Abstract
The paper sets out instruments for the evaluation of pragmatic argumentation, i.e. of argumentation that seeks to support a recommendation (not) to carry out an action by highlighting its (un)desirable consequences. The theoretical starting point is the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation. The evaluative instruments proposed consist of an argument scheme and two dialectical profiles, one specifying the inter-subjective identification procedure (IIP) and another outlining the inter-subjective testing procedure (ITP) for pragmatic argumentation. The argument scheme represents those elements of pragmatic argumentation that are directly relevant to its evaluation: the type of propositions involved – one causal and another evaluative – and the type of justificatory relationship connecting those propositions to the standpoint. The dialectical profile representing the IIP outlines the moves the parties to the discussion can carry out to establish the acceptability of the causal and evaluative propositions. The dialectical profile representing the ITP sets out the argumentative moves the parties can perform to assess the justificatory function of pragmatic argumentation. The latter profile comprises a general question on whether the pragmatic argument scheme is within the discussants shared procedural starting points and a set of critical questions to examine whether the argument scheme has been correctly applied. The author elaborates on and supplements contributions made within (Garssen B, Argumentatieschema’s in pragma-dialectisch perspectief. Een theoretisch en empirisch onderzoek (Argument schemes in a pragma-dialectical perspective. A theoretical and empirical examination). With a summary in English. IFOTT, Amsterdam, 1997; Feteris ET, Pragmatic argumentation in a legal context. In: van Eemeren FH (ed) Advances in pragma-dialectics. Sic-Sat, Amsterdam, pp 423–259, 2002) and outside the pragma-dialectical paradigm (Clarke DS Jr, Practical inferences, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1985; Schellens JP, Types of argument and the critical reader. In: (van Eemeren FH, Grootendorst R, Blair JA, Willard ChA (eds) Argumentation: analysis and practice. Proceedings of the conference on argumentation 1986. Foris Publications, Dordrecht/Providence, 1987; Walton D, Synthese 157:197–240, 2007) to the study of pragmatic argumentation. As regards the argument scheme for pragmatic argumentation, she distinguishes a material and a connection premise in the argument scheme, defines the connection premise of the argumentation as a complex premise, and analyses it into two propositions, one causal and another evaluative (Sect. 3.1). Together with outlining a dialectical profile for the IIP, the author discusses some of the complexities involved in establishing the acceptability of these two propositions (Sect. 3.2.1). Concerning the ITP for pragmatic argumentation, the author gives a rationale for the relevance of each the critical question proposed and situates them in a dialectical profile in order to make clear that certain critical questions have priority over other and that sometimes there is more than one reasonable type of response to the same critical question (Sect. 3.2.2). Finally, the author discusses in which ways the critical questions outlined in the profile also account for situations in which there is an objective that is both more desirable and in some way incompatible with the desirable consequences mentioned in a pragmatic argument (Sect. 3.2.3).
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- 1.
Pragmatic argumentation is described in van Eemeren et al. (1983); van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992, pp. 97, 162), Garssen (1997, p. 21), and van Eemeren et al. (2002, pp. 101–2). The argument scheme is outlined in Feteris (2002, p. 355) and, also, with some modifications, in van Eemeren et al. (2007, p. 170). Critical questions for pragmatic argumentation are listed in Garssen (1997), p. 21 (available only in Dutch). An English translation of these questions can be found in van Eemeren et al. (2007, p. 170).
- 2.
This description of the evaluative process is premised on an immanent view of dialectics. According to this perspective, the analyst should examine the acceptability of the argumentation solely in consideration of the material starting points of the discussants (see Hamblin 1970). Nevertheless, it is also possible to conceive the evaluative process from a non-immanent perspective and assign the analyst a more active role in the evaluation. In the latter case, if the analyst considers that the material premise of the argumentation is unacceptable when both parties have recognised it as a shred material starting point, s/he may start a discussion with the parties concerning the acceptability of that proposition. In this discussion, the analyst not only questions the acceptability of the argumentation but also assumes the opposite point of view than the parties. Being protagonist of his own standpoint, he should put forward argumentation to justify her/his position. The description also assumes that there are two real parties to the discussion. The same alternatives – and immanent versus a non-immanent view of dialectics – apply even if the antagonist is only ‘projected’ by the protagonist. In both cases the analyst should try to ‘reconstruct’ the projected antagonist. In the first case, the analyst will judge the acceptability of the argumentation in view of the presumably shared starting points by protagonist and antagonist; in the second case, he will take a more active role in the evaluation, making explicit his disagreement concerning the acceptability of the argumentation.
- 3.
In the ideal model of a critical discussion, where every argumentative move is made explicitly, the parties expressly agree on the critical questions at the opening stage. This agreement is reached simultaneously to the agreement that a certain type of argument scheme will count in the present discussion as an acceptable means of defence. By contrast, discussants rarely agree explicitly in practice on the critical questions relevant to a type of argument scheme. This puts the burden on argumentation theorists to propose critical questions for conventionalised types of argument schemes such as the pragmatic argument scheme. In designing these questions, they look for the kind of evidence that could count against a specific type of argumentation starting from the assumption that the material premise is acceptable.
- 4.
