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Existence As a Real Property

  • Francesco Berto
Chapter
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 356)

Abstract

What does existence consist in, if it is not what the Parmenidean takes it to be? Here comes a non-Parmenidean approach. To begin with, “exists” is a predicate of individuals just like the others – a predicate for real, not only from the point of view of our ordinary language’s surface grammar. It is a predicate in the same sense that “eats”, “flies”, and “is a man” are. The modo materiali, ontological counterpart of the semantic thesis, is that existence is a genuine, non-blanket property of individuals, just as the properties of eating, flying, being a man.

Keywords

Causal Power Fictional Character Existential Quantifier Bare Plural Causal Feature 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Francesco Berto
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Philosophy and Northern Institute of PhilosophyUniversity of AberdeenAberdeenUK

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