Abstract
Canguilhem’s work in epistemology and in the history of the life sciences rests on a double deontological dogma: a ‘vitalism of norms’ and, as a consequence of this, a ‘normative vitalism’. According to Canguilhem, life consists in the plastic power, proper to all organisms, of creating qualitatively new norms; if life is essentially a potentiality, then this means that the living being is not simply a machine, an assembly of pieces reacting to the environment, but is what modifies and creates it. If the organism is not a mechanism, then it also means that pathology cannot be described as a deficit or a disorder of a supposed normal state, but it is just a qualitatively different norm proper to the living being confronted with an obstacle.
This simple stance also entails an anthropology: both Canguilhem’s theory of knowledge and social theory are vitalist insofar as they are deeply rooted in this minimal definition of life. Both technology and society are conceived as external organs (prostheses) created by the human animal and science and morals, value judgments and judgments of fact are a reflection on the reason for the failure of those organs. On a deontological level (methodological and ethico-political), it follows, finally that, from the perspective of life, ‘vitalism’ as a doctrine is the most ‘vital’ stance one can adopt both epistemologically and politically.
While not systematically formulated, these ideas are sketched for the first time in The Normal and the Pathological and in a series of essays written at the beginning of the 1940s (and later published in The Knowledge of Life in 1955). Therefore, if we look at Canguilhem’s intellectual trajectory before World War II, and, even more, before 1935, the moment at which Canguilhem begins his medical studies, it seems that Canguilhem was far from being a ‘vitalist’, even in this peculiar sense, and far from presenting his work as a historical epistemology of the life sciences. On the contrary, he was a harsh critic of vitalism and finalism and a strong defender of “transformism” in its strictly mechanistic, Lamarckian version. Faithful to Alain’s theory of knowledge and to Auguste Comte’s sociology, he strictly distinguished human mind (l’esprit) – conceived as the only source of judgments and volition – from the human body, conceived as a machine.
Why such a change? This essay aims to describe Canguilhem’s first 10 years of activity, the implicit theoretical framework of his intellectual work, the relation between his anthropology and the doctrines of Alain, Comte and especially Broussais’s theory of irritation. Finally, it aims at explaining the social and political reasons at the base of his later vitalist philosophy of life and his implicit rejection of Kantianism and Comtism.
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- 1.
Foucault (1998).
- 2.
Sartre (1966, 96).
- 3.
Canguilhem (2005, 87).
- 4.
Sartre (1966, 87).
- 5.
Canguilhem (2005, 88).
- 6.
Canguilhem (1947, 324). In “Aspects of vitalism,” an essay written during the 1940s and later published in The Knowledge of Life (Canguilhem 2008) Canguilhem tries to defend vitalist models in the life sciences, but denounces their use by Nazi ideology (e.g. Driesch, who viewed entelechy as the “organism’s Führer”). According to Canguilhem, it is not a question of connivance between ideology and scientific models, but rather of a simple “parasitism of biology”: the ideological use of models does not diminish their scientific importance. If “cellular theory” had been inspired by images deriving from the “imaginary of the discontinuous,” it does not mean that those images were mere myths. Starting from the second half of the 1930s Marxist philosophers were on the contrary inspired by a strong Cartesianism aimed at opposing all philosophical currents that were supposed to prepare the terrain for nationalist ideology. Politzer denounced Rosenberg’s propagandist book Der Mythus des Zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts where he pretended to create a “new kind of man starting from a new Life myth.”
- 7.
Cf. Politzer (1967).
- 8.
Cf. Lukács (1980).
- 9.
Canguilhem (1947, 323).
- 10.
Ibid., 332.
- 11.
Ibid.
- 12.
Ibid.
- 13.
- 14.
- 15.
Vialleton (1929).
- 16.
Canguilhem (1929a).
- 17.
“Concerning thought one can read Descartes, who will explain the separation of thought and extension,” Ibid., 139.
- 18.
Ibid.
- 19.
Ibid.
- 20.
“According to Vialleton it is easy to admit that thought is in things and creation in the object…. Biologists do not know very well what is thinking, and there’s no psychologist that could teach them, insofar as psychologists are learning from biologists. For a long time, in psychology thinking is considered as … ‘a thing like other things [une chose parmi les choses].’ This is why a biologist cannot take into account thinking as a factor without making great mistakes. And calling it hormé doesn’t change the situation, as do Monakov and Morgue, who are quoted by Vialleton,” Ibid., 138.
