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Naïve Meinongianism

  • Francesco Berto
Chapter
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 356)

Abstract

The previous Chapters may have shown that Meinongianism is worth the further investigation to be pursued from now on. I have to warn, though, that this Chapter is partly a false start. The theory described here can be labeled “naïve Meinongianism” and, as we shall see, it ends up suffering from many a problem (e.g., it is inconsistent). We shall also see, however, that this naïve theory has so promising applications that trying to recover (some of) the insights it is based on is a worthy exercise.

Keywords

Fictional Character Receive View Impossible Object Fictional Object Nonexistent Object 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Francesco Berto
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Philosophy and Northern Institute of PhilosophyUniversity of AberdeenAberdeenUK

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