Abstract
I argue that there is an inherent tension in the notion of a proposition that gives us reason to doubt that there can be any single entity that plays all the roles and possesses all the features normally attributed to propositions. The tension is that some of the roles and features of propositions require them to be essentially representational, while others require them to be non-representational. I first present what I call the standard view of propositions: a series of theses outlining the roles they are normally thought to play and the features they are normally thought to possess. I then highlight a number of tensions inherent in the standard view. I illustrate how this very tension creates problems for some realist theories of propositions. I discuss the distinction between the truth of a proposition and its existence, and argue that paying heed to this distinction allows us to identify, and clear up, a particular confusion that leads us to posit propositions in the first place. Finally, I consider where a rejection of propositions leaves us, ontologically and theoretically.
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Notes
- 1.
There are, of course, particular theses that are rejected by some friends of propositions, but by and large, they adhere to a majority of these theses.
- 2.
Wrigley (2006) alludes to the objection to realism about propositions that the roles they play are “potentially incompatible” (p. 158) but does not expand on the nature of this incompatibility.
- 3.
The term ‘fact’ is, unfortunately, a theoretically loaded one. My use of it is intended to be as theoretically neutral as possible. By ‘fact’ I simply mean some extra-linguistic, non-truth-bearing entity or collection of entities.
- 4.
I allude here to an objection to theories that reduce propositions to sets of possible worlds or mathematical functions, according to which they cannot perform many of the roles of propositions because they are entities of the wrong sort.
- 5.
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Dyke, H. (2012). Propositions: Truth vs. Existence. In: Maclaurin, J. (eds) Rationis Defensor. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol 28. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-3983-3_10
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