Towards a Philosophy of Argument

Abstract

This chapter is an essay in the philosophy of argument. It recommends a way of conceptualizing argument and argumentation that is consistent with arguments being put to a wide range of uses and that frees the definition of argument from association with any particular use. The goal is to construct a framework in terms of which various particular theories of argument can be seen to have their place, and the various controversies in the field of argument studies can be located. I argue that the recommended conceptualizations have the implication that some of the controversies have been misplaced, and either disappear or need to be thought of differently. Specifically, some of the controversies are based on a failure to distinguish different uses of arguments, or else (or as well), a confusion of modes or models of arguments with perspectives on argument. The conception of argument proposed is in an important respect pluralistic, and is hostile to the attempt to reduce the variety of models or uses of arguments to any single one.

Reprinted, with permission, from J. A. Blair, R. H. Johnson, H. V. Hansen, & C.W. Tindale (Eds.), Informal Logic at 25, Proceedings of the 25th anniversary conference, Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation, 2003. CD-ROM.