- 21.
Canguilhem wrote to the Clermont-Ferrand faculty of medicine in 1936, and defended his thesis in 1943.
- 22.
Canguilhem (1968, 48).
- 23.
The description given by J.-F. Braunstein is very clear: “Canguilhem writes several essays against war and militarism. In 1935, he is at the origin of a normaliens’ petition against the Paul-Boncour military law and, in 1927, on the occasion of the Ecole normale’s annual review, he mocks the military preparation. In 1931, he reacts against the ‘enregimentation of intellectuals’” (Braunstein 2000, 11).
- 24.
For Broussais, cf. Braunstein (1986).
- 25.
For an accurate (yet not exhaustive) list of Canguilhem’s published writings, cf. Camille Limoges’s bibliography in Canguilhem (1994, 385–454).
- 26.
Canguilhem (1996, 90).
- 27.
I am taking the adjective in the sense Alain gave it.
- 28.
See the lecture notes written between 1922 and 1927 and preserved in the Fonds Georges Canguilhem of the Centre d’archives de philosophie, d’histoire et d’édition des sciences in Paris, pressmark GC. 5. 4.
- 29.
The only essay concerning medical problems is a review of the book by the psychoanalyst and doctor René Allendy, Orientation des idées médicales. Canguilhem (1929b).
- 30.
As a rider to this, cf. Mazon (1983).
- 31.
Cf. Vogt (1979). François Souillé has called Bouglé a “mediator” between the idealist intellectualism of the Revue de métaphysique et de morale and Durkheimian sociology (Cf. Souillé 2009, 232). Cf. also Logue (1979, 159); A. Policar, “Sociologie et morale: la philosophie de la solidarité et Célestin Bouglé,” in Ferréol (1997, 287–320), Policar (1999, 2000), Spitz (2005).
- 32.
Bouglé’s influence on the students formed at the École Normale (Aron, Canguilhem, Friedmann and Weil) has been stressed by Sirinelli, who, however, did not emphasize his friendship with Alain (Sirinelli 1984).
- 33.
The DES, acronym for ‘diplome d’études supérieures’ is the dissertation that French students were supposed to write at the end of their third year at the university.
- 34.
- 35.
Canguilhem (1926). Starting from 1923 and until the completion of the dissertation, Canguilhem wrote almost 300 pages on Comte (Cf. Canguilhem 1923–1926).
- 36.
Challaye (1932, 8).
- 37.
Ibid, 3.
- 38.
Canguilhem (1935a).
- 39.
Canguilhem (1935b).
- 40.
Canguilhem (1995, 18).
- 41.
Hypokhâgne and khâgne are, respectively, the first and second year of preparation (classes préparatoires) to the entrance examination for the École normale supérieure.
- 42.
Canguilhem is interested in the German situation starting from the early years of the 1930s. In a review of a book by Pierre Viénot, Incertitudes allemandes, he stresses “the German hesitation is relative to an entirely relative conception of Civilization” (Canguilhem 1931, 514). Quoting Valéry’s words, “We, civilizations, we now know that we are mortal,” he stresses how they can “resume the dramatic state of German consciousness,” which explains Hitler’s success.
- 43.
Braunstein et al. (1998, 8).
- 44.
Canguilhem (1991, 39).
- 45.
Braunstein et al. (1998, 8).
- 46.
The answers that had been given to this question are not entirely convincing or they simply do not constitute a real answer. In his reconstruction of Canguilhem’s itinerary Jean-François Braunstein rightly argues that “the specialization, the diversity of Canguilhem researches seems to be the exact opposite of Alain’s indifference for the particular” (Braunstein 2000, 16). Dominique Lecourt advocates the view that Canguilhem’s career is not that of a ‘canonic’ epistemologist, but he does not explain why medicine had constituted the best “unknown material” (matière étrangère) (Lecourt 2008, 33). The idea that philosophy is a discipline that has to deal with an “unknown material” (“Philosophy is a reflection for which all unknown material is good, and we would gladly say, for which all good material must be unknown,” Canguilhem 1991, 33) came from Brunschvicg. In an essay from the early 1920s he argues that “philosophy does not have its own matter; because its own matter is mind [esprit], how it appears when one studies history, science and esthetics; it is on this mind [esprit] that it uses its reflection in order to make its unity appear” (Brunschvicg 1921, 123).
- 47.
