Abstract
In Part I, I provided a critical assessment of Habermas’s account of truth, especially his criterion of truth, and announced that I would develop an alternative view. I will try to do this in the present chapter, by employing the notions of the material realization and theoretical description of experiments, which have been introduced in the previous chapter. As we have seen, these notions were inspired by Habermas’s distinction between instrumental action and discursive argumentation.
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Notes
- 1.
It will be understood that the proposed criterion will not involve specific methods for the verification of concrete propositions from the natural sciences (in line with the distinctions made at the beginning of Sect. 2.3).
- 2.
Universal propositions will be evaluated in terms of plausibility, as we will see further on, under point (6).
- 3.
It follows from the criterion that a proposition C that was thus far accepted as verified-true can generally prove to be not verifiably true after all for four different reasons:
-
(a)
The material realization of the experiment is not reproducible.
-
(b)
The required general laws are not plausible.
-
(c)
The logical inference rules have not been correctly applied.
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(d)
C has been inferred from other propositions that, after all, prove to be not verifiably true.
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(a)
- 4.
In fact, in the practice of scientific research cognitive and social aspects are often interwoven. See, e.g., Latour and Woolgar (1979, 23–27).
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
Often, a preference for a particular model is not a purely cognitive matter (see, e.g., Van Lieshout 1982, 61–62). Such cases clearly display the entanglement of cognitive and social aspects, mentioned in note 4.
- 8.
Shapin (1979, 41). In Shapin (1982) he presents an extensive survey of the (mainly English-language) studies in this field. For a general review of this strong program, see Van Lieshout (1982). For a survey of the various theoretical approaches in the sociology of scientific knowledge, see Knorr–Cetina and Mulkay (1983).
- 9.
- 10.
Meanwhile, this test has been carried out with a positive result for quantum mechanics (see Aspect et al. 1982).
- 11.
For a somewhat more extensive exposition of this criticism of the claims of these micro-sociological studies of science, see Kwa et al. (1982), the even pages.
- 12.
Cooke (1978, 320) (emphasis added). Another example is provided by Michael Devitt (1979, 30): “I distinguish sharply between what is the case and how we judge what is the case. This reflects a strong commitment to realism. I take scientific theories to consist, in the main, of true or false descriptions of reality irrespective of our views of the matter.” As if our theories are unrelated to “our views of the matter”.
- 13.
This point may seem debatable. One might object that there is the rest mass that is invariant or that, in later versions of Lorentz’s theory, the mass of the electron was also variable (see McCormmach 1970, especially 47–52). The simplest reply to this objection is to argue that, as far as mass is concerned, the conceptual break proves to be earlier, namely between Wilhelm Weber’s theory and later theories (see Leplin 1979, 271ff.). Alternatively, one could point out the problems raised by identifying the Lorentz mass with either the rest mass or the relativistic mass (see Field 1973, 463–473).
- 14.
Some aspects of this example (points 1–4) will be discussed in more detail in Chap. 5.
- 15.
In the next section, I shall say more about the relation between “domain” and “material realization”.
- 16.
A positive account of the relation between the theoretical languages and the description of the material realization will be given in Sect. 4.4, under point (2).
- 17.
In principle, it is also possible to argue for a difference in degree between theoretical and observational propositions (see Newton–Smith 1980, 94–95). However, if the thesis of underdetermination is used in debates on realism, such a pragmatic solution is insufficient, as is shown by the examples presented in Sect. 5.2.4.
- 18.
- 19.
- 20.
- 21.
See for instance Laudan (1981), a paper that contains much relevant material.
- 22.
My evaluation follows more or less the same lines as Hesse’s (1980, vii–xiv).
- 23.
Apparently, Putnam has realized this himself, considering his recent change to an “internal realism”. See his “Realism and Reason”, in Putnam (1978), 123–140 (for a review, see Doorman 1983). In this chapter, I shall regularly refer to various views of Putnam. However, I do not intend to describe, or even sketch, his intellectual development. For an autobiographical account, see Putnam (1983, vii–xviii).
- 24.
As the next chapter will show on the basis of a detailed analysis, the reading of “T 2 is better than T 1 ” in terms of “T 1 is a limiting case of T 2 ” cannot simply be taken as a case of conceptual convergence. This is contrary to what advocates of this reading suggest (see, e.g., Putnam 1978, 19–22). The problem is that they do give all kinds of quick examples, but never elaborate these in sufficient detail.
- 25.
