Abstract
In the final sections of this chapter I will present a theory of technical functions and of technical artefact kinds that capture and further clarify the hybrid, dual nature of technical artefacts. Before I can do so, however, some further preliminary steps still have to be made. First we have to deal with the issue of malfunctioning of technical artefacts. Malfunction statements are just one of the various kinds of normative statements we make with regard to technical artefacts. Theories of technical functions will have to able to account for these normative aspects of technical artefacts, including the malfunction aspect. That is the reason I start off with an analysis of the nature of normativity related to functions and technical artefacts (section 4.1). Another issue that also stands in need of clarification is the distinction between proper and accidental functions and how this distinction is related to being an instance of a technical kind. I point out two reasons why the assumption, we made in section 2.5.1, that (proper) functions as defined by theories of technical functions determine technical kinds has to be given up. We have already come across the first one: it leads to the problem that a malfunctioning TV-set is not a TV-set at all. The second reason only applies to reproduction theories of technical functions that make use of the type-token distinction; for this kind of theories the assumption leads to a problem of circularity (section 4.2). Our final preliminary step concerns the notion of technical kinds. I briefly discuss Thomasson’s theory of artefact kinds which I consider to be a promising starting point for developing a theory of technical artefact kinds (section 4.3). One of the advantages of this theory is that it offers the opportunity to reinterpret and qualify the assumption about the relation between functions and being an instance of a technical kind. To this end, I introduce a distinction that plays a pivotal role in the theories of functions and technical artefact kinds to be presented, namely the one between use-proper functions and kind-proper functions (section 4.4). All in all, this leaves us with tree different kinds of functions of technical artefacts (use-accidental, use-proper and kind-proper functions) with regard to which various kinds of normative statements can be made (section 4.5). After drawing up a list of adequacy conditions for theories of technical functions and of technical artefact kinds (section 4.6), I present a theory of technical functions combined with a theory of technical artefacts kinds that, in my opinion, takes due account of and explicates the dual nature of technical artefacts (section 4.7).
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Notes
- 1.
Note that in statements of the form “X is good for ϕ-ing” X may also stand for objects without a function (such as natural objects).
- 2.
See (Davies 2001) for a discussion of the analogous idea that there are norms in nature in relation to normative statements about biological functions.
- 3.
There are only a few in depth analyses of normative statements about technical artefacts. Here I concentrate on the analyses by Von Wright (1963) and Franssen (2006, 2009b, 2009a). See also Vaesen (2008). For an analysis of some of the logical relationships between value statements about functionally specified categories, among which technical artefacts, and their subcategories, see Hansson (2006a) and Franssen (forthcoming).
- 4.
I will not enter into a discussion of whether the descriptive content of the judgment “X is a good knife” has to be true or not in order for it to imply a reason for use. This involves the distinction between objective and subjective reasons; see, for instance, Dancy (2000). It appears that Von Wright allows that reasons are subjective; see (1963, p. 32).
- 5.
For more details about how to interpret function ascriptions as normative facts, see (Franssen 2006, p. 52–53); he argues that function ascriptions express normative facts of a theoretical kind (i.e., reasons about what to believe) instead of normative facts of a practical kind (i.e., reasons about what to do). For a criticism of Franssen’s analysis on this point, see Dancy (2006, p. 59).
- 6.
In certain circumstances morally justified statements may, in my opinion, also be made with regard to natural (biological) objects; see the example of the shells in our discussion of Preston’s theory of functions in section 3.5.2.
- 7.
What Franssen calls ‘artefact kinds’, I have been referring to so far as ‘technical kinds’ and what he calls ‘artefact types’ I will be referring to later as ‘technical artefact kinds’. In later work Franssen(2009a) rephrases his distinction as a contrast between functional kinds and artefact kinds.
- 8.
According to Franssen the level of detail required for identifying artefact types is context dependent.
- 9.
‘New’ tokens in order to exclude the poor functioning of tokens due to wear and tear.
- 10.
McLaughlin (2009) argues that one way normativity enters function ascriptions is by the use of the type-token distinction; he claims that that distinction itself is normative since tokens can instantiate a type in better or worse ways. If the type-token distinction is taken to run parallel to the kind-instance distinction then this kind of normativity is not specific for technical artefacts.
- 11.
Davies (2001, p. 194, 214) reaches a similar conclusion; the only norms involved in functions are, according to him, epistemic in character; objects with a proper function “are not the bearers of norms of any sort.”
- 12.
- 13.
See also Davies (2001, p. 175 ff; 212) who claims that systemic malfunctions are not possible (because the malfunctioning object, lacking the function, is no longer a member of the relevant functional type), but he explains our inclination to attribute malfunction in such cases in terms of our expectations based on our experiences with well-functioning tokens of the relevant functional type.
- 14.
See also (Kroes 2003).
- 15.
See also Davies’s remarks about the impossibility of systemic malfunctions (2001, p. 212); he does not see this as a decisive arguments against the theory of systemic functions.
- 16.
Intuitively, the type-token and kind-instance distinctions express the same difference, namely that between a general sort of thing and its particular concrete instances. In fact, the two notions appear to be used indiscriminately by some function theorists (see for instance Davies (2001, 212–3), who equates functional kinds and functional types). There may be general metaphysical/ontological reasons for distinguishing types from kinds (see (Wetzel 2006)), but I see no reason that they make it necessary to distinguish in the present context between artefact types and artefact kinds.
