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Stanley Cavell’s Ordinary Language Philosophy as an Example of Practicing Philosophy in the Essay-Form: In Search of a Humanistic Approach to Teacher Education

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Education for Self-transformation

Part of the book series: Contemporary Philosophies and Theories in Education ((COPT,volume 3))

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Abstract

The author introduces the idea of Stanley Cavell’s ordinary language philosophy as an example of the essay-form of philosophical practice by examining its underlying methodology and aspiration to see if it can be developed into a humanistic approach to teacher education. Here, Cavell’s ordinary language philosophy is shown as a form of philosophical practice that “strikes us dumb,” only to lead us to become aware of what we already know through our lived experience of it. It is also shown that the practice of ordinary language philosophy is supposed to challenge our power to use language at all, by making us confront the gap between the words we say and what we mean by them, only to lead us to see the language-game in which we live, i.e., its limitations as well as its possibility. This limits-experience makes the philosophical practice a personalized form of practice, showing how Cavell’s ordinary language philosophy can be employed to cultivate our ability to reflect on our relationship to ourselves as well as to the world, as a way of transforming our (or others’) sensibility.

An earlier version of this essay was published in Teachers College Record, 113:8 (2011). I am grateful for permission to use this material here.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    What is assumed here is that practically-minded students will be looking for some instrumental connection between philosophy and their professional lives. That is, they will want to know with what skills and competences philosophy will equip them.

  2. 2.

    In his book Exploring the Moral Heart of Teaching (2001), David Hansen refreshingly explores the nature and predicament of teaching that can be well articulated and responded to by the humanistic sensibility.

  3. 3.

    Think, for example, of the kind of classroom setting with students from different ethnic and ­cultural backgrounds that is seen in the recently released French film, The Class (2009), and the kinds of challenges that these rebellious students present to the teacher. These wild and unconventional, yet curious and self-assertive, students seem to represent a new kind of challenge to teachers today. Even in South Korea today, well-intentioned young teachers often leave their teaching career after the disillusionment they experience when confronted by wild teenage students, who seem completely unintelligible to them.

  4. 4.

    Emphasizing this modernist aspect of Montaigne’s philosophy, Hartle calls it “accidental philosophy,” implying the radically contingent and created order of the world (Hartle 2003, pp. 3–27).

  5. 5.

    The term “modern art” is usually associated with art in which, in a spirit of experimentation, the traditions and conventions of the past are no longer taken for granted, and it refers to artworks produced during the period extending roughly from the 1860s through to the 1970s. Modern artists experimented with new ways of seeing and with fresh ideas about the nature of materials and the functions of art, being highly conscious of the nature of their own practice. A salient characteristic of modern art is self-consciousness. This often led to experiments with form and work that draw attention to the processes and materials used. I think that the same thing can be said about the nature of what Cavell attempts to do in his practice of philosophy.

  6. 6.

    Now, it may be objected that this is a slight variation on the formulation of words with which ordinary language philosophy is most commonly associated, which is “When we say…, we mean…” And indeed, Cavell makes much of the importance of this being both first person and plural, indicating first that we are required to say how things seem to us, and second that in so doing we are trying to speak for others, too, making an appeal to community. But it is this very point that legitimates my expressing this in the second person: in doing ordinary language philosophy with others (and how else could it be done?), I must take the other’s first person expression as at the same time an address to me, to see if this is what I mean by the words I use.

  7. 7.

    Some people are very good at explaining what they mean by their words, putting their thoughts another way, perhaps referring to a range of similar or identical thoughts that have been expressed by others, depending upon who the listeners are. These good explainers are those who are quick to notice what prevents the listeners from understanding the meaning of their words, whether this is their presuppositions, their prejudices and so forth. But to explain what I mean by my words is basically to reproduce the literal meaning of the words; nothing is to be added to the original meaning of them. On the other hand, in the case of metaphor, in giving the paraphrase, we are free to create meaning in an indefinite way. According to Cavell, this is the very attraction of metaphor as a form of expression, even if there is always the danger of over-reading (Cavell 1976, p. 79).

  8. 8.

    Cavell cites as examples of poetic expression of this kind “The mind is brushed by sparrow wings,” and “as a calm darkens among water-light” (Cavell 1976, p. 81).

  9. 9.

    “Transcendental argument” refers to a kind of philosophical inquiry that seeks to spell out all the presuppositions that are necessary to make sense of experience, or all the objective conditions that are necessary to make our experience at all. The first technical distinction between the terms “transcendent” and “transcendental” was made by Kant. Kant reserved the term “transcendent” for entities such as God and soul that are said to be beyond human experience and to be unknowable. The term “transcendental” Kant reserved to signify prior thought forms: the innate principles that give the mind the ability to formulate its perceptions and to make experience intelligible.

  10. 10.

    In A Pitch of Philosophy (1994), Cavell introduces an autobiographical example that shows ­vividly the way we have an access to the meaning of a work of art. According to Cavell, in his college music class, a famous teacher, Ernest Bloch, often introduced an exercise to the students by playing something simple at the piano, for instance, a Bach four-part chorale, with one note altered by a half step from Bach’s rendering, and then with the Bach unaltered. Introducing these two versions, he asked the students if they could hear the difference. And then he went on to say: “my version is perfectly correct; but the Bach, the Bach is perfect; late sunlight burning the edges of a cloud. Of course, I do not say you must hear this. Not at all. No. But, if you do not hear it, do not say to yourself that you are a musician. There are many honorable trades, shoe-making for example” (Cavell 1994, pp. 49–50). Cavell confesses that he heard the difference, supposing that not everybody did, and describes how thrilled he was by the drama of this teaching because it made him interested in the understanding of what he heard as well as in the rightness and beauty of what he heard. I think that this sense of a private triumph about what we experience is exactly what ordinary language philosophy aspires towards for our education.

  11. 11.

    The recent discourse of “emotional intelligence” or “emotional literacy” in the practice of ­teaching and learning tends to highlight interpersonal sensitivity and emotional responsiveness not only as an effective pedagogical virtue but also as an educational aim. The term “emotional literacy” was coined and popularized in the 1990s in the field of positive psychology, especially in the UK, whereas the term “emotional intelligence” became popularized in the US by Daniel Goleman’s book Emotional Intelligence (1995).

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Kwak, DJ. (2012). Stanley Cavell’s Ordinary Language Philosophy as an Example of Practicing Philosophy in the Essay-Form: In Search of a Humanistic Approach to Teacher Education. In: Education for Self-transformation. Contemporary Philosophies and Theories in Education, vol 3. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2401-3_5

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