For a detailed criticism of convergent realism, see also Laudan (1981).
- 26.
- 27.
In the next sections, I shall examine why we do speak of e (electron) or m (mass) as such.
- 28.
See also Hacking (1982, 58ff)., who argues that the crucial point of the problem is not “truth” but “truth-or-falsity”.
- 29.
Note that the reproducibility of a material realization does not depend on this A and his specific theoretical description. It suffices that there is some experimenter who, when repeating the experiment, will arrive again and again at the same theoretical description.
- 30.
For the sake of simplicity I speak here of “theory”, singular. In fact, in the theoretical description of experimental episodes a variety of theories come into play, as was illustrated by the boiling-point example given in Sect. 3.2. If the material realization is reproducible, then all descriptive terms from the theoretical description of all experimental episodes refer. The distinctions between the different kinds of theories (for example, between auxiliary theories and theories to be tested) are not relevant with respect to the reference of terms.
- 31.
- 32.
- 33.
An extensive discussion of the historical and philosophical aspects of this kind of correspondence will be provided in the next chapter, in particular in Sect. 5.2.
- 34.
This qualification is needed, because we can certainly not relate all E- and N-equations through this procedure (see Bunge 1970, 288–291).
- 35.
Although I do generally agree with many of Hesse’s viewpoints (see note 22), on this point there is a radical difference. Hesse (1980, 146) does aim at a (kind of) translation of one theoretical language into the other, through a set of true observation sentences. I think that this difference will be consequential at some other points as well, but it would carry me too far astray to address this issue here explicitly.
- 36.
Thus, the transition from classical physics to the special theory of relativity is less radical than the transition to quantum theory.
- 37.
Hardin and Rosenberg (1982), 608 (emphasis added). I should add, though, that these authors present this as only one of the possible views on reference.
- 38.
- 39.
- 40.
On this point, this interpretation opposes the one offered in Nola (1980, 515–517).
- 41.
As mentioned before, the exposition of formal correspondences in specific cases requires new and detailed research. The reason is that the way in which terms can formally correspond with each other may differ from case to case. However, an examination of the formal correspondence between “phlogiston” and “oxygen” would carry me too far from the main line of the argument.
- 42.
Again, accepting that these terms formally correspond with each other in this domain.
- 43.
Note that we can only perceive the larger variety from the point of view of the modern theory; for example on the basis of the “referential refinement” (for this term, see Derksen 1980, 285–286) of “phlogiston” to sometimes “oxygen” and sometimes “hydrogen”.
- 44.
I will address his more recent internal realism in the next section.
- 45.
For the sake of clarity, let me add the following two qualifications. First, we will have to restrict the propositions C to empirical claims. The reality conditions are not meant to apply to logically true propositions or to propositions with logically true parts. Next, we should be careful when interpreting the negation, by clearly differentiating between “C has no truth value” and “C is false”. We can then interpret the reference of the terms of C as a presupposition of C’s possession of a truth value. Two reasons support such a view. Firstly, it links up with the distinction made in Sect. 4.3 between conceptual relativism and relativism with respect to truth. Furthermore, if we would identify “not–(C is true)” with “C is false”, we would be left with contradictions. (After all, the claim “not–(‘all descriptive terms of C refer’ is true)” implies “not–(‘all descriptive terms of not–C refer’ is true)”, because C and not–C contain the same descriptive terms; hence, the first claim would imply both “C is false” and “not–C is false”).
- 46.
Note that these conditions are restricted to singular propositions. As was explained in Sect. 3.2, singular propositions about successful experiments in the natural sciences always refer to a theoretically defined domain of reproducible phenomena. This is the reason why, through this reproducibility, universal laws and theories are also involved in the reference and truth of singular propositions. Of these universal propositions we can, I think, only demand that they be plausible. The focus of this study is on the problem of reference. Hence, wherever the argumentation did require the notion of plausibility, I have tried to use it in an intuitively clear and acceptable way.
- 47.
- 48.
Koyré (1968, 90). One should, however, keep in mind that this fusion of theoretical and experimental traditions did not emerge everywhere at the same time and its development was not equally fast in all fields (see Kuhn 1977a, about the rise of the “Baconian sciences”). Apart from this, there is the important question of the macro-social background of the rise of the experimental tradition (see, e.g., Keulartz 1981, Part I, 29–36).
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Radder, H. (2012). Verifiability and Reference, Relativism and Realism. In: The Material Realization of Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 294. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4107-2_4
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