Abstract
Aristotelian dialectic has inspired important developments in contemporary argumentation theory, the rhetoric of science and the theory of controversies. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate these developments with respect to both Aristotle’s own approach—enriched as it might be by crucial historical developments—, and to the epistemic significance of dialectical reasoning. In the first part of the paper, I will analyze the relationship between dialectic and rhetoric, two sister disciplines dealing specifically with effective discourse. In the second part, I will look more particularly at the meaning of ‘endoxa’, the premises of dialectical reasoning, and I will occasionally refer to important developments in the tradition of dialectic. Given this background, in the third part I will show how contemporary developments take different forms which correspond to two separate trends. The first trend emphasizes rhetorical persuasion and sees dialectic as a particular kind of discourse whose ultimate goal is to create a consensus about a controversial claim. The second trend, which better corresponds to Aristotle’s own approach, sees dialogue and disputation as the distinctive feature of dialectic. In the last section, I will highlight the specific contribution that dialectic can make to the advancement of knowledge: dialectic allows one of the two interlocutors in a disputation to shift the burden of proof and acquire a presumption of truth in his favor by forcing an adversary to concede to objectively acceptable premises. James Freeman, more than either Frans van Eemeren & Rob Grootendorst and Douglas Walton, maintains a position similar to Aristotle’s. Claims to knowledge are thus tested in a fallible, albeit not contextually-dependent, way. In a slightly more skeptical approach, claims are “balanced” one against the other: the theory of controversies, at least in Marcelo Dascal’s approach, can also be seen as corresponding to Cicero’s interpretation of the Aristotelian legacy of dialectic.
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
On the “counterpart” relationship between rhetoric and dialectic and its various interpretations up to the Renaissance, see Green (1990).
- 3.
At the beginning of the Rhetoric Aristotle writes that rhetoric and dialectic “are concerned with matters that are in a manner within the cognizance of all men (‘koina’) and not confined to any special science” (1354a1-3). He intends that the practice of these two arts presupposes (but does not furnish) knowledge of such common principles as the principle of non-contradiction: “Dialectic must be distinguished from the sciences in that it does not work with any set view of reality. In this it is opposed both to the many special sciences and to the universal science of ontology” (Evans 1977, p. 5).
- 4.
During the ages, the attribution of “queen” of the liberal arts has shifted from rhetoric to dialectic and back again to rhetoric. Martianus Capella describes dialectic as a skinny stern woman and rhetoric as a more pleasing and elegant beauty (1977). This vision changed in the Middle Ages and is reflected in the changed iconic representations of the two rival arts (D’Ancona 1902). Then, the serious and majestic beauty of dialectic is valued over rhetoric’s frivolous appearances.
- 5.
In the tradition of dialectic, a dialogue is a literary “image” of a dialectical disputation (Sigonio 1993, 40r).
- 6.
Recently, a helpful bridge has been established between the pragma-dialectic approach to argumentation and the theory of scientific controversies (van Eemeren and Garssen 2008).
- 7.
Some authors identify ‘endoxa’ with the basic data of experience (‘phainomena’), and thus hold that dialectic can offer a justification for certain scientific claims, insofar as it uses empirically validated premises: dialectic can help us “find those candidates for first principles which, among other things, do the best job of explaining the empirically most well-confirmed information that we have now” (Bolton 1999, p 98). This analysis, however, confuses the meaning of ‘endoxa’ in a dialectical argument and their meaning in the aporetic method which Aristotle uses in the Physics and the Nicomachean Ethics (Barnes 1980).
- 8.
Aristotle identifies three different types of dialectical arguments: sophistical arguments describe a deviant use of dialectical arguments when they aim at deceiving another. He carefully describes them in the Sophistical Refutation, so that someone can learn how to better defeat them. Didactic arguments are pseudo-dialectical arguments: they are used by a teacher who already knows the answers to his questions and slowly wants to lead his pupil to understand them. By contrast, those who argue “for the sake of examination (‘peiras’) and inquiry” (Sophistical Refutations, 159a34), use genuine dialectical arguments which are thus called “peirastic”, from ‘peiras’ which means test and investigation (Aristotle 1978).
- 9.
On the history of the tradition of Aristotelian dialectic, see my recent book (Spranzi 2011).
- 10.
This is especially true for what Dascal calls “disputes”, that is controversies where divergent world-views prevent the participants from achieving closure. In Dascal’s threefold typology of debates, “discussions” end by the sheer force of logical arguments, be they formal or informal. Closure of genuine “controversies” is less linear and certain than that of “discussions”, but it is more productive of new knowledge (2008a).
- 11.
It is unclear whether according to Walton increasing the depth of dialogue is positively related to the truthlikeness of dialectical conclusions.
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Spranzi, M. (2012). The Nature and Purpose of Aristotelian Dialectic Revisited: Argumentation Theory, Scientific Controversies and Epistemology. In: van Eemeren, F., Garssen, B. (eds) Topical Themes in Argumentation Theory. Argumentation Library, vol 22. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4041-9_11
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