Meinongianisms of the First, Second, and Third Kind

  • Francesco Berto
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 356)


It is a shared opinion that Russell’s and Quine’s critiques were a definitive demolition of Meinongianism. It is not clear, though, exactly what Russell and Quine demolished. The Parmenidean philosophers may have wanted to dismiss both (a) the claim that there are nonexistent objects, and (b) the Unrestricted Comprehension Principle, in a single move. But the two should be kept distinct.


Actual World Abstract Object Singular Term Fictional Character Definite Description 
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© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Francesco Berto
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Philosophy and Northern Institute of PhilosophyUniversity of AberdeenAberdeenUK

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