Abstract
In this paper I defend a Quinean view on ontological commitment against some recent challenges. I outline the virtues and limitations of the Quinean approach before considering two different theories. Thomas Hofweber argues that commitment in natural language is ambiguous and that Quine’s canonical notation is incapable of representing the two functions of natural language quantifiers. Truthmaker theorists argue that Quine’s approach is based on a fallacious view of the relation between true sentences and the truthmaking domain (the world). In response I argue that both objections are aimed at a particularly strong version of the Quinean approach, and that rather than abandon it we can use these challenges to understand its true value.
In this paper I defend a Quinean approach to the ontological commitments of theories against some neo-Carnapian alternatives.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
Armstrong, D. 2004. Truth and truthmakers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cameron, R. 2008. Truthmakers and ontological commitment. Philosophical Studies 140: 1–18.
Dyke, H. 2008. Metaphysics and the representational fallacy. New York: Routledge.
Haack, S. 1978. The philosophy of logics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Heil, J. 2005. From an ontological point of view. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hofweber, T. 2005. A puzzle about ontology. Noûs 39: 256–283.
Macdonald, C. 2005. Varieties of things: Foundations of contemporary metaphysics. Malden: Blackwell.
Quine, W. 1961. On what there is. In From a logical point of view, 2nd ed. New York: Harper & Row.
Acknowledgements
I owe great thanks to Colin Cheyne for his time and patience in helping me to develop and express the views in this paper.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2012 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Gill, E. (2012). Defending Quine on Ontological Commitment. In: Maclaurin, J. (eds) Rationis Defensor. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol 28. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-3983-3_13
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-3983-3_13
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-007-3982-6
Online ISBN: 978-94-007-3983-3
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)