Abstract
In epistemic utility theory, we apply the tools of decision theory to justify epistemic norms. We treat the possible epistemic states of an agent as if they were epistemic actions between which she must choose. And we ask how we should measure the purely epistemic utility of being in such a state. We then apply the general apparatus of decision theory to determine which epistemic states are rational in a given situation from a purely epistemic point of view; and how our epistemic states should evolve over time. In this paper, I survey recent attempts to justify the tenets of Bayesian epistemology by appealing to epistemic utility theory. And I raise objections to arguments based on the technical notion of propriety.
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Notes
- 1.
This is slightly unfair to Ramsey and Savage who favoured behaviourist reductions of mental states, and thus would not recognize a distinction between pragmatic and epistemic norms for those states. In many ways, epistemic utility theory is born in the attempt to justify norms for epistemic states in the absence of a behaviourist reduction of those states.
- 2.
Those familiar with (Joyce 2009) might worry that his definition of coherent admissibility differs from mine; indeed, it is weaker. After Joyce’s paper went to press, he realized that this stronger version of the definition is required for his proof to go through. To see this, note that the absolute value measure satisfies the published version of the definition, along with the other conditions imposed by the hypotheses of his theorem, but it does not satisfy the conclusion of his theorem. The stronger version of coherent admissibility stated here is required to rule out this putative epistemic utility function.
- 3.
In fact, Joyce’s proof concerns not credence functions defined on the full algebra P(W), but rather those defined only over partitions of W. However, he claims that it generalizes to establish the conclusion for credence functions on P(W) as well (288, Joyce 2009). I confess that I have been unable to provide the necessary generalization. Of course, if it turns out that Joyce can only establish the partition version of his theorem, the objections I raise here will still tell against any attempt to justify Probabilism on the basis of this less general result.
- 4.
In fact, in the original paper, Joyce did not prove the second clause of this claim, namely, that no probabilistic credence function is weakly dominated by another credence function relative to a legitimate measure of accuracy. However, it is possible to adapt his characterization of the legitimate inaccuracy measures in a natural way so that the second clause comes out true as well.
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Pettigrew, R. (2012). An Improper Introduction to Epistemic Utility Theory. In: de Regt, H., Hartmann, S., Okasha, S. (eds) EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. The European Philosophy of Science Association Proceedings, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2404-4_25
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