Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Relational Space and Places of Value

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Human-Environment Relations

  • 1591 Accesses

Abstract

Drawing on a Leibnizian panpsychist ontology of living beings ­comprising both body and soul, this chapter outlines a theory of space based on the perceptual and appetitive relations among these creatures’ souls. Co-extensive with physical space founded on relations among bodies subject to efficient causation, teleological space results from relations among souls subject to final causation, and is described qualitatively in terms of creatures’ pleasure and pain, wellbeing and happiness. Particular places within this space include the kingdom of grace, where morally responsible, rational beings act as far as possible in accord with the ideal of justice as universal love and wise benevolence. However, while Leibniz considered love as properly directed only towards rational beings, it is argued here that the truly wise person will direct their love and benevolence towards all living things.

A longer version of this paper appeared in Phemister (2011).

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Tensions and ambiguities in Descartes’ account of animal sensation are outlined in Cottingham (1998). See also Clarke (2003: 71–77).

  2. 2.

    E.g. Strawson (2006).

  3. 3.

    For ‘corporeal substance’ interpretations of Leibniz, see Garber (2009), esp. chapter 2; Phemister (2005); Smith and Nachtomy, eds. (2011). The classic statement of the position occurs in Leibniz’s letter to De Volder of 20 June 1703 (1989: 177).

  4. 4.

    ‘Entelechy’ is the Aristotelian term Leibniz appropriates to signify the ‘form’ of the body. The terms ‘mind’, ‘soul’ and ‘entelechy’ signal differences of degree (of activity and distinct perception) rather than of kind.

  5. 5.

    Idealist interpretations of Leibniz (e.g. Adams 1994; Rescher 1979) conceive spatial relations as founded upon monads’ perceptions.

  6. 6.

    For detailed analysis of Leibniz’s theory, see Vailati (1997: chapter 4).

  7. 7.

    Monadology (1989: 215).

  8. 8.

    See also Leibniz’s letter to Arnauld, early November 1671 (1969: 150).

  9. 9.

    See also 1982: 90 and On Wisdom (1969: 425).

  10. 10.

    Also, Principles of Nature and Grace (1989: 213).

  11. 11.

    See Elements of Natural Law (1969: 137). In the New Essays Leibniz declares animals incapable of giving reasons for things, although he allows they can reason inductively (1982: 143). He grants they feel affection and anger (1982: 93, 167), but not misery (1985: 280–281). He was known to endorse vivisection (Smith 2007: 144; also Smith 2011: chapter 1, section 8).

  12. 12.

    See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VI, 7 and X, 5.

  13. 13.

    This is not to imply that our love for animals is reciprocated. Loving another presupposes the capacity to recognise their perfection, wellbeing and specific good.

  14. 14.

    See also Riley (1996: esp. chapter 4).

  15. 15.

    E.g. Diplomatic Codex (1969: 421) and Leibniz’s letter to Arnauld, 23 March 1690 (1969: 360).

  16. 16.

    Diplomatic Codex (1969: 422); Elements of Natural Law (1969: 134); Principles of Nature and Grace (1989: 212).

  17. 17.

    Elements of Natural Law (1969: 134); Principles of Nature and Grace (1989: 212).

  18. 18.

    Leibniz advises that cases of conflict be resolved in favour of the ‘better man, that is, the one who loves more generally’, for he will use his advantage to help others (1969: 150).

  19. 19.

    Leibniz characterises societies as equal (e.g. among friends) or unequal (e.g. between monarch and subjects) and as limited (constituted for particular purposes) or unlimited (concerned with the ‘common good’). See On Natural Law (1969: 429).

  20. 20.

    Leibniz envisages that minds constitute a society in which God, as ‘lord or monarch’ administers laws of justice that ensure the appropriate reward and punishment of good and evil acts respectively (1989: 67). See also, Principles of Nature and Grace (1989: 212); Monadology (1989: 224).

  21. 21.

    Remarks on the Three Volumes Entitled Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times (1969: 630).

  22. 22.

    For discussion, see Rateau (2008: 85–91). As Leibniz recognises in Elements of Natural Law, wise love often entails some cost, though he still insists that ‘even though our own pain intervenes, nothing prevents our taking pleasure in an expectation of the good of others’ (1969: 137).

  23. 23.

    Cp. On Wisdom (1969: 428).

References

  • Abram, D. (1996). The spell of the sensuous: Perception and language in a more-than-human world. New York: Random House.

    Google Scholar 

  • Adams, R. M. (1994). Leibniz: Determinist, theist, idealist. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Clarke, D. M. (2003). Descartes’s theory of mind. Oxford: Clarendon.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Cottingham, J. (1998). Descartes’ treatment of animals. In J. Cottingham (Ed.), Descartes (pp. 225–233). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Descartes, R. (1985–1991). The philosophical writings of Descartes (3 Vols; J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff & D. Murdoch, Ed. & Trans.; Vol 3 with A. Kenny). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Garber, D. (2009). Leibniz: Body, substance, monad. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Hostler, J. (1975). Leibniz’s moral philosophy. New York: Barnes and Noble.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leibniz, G. W. (1956). The Leibniz-Clarke correspondence (H. T. Alexander, Trans.). Manchester: Manchester University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leibniz, G. W. (1969). Philosophical papers and letters (L. E. Loemker, Ed. & Trans.; 2nd ed.). Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leibniz, G. W. (1982). New essays on human understanding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leibniz, G. W. (1985). Theodicy: Essays on the goodness of God, the freedom of man, and the origin of evil (E. M. Huggard, Trans.). La Salle: Open Court.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leibniz, G. W. (1989). Philosophical essays (R. Ariew & D. Garber, Ed. & Trans.). Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mathews, F. (1991). The ecological self. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Phemister, P. (2005). Leibniz and the natural world: Activity, passivity and corporeal substances in Leibniz’s philosophy. Dordrecht: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Phemister, P. (2011). Relational space and places of value. Logical Analysis and the History of Philosophy, 14, 89–106.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rateau, P. (2008). La question du mal chez Leibniz: Fondements et élaboration de la Théodicée. Paris: Honoré Champion.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rescher, N. (1979). Leibniz: An introduction to his philosophy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Riley, P. (1996). Leibniz’ universal jurisprudence: Justice as the charity of the wise. Harvard: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith, J. E. H. (2007). The body-machine in Leibniz’s early physiological and medical writings: A selection of texts with commentary. The Leibniz Review, 17, 141–179.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith, J. E. H. (2011). Divine machines: Leibniz and the sciences of life. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith, J. E. H., & Nachtomy, O. (Eds.). (2011). Machines of nature and corporeal substances in Leibniz. Dordrecht: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Strawson, G. (2006). Realistic monism: Why physicalism entails panpsychism. In A. Freeman (Ed.), Consciousness and its place in nature: Does physicalism entail panpsychism (pp. 3–31). Exeter: Imprint Academic.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vailati, E. (1997). Leibniz & Clarke: A study of their correspondence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Edinburgh, Dugald Stewart Building, 3, Charles Street, Edinburgh, EH8 9AD, Scotland, UK

    Pauline Phemister

Authors
  1. Pauline Phemister
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Pauline Phemister .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Edinburgh, UK, School of Geosciences, Institute of Geography, Drummond Street, Edinburgh, EH8 9JX, United Kingdom

    Emily Brady

  2. Dept. Philosophy, University of Edinburgh, George Square, Edinburgh, EH8 9JX, United Kingdom

    Pauline Phemister

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2012 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Phemister, P. (2012). Relational Space and Places of Value. In: Brady, E., Phemister, P. (eds) Human-Environment Relations. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2825-7_2

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation