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Troubles for the Received View

  • Francesco Berto
Chapter
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 356)

Abstract

As outlined in the Prologue, showing how the conception of existence opposed to Parmenideanism can be good and useful may be more fruitful than just criticizing the received view. However, the received view has its own difficulties, the most notable of which I shall list in this chapter, in no specific order. Some problems will turn out to be more compelling than others. Taken collectively, though, they should have enough weight to move the dialectical situation to the point at which investigating the alternative becomes a promising idea. This will happen in the following parts of the book.

Keywords

Intentional State Definite Description Individual Concept Receive View Individual Essence 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Francesco Berto
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Philosophy and Northern Institute of PhilosophyUniversity of AberdeenAberdeenUK

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