- 17.
Also Enç’s analysis of the attribution of functions appears to suffer from the kind of circularity discussed here; he presents a definition of the attribution of a function to X, where X is a member of a natural kind and part of the identity conditions for being an X involve the function of X; see (Enç 1979).
- 18.
See Simons (1995) who remarks that the identity conditions for (technical) artefacts are vaguer and more convention-bound than those for natural objects; see also (Thomasson 2003, p. 598–599).
- 19.
In my opinion, a promising way for individuating technical artefact kinds in terms of their function (input-output relations), the conditions under which this input-output relation obtains (system of interactions) and their structural and design features (object structure) has been presented by Soavi (2009). Pragmatic considerations may be taken to be part of the system of interactions.
- 20.
Because of their mind-dependence the ontological status of technical artefacts and of technical artefact kinds has been put into question; see for instance Baker (2008) and Kroes and Vermaas (2008). I will not enter here in a discussion of the general issue of how technical artefacts fit into the ontological structure of the world and whether they can be considered to be ontologically on a par with for instance natural kinds or not. Given my assumption about the basic ontology consisting of physical objects and intentions (see section 2.6), my aim in the following is to analyse what kind of physical objects and whose and what kind of intentions are involved in an object being an instance of a technical artefact kind. I will not address issues about what kinds of ontological dependence relations are involved between these physical objects and intentions and being an instance of a technical artefact kind; see for instance (Houkes and Meijers 2006; Meijers 2001; Kroes 2009).
- 21.
Such a substantive idea may be taken to be a correct idea of what we have been calling technical kinds, since they are functional kinds.
- 22.
I will have more to say on what a design is in the next chapter.
- 23.
To illustrate the complexity of defining artefact kinds in engineering practice, consider the Form, Fit and Function principle (see for instance http://www.dmsms.org/file.jsp?storename=Form_Fit___Function_Fundamentals.pdf). Artefacts with the same form, fit and function are supposed to be interchangeable. With regard to very simple components, such as nuts and bolts, the form, fit and function principle usually implies that those interchangeable artefacts are taken to belong to the same artefact kind. However, for more complex components, this is not the case; even when two artefacts have the same form, fit and function, they may be based on different designs and therefore be considered to be instances of different artefact kinds.
- 24.
The condition ‘under some description’ implies that a technical artefact cannot be produced by simply copying, in every minute detail, an existing instance of an artefact kind; the resulting object, that is a structural copy of an existing artefact, is not itself an artefact because it lacks the relevant description.
- 25.
- 26.
It may be objected that the newly acquired proper function is a status function and that because of this new status function the engines are instances of the kind of museum objects. However this may be this in no way affects the kind-proper function of these engines which makes them instances of a particular technical artefact kind.
- 27.
Preston’s reason for denying that in these cases we are dealing with proper functions is that the artefacts involved are not reproduced for this use.
- 28.
Although she does not refer to artefact kinds but to function categories, also Millikan (1993, p. 21–22) connects the issue of proper functions to being a member of a function category (artefact kind). Members of a function category are not always able to perform the proper function associated with that category. One of the problems that a definition of proper functions is supposed to solve is (ibidem) “how did the atypical members of the category that cannot perform its defining function get into the same function category as the things that actually can perform the functions?”.
- 29.
See also (Ridder and Kroes 2006).
- 30.
I disregard Searle’s theory since it does not address the issue of proper functions explicitly.
- 31.
A direct consequence of our characterization of the various kinds of functions is that the individual use of an artefact in accordance with its kind-proper function may have to be interpreted, paradoxically, as the assignment of a use-accidental function. This may happen when the actual use-proper function is different from the kind-proper function. In a community in which the use of flatirons for ironing has become obsolete and in which their use as door stops is standardized, an individual using a flat iron for ironing shirts assigns by that use a use-accidental function to the flat iron.
- 32.
With the help of the distinction between use-proper function and kind-proper function we may explain why instances of a technical artefact kind, of which almost all instances are and will never be used (for instance, because they are outperformed by a competitor the moment they were produced) may still have a proper function, namely a kind-proper function, and thus be an instance of the technical artefact kind. This is a problem similar to the one in biology where only a tiny fraction of an item type may actually perform its proper function (e.g., sperm cells); see for instance (Neander 1991).
- 33.
See also Houkes and Vermaas’ distinction between professional and amateur designing (2010, p. 27).
- 34.
An analogous case in biology are the ‘flippers’ of penguins; they are not malfunctioning wings.
- 35.
For a discussion of the various success criteria involved in evaluating artefacts, see also Hilpinen (2004, 1992).
- 36.
See Davies (2001, p. 103).
- 37.
For a discussion of the promiscuity objection to systemic function theories, see Davies (2001, Ch. 4).
- 38.
Note that in that case the capacity and contribution beliefs of the designers have to be true and not only justified on the basis of some account A. This is necessary to exclude the possibility of an incorrect (principally flawed) yet justified design.
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Kroes, P. (2012). Proper functions and technical artefact kinds. In: Technical Artefacts: Creations of Mind and Matter. Philosophy of Engineering and Technology, vol 6. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-3940-6_4
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