Abstract
What kind of objects are technical artefacts? In dealing with this question I will take a comparative approach. The two contrast classes that I will compare technical artefacts to are physical objects and social objects. My aim in the first three chapters is to argue that technical artefacts are a kind of hybrid objects that share some features with physical and others with social objects. They have a ‘dual nature’ because they may be said to be at the same time physical and social constructions. The first part of this chapter is preparatory. It starts with a demarcation of the kind of technical artefacts I will concentrate on (section 1). That is not a trivial matter since technical artefacts merge on the one hand into (mere) physical objects and on the other hand into social objects; they are, so to speak, embedded in a kind of seamless web with physical and social objects. My focus will be on technical artefacts produced on the basis of a design, a situation typical for most modern engineered technical artefacts. In view of my comparative approach I then turn to a sketch of some of the main differences between the conceptual frameworks used for describing physical and social objects and phenomena (section 2). It will also be necessary to address briefly the relation between the notions of natural and physical objects and between the notions of social and intentional objects (section 3). The second part of this chapter presents an overview of the kind of problems involved in clarifying what kind of objects technical artefacts are and ends with a first description of the dual-nature thesis and the various ways it may be interpreted. I turn to engineering practice to see how engineers conceptualize and describe technical artefacts (section I.4). They use what I call a structure-function conception of technical artefacts: they are physico-chemical structures with a (practical/technical) function. This conception still leaves open whether it involves concepts from the intentional conceptual framework. In order to shed light on this issue it will be necessary to unpack the notion of function, in particular how this notion is related to intentional human action. I will outline two different approaches for interpreting the notion of technical function, the one grounding technical functions in the physical world, the other in the intentional (social) world, and the problems they run into (section I.5). The conclusion I will draw from this is that an adequate conception of technical functions has to take into account their intimate relationship to physical features on the one hand, and to intentional features on the other, which leads me to posit that technical artefacts have a dual nature (section I.6). I close with taking stock of the main issues that our first exploration of the nature of technical artefacts has put on our agenda (section I.7).
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- 1.
In the following pages I will focus on the boundary between technical artefacts and natural objects. For reasons that will become clear in section 2.3, which contains a discussion of the relation between the notions of natural and physical objects, I will concentrate in the rest of this book on a comparison of technical artefacts to physical objects. Note that just as there is no sharp demarcation between technical and natural objects, there is also no sharp demarcation between technical and physical objects.
- 2.
According to Preston (1998, p. 253; 2008, p. 28) there is from the point of view of using existing things for new purposes (that is, conferring a new function onto existing things, what is called in biology “exaptation”) no significant difference between using natural things or technical artefacts and from that point of view “the realm of artifacts is a seamless extension of the realm of naturally occurring things.”
- 3.
According to Chittaro and Kumar (1998, p. 331) the functional representation of a traffic light “should establish a relation among the traffic light (specific system), the crossroads (the context), transitions among the three colors of the light (behaviour of the system), meaning of the colors for drivers (interpretation of behaviour), and regulation of traffic (purpose).” If we follow systems theory in assuming that the function of a system determines what is considered to be part of the system and what is part of its environment, then this implies that the traffic light is a system that also involves social/intentional elements. For more details about socio-technical systems, see Kroes and Franssen (2006), and chapter 7.
- 4.
Artefacts, and therefore also technical artefacts, are often characterized as social objects. For instance, Thomasson (2007, p. 52) writes: “It is frequently observed that artifacts and other social and cultural objects are…”. So it would make no sense to try to demarcate technical artefacts from social objects, since they are social objects themselves. I find this view rather misleading, although I am going to argue that technical artefacts have a dual nature, one of which is social/intentional. Even if it is granted that technical artefacts are in some respect social objects, there is clearly a need to distinguish this kind of social objects from social objects like laws and organizations. It is this distinction that I have in mind here.
- 5.
For legal reasons (patent-law) it may be necessary in this case to draw a sharp boundary line between natural and technical objects or processes; see, for instance, (Koepsell 2009).
- 6.
For a brief discussion of technical artefacts, biological organisms and social institutions as functionally organized entities, and their intermediates or hybrids, see (Krohs and Kroes 2009).
- 7.
Which physical quantities are considered to determine the state of a system depends upon the level of description (e.g. macro- or microscopic) and the chosen perspective (mechanical, thermodynamic, electromagnetic etc.).
- 8.
The following quote from Dretske (2006, p. 107) illustrates this difference in terms of what he calls ‘minimal rationality’: “When you make a sudden movement towards my eyes, I blink. I cannot help myself. Of course, I do not want your finger in my eye. I also believe one way to keep your finger out of my eye is to close my eye when you poke at it. But though I think these things, and though I close my eye when you poke at it, I do not close my eye because I think these things. I would close my eye whether or not I had these beliefs and desires. The mechanisms for these reflexes are hard-wired. They swing into action well before thought has time to act. I have reasons to close my eyes, but my reasons for closing them are not the reason I close them. So despite the fact that I do exactly what I think will get me what I want, my behavior is not a purposeful act. It does not exhibit what I will call minimal rationality. Though the behavior is in conformity with thought, it is not explained, not governed, by thought. Minimal rationality requires that thought be involved in the process by means of which the behavior is produced.” In fact there is in such situations no reason why I close my eyes, but only a physical cause.
- 9.
