 27.
See the references given above in note 24.
- 28.
This is the subject of Giglioni’s essay (Chap. 2) in this volume.
- 29.
See Aristotle, Mechanica 848b1 f with Galileo, Discorsi, in Opere, vol. VIII, p. 50f., translated in Two New Sciences, p. 12.
- 30.
See Aristotle, Mechanica 855a29 f with Galileo, Discorsi, in Opere, vol. VIII, pp. 68–72, translated in Two New Sciences, pp. 29–33. On the first 2 days of Galileo’s Discorsi as mixed mathematics, see Biener, “Galileo’s First New Science.”
- 31.
Galileo, Il Saggiatore, in Opere, vol. VI, p. 350, translated in Drake, Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo, pp. 276f. On Galileo’s atomism, see Shea, “Galileo’s Atomic Hypothesis”; Smith, “Galileo’s Theory of Indivisibles”; Nonnoi, “Galileo Galilei: quale atomismo?”; and most recently, Galluzzi, Tra atomi e indivisibili.
- 32.
Galileo, Discorsi, in Opere, vol. VIII, pp. 71f., translated in Two New Sciences, p. 33.
- 33.
Galileo, Discorsi, in Opere, vol. VIII, p. 59, translated in Two New Sciences, p. 19.
- 34.
Galilei, Opere, vol. V, pp. 187f., translated in On Sunspots, p. 254.
- 35.
I have in mind here the title of Lenoble’s seminal, and still useful book, Mersenne ou la naissance du mécanisme.
- 36.
For the details concerning Mersenne’s relations with Galileo, see Garber, “On the Frontlines of the Scientific Revolution.”
- 37.
Mersenne, Questions Inouyes, p. 224.
- 38.
Ibid., p. 54.
- 39.
Ibid. See pp. 51–54, 357.
- 40.
Ibid., p. 78.
- 41.
“Il verra la plus noble academie du monde qui se fait depuis peu en ceste ville, dont il sera sans doute, car elle est toute mathematique” (Mersenne, Correspondance, vol. V, p. 209).
- 42.
Principia IV 188.
- 43.
Principia IV 203.
- 44.
Descartes to?, March 1642, in Œuvres, vol. V, p. 546.
- 45.
For Gassendi’s Epicurean project, see Rochot, Les travaux de Gassendi, and Joy, Gassendi the Atomist.
- 46.
Gassendi, Opera, vol. I, pp. 266f.; see p. 366.
- 47.
Ibid., p. 273.
- 48.
Hobbes, De corpore, 8.1. Translations are taken from the 1656 English translation.
- 49.
Ibid., 8.10.
- 50.
Ibid., 9.7.
- 51.
Ibid., 9.9.
- 52.
Ibid., 15.3.
- 53.
Ibid., 8.19, 15.2, 15.8.
- 54.
Descartes, Œuvres, vol. VII, pp. 265, 275, 321, etc.
- 55.
Ibid., pp. 352, 354, 357, etc.
- 56.
Principia IV 202.
- 57.
Principia II 20.
- 58.
Principia II 16–17.
- 59.
Principia II 18.
- 60.
Gassendi, Works, vol. III, pp. 384b, 305b; see LoLordo, Pierre Gassendi and the Birth of Early Modern Philosophy, p. 52. An anonymous referee of this chapter pointed out that Gassendi’s account of body also recognizes material souls and semina. While these are ultimately made up of atoms, they do seem to have some emergent properties that look resistant to a simple reduction to size, shape and motion. See LoLordo, Pierre Gassendi, chap. 8 .
- 61.
The vacuum is discussed in Gassendi, Works, vol. I, pp. 179ff. The vase argument is discussed in I 184a.
- 62.
See Garber, Descartes’ Metaphysical Physics, pp. 136–143 and the references cited there.
- 63.
Leviathan, chap. 34.2.
- 64.
Leviathan, chap. 46.18.
- 65.
See, e.g., Descartes to Mersenne, 5 Oct. 1646, in Descartes, Œuvres, vol. IV, pp. 510f.
- 66.
In the physics, there is also an interesting exchange on creation. Descartes’ physics proper begins with the creation of the world. On Descartes’ account in the Principia, “hypothetical” because inconsistent with Genesis, God creates the world with particles of roughly equal size, all in motion; see Principia III.46. In De corpore 26.1, Hobbes sets aside the question of the initial state of the universe: “The questions therefore about the Magnitude and Beginning of the World, are not to be determined by Philosophers, but by those that are lawfully authorized to order the Worship of God.” Which is to say, the question of the state of the world at creation is a theological question that lies outside of philosophy. Hobbes and Descartes also clashed on questions in optics after the publication of Descartes’ Dioptrics. On this see Sabra, Theories of Light from Descartes to Newton, chap. 3.
- 67.
Mersenne, Quaestiones in Genesim, col. 1838.
- 68.
Mersenne, La vérité des sciences, p. 109.
- 69.
Descartes, Œuvres, vol. I, p. 158.
- 70.
See [Espagnier, J. d’], La philosophie naturelle restablie en sa pureté …, the (unpaginated) preliminary “Discours a la recommendation de la Philosophie ancienne restablie en sa pureté; Et sur le nom de son premier Author.” (When the work was originally published in Latin in 1623, it was anonymous. In this brief introduction, the translator reveals the name of the author and puts him in the company of other novatores.)
- 71.
In her essay in this volume, Sophie Roux calls attention to largely the same lists of novatores, though she makes somewhat different use of them, seeing them as leading later in the century to a distinction between the ancients and the moderns. I will return to her point later in this essay.
- 72.
La vérité des sciences, pp. 109f.
- 73.
Boyle, Works, vol. II, p. 90.
- 74.
See Jacob and Jacob, “The Anglican Origins of Modern Science” and “The Saints Embalmed. Scientists, Latitudinarians, and Society.”
- 75.
See Shapin and Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump, chap. 7.
- 76.
This was published as essay 7 of Glanvill’s Essays on several important subjects.
- 77.
See Spurr, “‘Latitudinarianism’ and the Restoration Church.”
- 78.
See Hunter, “Latitudinarianism and the ‘Ideology’ of the Early Royal Society.”
- 79.
Boyle, Correspondence, vol. I, p. 57.
- 80.
This are the considerations that Machamer seems to suggest for considering Galileo as a mechanist in “Galileo’s Machines, his Mathematics, and his Experiments.” (Machamer and I have been disagreeing about whether or not Galileo counts as a mechanical philosopher for years.) Ursula Goldenbaum has also suggested in conversation that she thinks of Galileo as a mechanical philosopher.
- 81.
Alan Gabbey, though, points out how difficult it is to say what exactly it means to be a mechanist in this broader sense, and what the relation is to mechanics. See Gabbey, “What Was ‘Mechanical’ about ‘The Mechanical Philosophy’?”
- 82.
See her essay in this volume.
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Garber, D. (2013). Remarks on the Pre-history of the Mechanical Philosophy. In: GARBER, D. (eds) The Mechanization of Natural Philosophy. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, vol 282. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4345-8_1
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