Abstract
The chapter argues that there are several different, and on the face of it incompatible, conceptions of the relationship between rhetoric and argumentation in the more or less current literature. (1) The class of arguments is a member of the class of rhetorical entities or processes. Argumentation is inherently rhetorical. (Perelman, Reboul, Meyer) (2) The class of arguments overlaps with the class of rhetorical entities or processes, so while some arguments are rhetorical, others are not, and part of the domain of rhetoric has to do with entities or processes other than arguments. (Hauser, Kock) (3) Arguments and argumentation are amalgams of three different kinds of properties, rhetorical, dialectical and logical, which correlate with three perspectives from which to consider arguments and argumentation. (Tindale, Wenzel) (4) The rhetorical properties of arguments and argumentation consist of the framing, selecting or formulating arguments or argumentation that can make logically and dialectically good arguments more appealing and persuasive, or can cover the blemishes of logically or dialectically defective arguments. (van Eemeren & Houtlosseer, Johnson)
Reprinted, with permission, from Ton van Haaften, Henrike Jansen, Jaap de Jong and Willem Koetsenruijter (Eds.), Bending Opinion, Essays on Persuasion in the Public Domain, (pp. 95–112). Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2011. I thank an anonymous reviewer for many corrections to and helpful comments on an earlier version.
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Notes
- 1.
“Le rhétorique est la négotiation de la distance entre des individus à propos d’une question donnée.”
- 2.
“L’argumentation fait traditionnellement partie de la rhétorique comme discipline.”
- 3.
“Voici donc la définition que nous proposons: la rhétorique est l’art de persuader par le discours.”
- 4.
“Celle-ci [l’argumentation] vise toujours à faire croire.”
- 5.
I won’t mention another argument that is too controversial to take up here, namely that philosophical claims—those that Kock contends are about truth—are all conceptual, that is, all about how we should conceive of the world, and as such, are all normative.
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Blair, J.A. (2012). Rhetoric and Argumentation. In: Tindale, C. (eds) Groundwork in the Theory of Argumentation. Argumentation Library, vol 21. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2363-4_23
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