Franssen (2008) has argued that the social/intentional conceptualisation presupposes the physical one and that the social/intentional language is an extension of the physical language. I will leave it an open matter whether this is indeed the case (see also Searle (1995, p. 55-56)). Even if it is, the problem of the coherence of the two descriptions for technical artefacts presents itself.
- 10.
Hacking (1983) has put forward the claim that physical phenomena are created and not discovered. For a critical analysis of this claim, see Kroes (2003).
- 11.
In my opinion technical artefacts are necessarily intentional objects, but that does not imply that they are also necessarily social objects. I leave open the possibility of Robinson Crusoe creating a first instance of a new technical artefact during his solitary stay on his island. This is in line with the theory of technical artefact kinds to be presented in chapter 4.
- 12.
- 13.
In another part of the text, not reproduced here, he describes how certain components of the lamp, such as the carbon filament, can be made.
- 14.
A structural or physical description of a technical artefact describes what engineers refer to as the form of a technical artefact: “The term “form” is used to relate any aspect of physical shape, geometry, construction, material, or size.” (Ullman 1992, p. 20).
- 15.
Note that in a functional description also structural concepts may occur in the phrase replacing y; this does not imply, however, that the object x itself is described (partly) in a structural way.
- 16.
In archaeology we also come across purely structural descriptions of objects that are known (or supposed) to be technical artefacts but of which the specific practical functions are unknown.
- 17.
That is the reason why I will use the terms ‘structural’ and ‘physical’ interchangeably.
- 18.
Note that there is an important difference between the notions of a mathematical and a technical function, when the latter refers to intended behaviour. A technical function in the sense of intended behaviour has a normative element that is not present in mathematical functions: the technical artefact is supposed to (ought to) transform the input into the (desired) output. Whenever it does not do so, the technical artefact is not functioning as intended. But even when it is not performing its intended function, the input and output of a technical artefact may be represented by a mathematical function.
- 19.
- 20.
Note that Cummins’ approach does not allow the attribution of functions to systems as a whole; functions are attributed to components of a system relative to a capacity of that system as a whole (and relative to an analytical account). This may not be a drawback for a function theory in the context of biology (where it is uncommon to attribute functions to organisms as a whole), but is surely is a serious shortcoming for a theory of technical functions.
- 21.
Cummins’ aim is a non-teleological analysis of functions ascriptions, and therefore he avoids an appeal to human intentions as much as possible (1975, p. 751). It may be questioned, however, whether human intentions play no role in Cummins’ interpretation of functions. Function attributions to components of systems are always relative to an analytical account. The content of the analytical account may not contain reference to human intentions, but the analytical account as such does. So after all Cummins’ interpretation appears to be based, implicitly, on human intentions.
- 22.
Duzi, Jespersen et al. (2010, p. 406 ff) present a formal analysis of two different accounts of malfunction, namely subsective versus privative malfunction; a subsective malfunctioning X is still an X, but a privative malfunctioning X is no longer an X; see also Jespersen and Carrara (2011). Whether in the case of technical artefacts we are dealing with subsective or privative forms of malfunction depends, of course, heavily on the cause of its malfunctioning; if a telephone malfunctions because of a loose wire it is most plausible to opt for the subsective form of malfunction; however, if it is smashed to pieces, then the privative form of malfunction appears to apply. Clearly, a sharp distinction between both forms of malfunctioning will be difficult to make; see Kroes (2003).
- 23.
Millikan (1993, p. 22) makes a similar claim.
- 24.
McLaughlin remarks that the function of simple and even more complex technical artefacts can be arbitrarily changed, but that for more complex technical artefacts, in particular for its parts, it becomes (2001, p. 53) “somewhat more difficult for the armchair philosopher to think up plausible stories in which the function changes without any physical change”. But why would a change in function attribution imply a change in physical structure if function attribution is in no way constrained by success, as he repeatedly stresses? If the newly designed can opener, that is a total failure, has the function of opening cans, then I see no reason why the stapler, used as a telephone, would not have the function of making telephone calls.
- 25.
As we will see later on in more detail (chapter 3), Searle’s view on functions appears to be not as permissive as McLaughlin’s since he interprets technical functions as causal agentive functions, which means that technical functions are performed on the basis of physical capacities.
- 26.
In this figure and the following ones the solid arrows stand for conceptual implication: the notion of a technical artefact conceptually implies the notion of a domain of physical objects and a domain of human intentions.
- 27.
A much more daunting problem would be how to integrate the physical and intentional conceptual frameworks into one coherent conceptualization in general. That problem falls outside the scope of this book.
- 28.
In a more or less similar way, Losonsky (1990, p. 84) analyses the nature of artefacts in terms of the following three features: internal structure, purpose and manner of use.
- 29.
This assumption may be questioned on the grounds that nowadays engineers design complex adaptive systems that appear to have goals of their own (for instance, missiles that track their targets). Even if it is granted that these technical systems have genuine goals in the sense that these goals are somehow independent of the intentions of designers and/or users, such goals have to be distinguished from goals (ends) that play role in contexts of human actions. Whereas these human goals are related to intentional states, it is highly questionable that this is also the case for the goals of complex adaptive systems. In order to avoid confusion between these two kinds of goals, I prefer to refer to goals only in a context of human action.
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Kroes, P. (2012). Technical artefacts. In: Technical Artefacts: Creations of Mind and Matter. Philosophy of Engineering and Technology, vol 6. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-3940-6_2
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