Cf. Feteris (2002, p. 355), who proposes an argument scheme where the standpoint has an evaluative proposition, and van Eemeren et al. (2007, p. 170), who outline an argument scheme with a prescriptive proposition in the standpoint but without the connection premise ‘If action X leads to consequence Y and consequence Y is desirable, then action X should (not) be carried out.’
- 5.
From an evaluative perspective, the acceptability of the causal proposition is just as significant as that of the evaluative proposition. For this reason, the order followed by the parties when checking the acceptability of the material premise in the IIP is irrelevant. This is not to say, however, that the order is irrelevant from the point of view of the production of a pragmatic argument: means cannot be defined without having established the goal to be achieved first.
- 6.
The gradable aspect of desirability should be distinguished from its ‘relative’ dimension. Desirability is partly a relative concept in the sense that given some agreed standard S, the same consequence Y might be judged desirable in one context but undesirable in another. For example, assuming that ‘the lower the rate of unemployment, the better’ is the parties’ shared standard, they might agree that achieving an 8% of unemployment is undesirable if in the last year the unemployment rate was of 6%. However, an 8% of unemployment would probably be taken as good news if the unemployment rate in the last year had been of 10%. As long as the parties have a shared standard from which to judge the desirability of different events or outcomes (such as, for instance, ‘the lower the rate of unemployment, the better’), and as long as there is agreement as to the events or outcomes to which Y will be compared (such as, for instance, last year’s unemployment rate), it should be possible to establish whether or not Y is desirable in a given context of dispute, despite the relative (and gradable) dimension of ‘desirability.’
- 7.
In this context, incompatibility does not mean, of course, contradiction: if Y and Y′ were contradictory, the parties could not regard both objectives desirable without being inconsistent.
- 8.
I am grateful to the commentator of an earlier version of this paper for drawing my attention to this point.
- 9.
The first question, as formulated by Garssen (1997, p. 22), is: “Does that which is introduced as a cause indeed lead to the mentioned (un)desirable result?” I have reformulated this question to make clear that its purpose is to test the causal generalisation rather than the specific causal relation established in a pragmatic argument (Garssen, Personal communication, May 15, 2009).
- 10.
To evaluate an argument based on a causal generalisation aimed at justifying a prediction, the antagonist should also ask the critical question ‘Are those additional factors necessary to bring about the effect present?’ If this question were not considered in the evaluation, the antagonist would be demanding from the protagonist to mention a sufficient cause in his causal argumentation, i.e. one where the presence of the mentioned cause would necessarily imply the presence of its alleged effect. This requirement is too strict. A single cause is seldom, if ever, sufficient by itself to produce a given effect. Effects seem to be instead the result of a combination of factors. One should not expect from an arguer, therefore, to mention a sufficient cause; one should expect from him, rather, to mention a cause and show, if requested to do so, or if it is not clear from the context of utterance, that other necessary contributory causes are present.
- 11.
In this way, it is to the parties to decide whether to follow a teleological or a deontological conception of ‘reasonable actions’, in case there is a clash between desirable consequences and moral principles.
- 12.
Once the protagonist has advanced argumentation to meet a critical question, the antagonist may regard this argumentation unconvincing. In that event, the parties may decide to start a sub-discussion. To keep the profile simple, I have not represented these sub-discussions.
- 13.
A weaker strategy available to the protagonist but still reasonable in my view, is to attack the antagonist’s argumentation in favour of alternative means X′, by questioning the acceptability of the premise ‘X’ leads to Y′ and advancing the critical question ‘Is X′ feasible?’ If the antagonist cannot answer these questions properly, then the protagonist has not demonstrated that ‘X’ does not lead to Y′ or that ‘X’ is unfeasible,’ but the antagonist has not been able to prove that there is indeed an alternative means X′ either. In my opinion, if the antagonist cannot prove the latter then it seems reasonable to take X as the only means available for the time being, in contexts where a practical decision needs to be taken at the end of the discussion.
- 14.
It is interesting to observe how politicians strategically defend their policies in terms of ‘necessary’ or ‘unavoidable’ means when in fact there are other options available – options which could eventually lead to more advantages and less disadvantages than the policy that is recommended. This point is nicely made, in my opinion, by David Milliband (UK shadow foreign secretary) in his commentary ‘These cuts are not necessary: they are simply a political choice’, published in response to the 2010 budget introduced by the Lib-Con government. See, The Observer, 27.06.10, p. 19.
- 15.
In my analysis I have assumed that the expansion of hydroelectric power is a necessary means to sufficiently increase energy supply in Chile, only for the sake of the argument. In reality, those opposing the Hidro Aysén project focused not only on the undesirable effects of building the dam complex but also criticised the government’s claim that the project was necessary. They stressed that the government should focus on energy efficiency and boosting capacity for non-conventional renewable fuels like wind, solar, and geothermal power (Protests after Chile backs giants dams in Patagonia’s valleys 2011).
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Ihnen, C. (2012). Instruments to Evaluate Pragmatic Argumentation: A Pragma-Dialectical Perspective. In: van Eemeren, F., Garssen, B. (eds) Topical Themes in Argumentation Theory. Argumentation Library, vol 22. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4041-9_10
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