The ‘propos’ (that we can translate as remarks) is the chapter-form in which Alain structured almost all his books (the reader Éléments de philosophie is one of the exceptions). Those short chapters (two or three pages-long) are supposed to be read independently from each other and take as points of departure observations concerning man and society. They use a common language insofar as they are supposed to be addressed to every man, every citizen who is in search of wisdom. At the beginning the ‘propos’ were published in popular journals (such as La Dépêche de Rouan) and, nearly always, they bear, in addition to their title, the date they were written.
- 48.
Alain (1991, 327).
- 49.
‘Propos’ originally included in Sentiments, passions et signes (1926), republished in Alain (1970, 520).
- 50.
- 51.
Alain (1956, 139–40).
- 52.
Cf. Starobinski (2003).
- 53.
Broussais (1828, 22).
- 54.
Canguilhem (1991, 54).
- 55.
Alain (2002, 399).
- 56.
Alain (1964, 34).
- 57.
Alain (1991, 323). Italics added by the author.
- 58.
Olivier Raboul rightly remarks that Alain had “never abandoned Cartesian dualism”: “To tie the involuntary to the animal-machine and to reduce the ego to the thinking subject, this is exactly Descartes’s legacy …: our screams of fear, anger, hate, and, in general, of sufferance, do not have more sense than those of a dead chicken” (Raboul 1968, 155). Alain will always consider “Cartesian mechanism” as “the universal type of explanation” (ibid., 125) and, through the theory of the man-machine, he will always consider the human body, as Descartes did as a “simple mechanism, refusing any idea of a vital force …. Thus physiology takes into account and will always take into account nothing but mechanisms without thought” (Ibid., 162).
- 59.
‘Propos’ originally published in Propos sur le bonheur (propos du 23 mars 1922, entitled ‘Médicine’) republished in Alain (1956, 379).
- 60.
‘Propos’ originally published in Mars ou la guerre jugée, republished in Alain (2002, 609).
- 61.
Canguilhem (1991, 39).
- 62.
‘Propos’ originally published in Vigiles de l’esprit, republished in Alain (1956, 786).
- 63.
‘Propos’ originally published in Système des beaux-arts (1922), republished in Alain (1958, 229). Italics added by the author.
- 64.
Ibid.
- 65.
Ibid.
- 66.
‘Propos’ originally published in Vingt leçons sur les beaux-arts (1931), republished in Alain (1958, 515).
- 67.
‘Propos’ originally published in Système des beaux-arts, republished in Alain (1958, 221).
- 68.
This excerpt is taken from the ‘propos’ “Irritation,” originally published in Alain’s 1928’s Propos sur le bonheur. Now in Alain (1958, 139).
- 69.
“What can we do [when we cannot stop coughing]? Can we avoid following and undergoing all those reactions? …. The main cause of those tensions and seditions … is precisely the fact that we absolutely don’t know what to do. In our example, what one has to do, is precisely to relax the whole body, and, especially, instead of inhaling vigorously, which would cause the disorder to deteriorate, expel the little parcel of liquid which was introduced into the wrong pipe. This means, also, chasing away fear which, in this case as in other cases, is entirely harmful” (Ibid., 140).
- 70.
‘Propos’ originally included in Vingt leçons sur les Beaux-Arts, republished in Alain (1958, 515).
- 71.
Alain (1970, 401).
- 72.
Alain (1958, 376).
- 73.
‘Propos’ originally included in Esquisses de l’homme, republished in Alain (1956, 575).
- 74.
‘Propos’ originally included in Propos sur le bonheur, republished in Alain (1956, 144).
- 75.
‘Propos’ originally included in Mars ou la guerre jugée, republished in Alain (2002, 548).
- 76.
‘Propos’ originally included in Sentiments, passions et signes (1926), republished in Alain (1970, 531).
- 77.
Cf. e.g. the ‘propos’ originally included in Propos sur le bonheur and entitled, “Sur la médecine,” Alain (1956, 375).
- 78.
