Abstract
Leuridan (2010) questions whether mechanisms can really replace laws at the heart of our thinking about science. In doing so, he enters a long-standing discussion about the relationship between the mechanistic structures evident in the theories of contemporary biology and the laws of nature privileged especially in traditional empiricist traditions of the philosophy of science (see, e.g., Wimsatt 1974; Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005; Bogen, Stud Hist Philos Biol Biomed Sci, 36:397–420, 2005; Darden 2006; Glennan, Erkenntnis, 44:49–71, 1996; MDC, Philos Sci, 67:1–25, 2000; Schaffner 1993; Tabery 2004; Weber 2005). In our view, Leuridan misconstrues this discussion. His weak positive claim that mechanistic sciences appeal to generalizations is true but uninteresting. His stronger claim that all causal claims require laws is unsupported by his arguments. Though we proceed by criticizing Leuridan’s arguments, our greater purpose is to embellish his arguments in order to show how thinking about mechanisms enriches and transforms old philosophical debates about laws in biology and provides new insights into how generalizations afford prediction, explanation, and control.
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- 1.
The full passage is “Contrary to Salmon/Dowe mechanisms, complex systems mechanisms (cs-mechanisms) are robust and stable. They form stable configurations of robust objects, and as a whole they have stable dispositions: the overall behaviors of these mechanisms” (Leuridan 2010, p. 319).
- 2.
On closer inspection, Leuridan’s question is still too imprecise since it does not specify the purpose for which cs-mechanisms are intended to replace p-laws (or vice versa). Mechanisms and stable generalizations serve many functions in our thinking about science. Perhaps mechanisms are useful for some philosophical purposes and laws are useful for others.
- 3.
Leuridan mentions Bogen’s work but rejects it summarily on the ground that Bogen’s criticism of regularism relies on a strict (i.e., universal) notion of “regularity” (see 2010, p. 330). But this is false. Bogen frames his discussion in terms of Mitchell’s view of generalizations.
- 4.
One might distinguish generalization (i.e., expanding the scope of the schema within a species/class) from extrapolation (i.e., expanding the scope of the schema beyond the species/class). Given that the parties to this dispute do not draw this distinction, we treat them as synonymous.
- 5.
This view fits with the semantic view of theories that Bechtel and Richardson embrace (cf. 2010, p. 232).
- 6.
It should be noted that Leuridan defines “irregularity” in such a way as to effectively exclude discussion of stochastic mechanisms, mechanisms that work only infrequently or whose frequency of operation and stability in space vary over time. A mechanism that works with probability 0.000001 will count as regular on Leuridan’s account because one can write a generalization of the form P(X) = 0.000001. This is unfortunate as there are a number of interesting questions that one might ask about probabilistic mechanisms and mechanisms whose probability of working varies over time (as one might expect in systems that are regulated). Thanks to Jim Bogen for calling this to our attention.
- 7.
Again, note that Leuridan is operating with a most unorthodox notion of “irregularity.”
- 8.
One might have expected Leuridan to defend the epistemic claim that one cannot learn about mechanisms in the absence of p-laws. One might hold that one can test causal connections only on the basis of regularities. Such a claim would be false, of course, as we might make causal inferences on the basis of temporal succession or spatiotemporal contiguity, for example. Leuridan might claim (correctly) that such inferences are fallible, but all inductive inferences are fallible, including those involving p-laws.
- 9.
- 10.
Contrary to Leuridan’s claim, Machamer et al. (2000) discuss bottom-out activities not as a way of solving some sort of epistemic regress but as a disciplinarily relative way of identifying when explanations come to an end.
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Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Jim Bogen, Lindley Darden, Alexander Reutlinger, and the members of the DFG research group “Causation and Explanation” for comments on earlier drafts. This project was made possible by the funding provided by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG).
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Craver, C.F., Kaiser, M.I. (2013). Mechanisms and Laws: Clarifying the Debate. In: Chao, HK., Chen, ST., Millstein, R. (eds) Mechanism and Causality in Biology and Economics. History, Philosophy and Theory of the Life Sciences, vol 3. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2454-9_7
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