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The Design of Morality

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Book cover Origin(s) of Design in Nature

Part of the book series: Cellular Origin, Life in Extreme Habitats and Astrobiology ((COLE,volume 23))

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Abstract

Morality, like many other complex things in the natural world, can look designed. The moralities that we see humans practicing today are largely designed, designed by humans. Morality did not originate in human design, however; it is not some original invention of ours but a creation of unguided natural evolution. However, by learning how to modify our conduct with our large brains, we now can manipulate what nature created. Morality would not have gradually emerged, grown more sophisticated, and become universally used and redesigned, unless it served some evolutionary purpose for our species. In this functional sense, morality looks designed even though no designer was ever involved. However, ancestors of humans and our species, Homo sapiens, have been gradually modifying moralities using some intelligence but little self-awareness, and more recently, we have been self-consciously and deliberately redesigning our moralities. An account of how humans use and redesign morality should harmonize with an account of how morality gradually came into existence from simpler protomoral modes of conduct. However, this account must not reduce morality to behaviors too simple to be moral nor introduce morality as an abrupt leap above much simpler kinds of behavior. The more complex forms of cooperative social interaction involving non-zero-sum games and indirect reciprocity are the modes of interaction which can supply the continuities required for the gradual biocultural emergence of morality. An analysis of the indirect reciprocity prisoner’s dilemma game, a computer program invented by the author which models large numbers of players utilizing a variety of strategies, suggests how genuinely moral conduct could gradually emerge from the protomoral components of niceness and fairness.

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8. Acknowledgments

Jeffrey Miecznikowski’s helpful expertise in biostatistics at the Roswell Park Cancer Institute is responsible for the current coding for implementing the IRPD game and the graphs displaying its results. This chapter is also deeply indebted to Richard Carrier for his insightful criticisms and suggestions which resulted in many improvements and to Liz Stillwaggon Swan who patiently encouraged every stage of this chapter’s progress from mere notion to fulfillment.

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Correspondence to John R. Shook .

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Shook, J.R. (2012). The Design of Morality. In: Swan, L., Gordon, R., Seckbach, J. (eds) Origin(s) of Design in Nature. Cellular Origin, Life in Extreme Habitats and Astrobiology, vol 23. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4156-0_9

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