“Thaumaturgie et médecine,” ‘propos’ originally included in Esquisses de l’homme. Alain (1956, 575): “If one studies fear and uneasiness from a physiological perspective and very carefully, one would discover that they are diseases that add to others and accelerate their development, so that the sick man who knows that in advance, thanks to the doctor, will be twice sick. I admit that fear will help us to fight the disease through cure and remedies; but what kind of remedies will cure us of the fear? This vertigo that suffocates us when we’re high up is a real disease which derives from the fact that we’re mimicking the fall and the desperate movement of a falling man. This trouble is an imaginative one. The diarrhea of the student too; thus the fear of giving the wrong answers is as powerful as castor oil. Try to imagine the effects of a continuous fear. To be prudent towards prudence, one has to take into account the fact that the movements of fear will naturally worsen the trouble. The one who fears not falling asleep will not be well-disposed towards sleeping, the one who fears about stomach-ache will not be well-disposed toward digestion. Therefore it would be better to mimic health than disease. This gymnastics is not well known in its details, but one can bet that kindness and benevolence are tied to health, following this theorem according to which the signs of health are nothing but the movements conforming to health; conversely the good doctors are the ones who ask you, as usual: ‘How are you?’, and then do not even listen to the answer,” “Médecine,” ‘propos’ originally included in Propos sur le Bonheur, Alain (1956, 375).
- 79.
“Thaumaturgie et médecine,” ‘propos’ originally included in Esquisses de l’homme. Republished in Alain (1956, 575), italics added by the author.
- 80.
‘Propos’ originally included in Eléments d’une doctrine radicale. Republished in Alain (1993, 431).
- 81.
Alain (2002, 664).
- 82.
‘Propos’ originally included in Propos sur le bonheur. Republished in Alain (1956, 109).
- 83.
Alain (1979, 150).
- 84.
‘Propos’ originally included in Eléments d’une doctrine radicale. Republished in Alain (1970, 407).
- 85.
Ibid.
- 86.
‘Propos’ originally included in Mars ou la guerre jugée. Republished in Alain (2002, 629), italics added by the author.
- 87.
Comte (1877).
- 88.
‘Propos’ originally included in Les Idées et les âges. Republished in Alain (2002, 18).
- 89.
Lévy-Bruhl (1900).
- 90.
Ibid., 239.
- 91.
Canguilhem (1991, 47).
- 92.
Ibid., 47–8.
- 93.
“It is the case of pathologies which, unluckily, are too frequent in the life of societies, perturbations more or less severe, caused by accidental or temporary causes. Those are the revolutionary times, which correspond to living bodies’ diseases. If one applies, as it is advisable to do, Broussais’s principle, that is to say if one admits that morbid phenomena are produced by the effect of the same laws of normal phenomena, the study of social pathology will replace, in a way, experimentation” (Lévy-Bruhl 1900, 278–279).
- 94.
Lévy-Bruhl (1900, 413).
- 95.
Durkheim (1982, 104).
- 96.
Durkheim (1994, 7).
- 97.
Raboul (1968, 268).
- 98.
Canguilhem (1927, 139).
- 99.
Guillaume Le Blanc correctly argues that “social life is regulated by a limited number of fundamental norms, starting from which all differences of intensity and speed are ordered, respectively by static and dynamic sociology. Comte criticizes the idea that several heterogeneous qualities would exist in social life. In social life every qualitative variation is just a difference of quantity. Thus all modifications find their justification starting from a series of norms which are ordered starting from a standard norm which is, according to Comte, the most normal state of society” (Le Blanc 2003, 138).
- 100.
Alain (2002, 629). Italics added by the author.
- 101.
Canguilhem (1927, 39).
- 102.
Republished in Alain (1997, 136). Again, Guillaume Le Blanc is right, when he writes that, according to Comte, “revolution is the pathology par excellence … but which has the advantage of making visible, to the eye of the good social physician, the normal type of society. In this respect positivism aims at ending the revolution, ending the state of crises that have engendered it.” He is right, once again, when he writes that Broussais’s principle offers an answer to the question of the rupture provoked by the events that can be understood only starting from a “normal type that gives them sense.” Revolution, according to Comte is considered as a “transition” (Le Blanc 2004, 141–143).
- 103.
Republished in Alain (1997, 146).
- 104.
Canguilhem (1927, 139).
- 105.
Canguilhem (1955).
- 106.
Cf. Murat et al. (2012, 16). In a 1937 annotation from his diary, Alain is very ironic concerning Canguilhem who, he writes, “has sworn to invent a philosophy and who has just to read Kant [n’a qu’à ouvrir son Kant] to outclass his rivals.”
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Bianco, G. (2013). The Origins of Georges Canguilhem’s ‘Vitalism’: Against the Anthropology of Irritation. In: Normandin, S., Wolfe, C. (eds) Vitalism and the Scientific Image in Post-Enlightenment Life Science, 1800-2010. History, Philosophy and Theory of the Life Sciences, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2445-7_10
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