Abstract
Structural criteria for defining the legitimacy of NGOs as partners of corporations often focus on technical aspects. As a consequence, structural criteria might serve as indicators for the descriptive legitimacy of NGOs but not for their normative legitimacy. This becomes evident in attempts such as to define NGOs by assessing whether they qualify for tax-exempt status in accordance with the US Internal Revenue Code. Legal accountability must not be confused with normative legitimacy. It is however admitted that structural measures such as disclosure statements might help to reveal corporate front groups, which constitute the most extreme case of blurred boundaries between NGOs and interest groups. Yet, beyond that, the orientation to be gained from accountability mechanisms which NGOs deploy is often hampered by the fact that these mechanisms mainly address the requirements of governments and donors. When it comes to the accountability of NGOs to their constituency, structural criteria are not as unambiguous. It is argued that NGOs need to be linked to their activist constituency to some extent in order to receive input from the grassroots. But structural criteria do not help in assessing the right degree of proximity between NGOs and more radical groups. Structural criteria thus only provide limited normative orientation. They might help to reveal the blurred boundaries between NGOs and interest groups but in general they fail to capture the fine lines between the three actor types.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
As mentioned in the section on the addressees of NGO legitimization (in the section “Addressees of NGO Legitimization” (Chapter 1)), Slim’s conception of voice accountability is termed downward accountability by other authors (Brown and Jagadananda, 2007: 24; Fowler, 2000: 63; Ebrahim, 2003: 816; Edwards and Hulme, 1996: 969).
- 2.
However, if we believe Hertel, the legal constraints which the nonprofit tax status entails, seem yet to be effective in securing legitimacy in so far as “(s)ome groups leave the NGO sector entirely, forgoing the traditional 501(c)(3) nonprofit tax status under U.S. law in order to be able to gain revenue from the promotion of strategies to enhance corporate responsibility” (Hertel, 2010: 172).
- 3.
On why requiring democratic structures is not tenable from a deliberative point of view see section “Implications of Restricting the Content of Public Reason” (Chapter 7).
- 4.
Suchman contrasts this conception of legitimacy with moral legitimacy, which reflects conscious moral judgments about the rightness of an activity. As a third notion he introduces cognitive legitimacy, which depends on the social acceptance of an organization and its behaviour (Suchman, 1995: 578ff.). As we will see later, the difference between pragmatic and moral legitimacy is especially relevant for the context at hand, because it is exemplary in pointing out the different notions of legitimacy that are typically associated with interest groups (self-interested calculations) and NGOs (moral legitimacy).
- 5.
Nijhof, de Bruijn, and Honders (2008: 164) note that the problem is further aggravated by the fact that NGOs are most likely to be sponsored or involved as partners by companies who predominantly follow a strategy of risk control. Such a strategy means that these companies only see NGO-business partnerships as a strategic tool in order to maintain their reputation or in order to prevent it from being damaged. Such companies should be approached especially critically by NGOs.
- 6.
The dependence can also assume less straightforward forms. The pressure might not directly stem from companies as funding sources but rather from foundations that make the granting of funds to NGOs dependent on the NGOs’ engagement with a company (SustainAbility, 2003: 33).
- 7.
“Greenpeace relies on donations from generous individuals to carry out our work. In order to remain independent, we do not accept funding from governments, corporations or political parties.” (http://www.greenpeace.org.uk/donate)
- 8.
Other means for avoiding structural co-optation are a thorough monitoring of the projects involved in a partnership and explicitly stated permission to criticize the other partner in activities that are not part of the partnership. We could extend this with a limitation on co-branding, and clear guidelines on the interplay between confidentiality and transparency in various aspects of the partnership. Moreover, both partners are usually allowed to withdraw from the cooperation any time (SustainAbility, 2003: 30).
- 9.
Snow, Soule, and Kriesi (2004: 7) find a similar distinction at work between social movements and interest groups. According to them, interest groups “are generally embedded within the political arena”, whereas social movements “are typically outside of the polity”. Snow concludes from the embedding of interest groups that they are recognized as legitimate actors within the system whereas social movements usually lack the same “standing or degree of access to or recognition among political authorities”. Obviously, Snow et al. advocate a descriptive notion of legitimacy which equates with social acceptance.
- 10.
BP’s official justification was that “the time to consider the policy dimensions of climate change is not when the link between greenhouse gases and climate change is conclusively proven, but when the possibility cannot be discounted and is taken seriously by the society of which we are part. We in BP have reached that point.” (Earth Policy Institute, 2006). One can easily recognize the company’s attempt to salvage its reputation by taking societal perceptions as a benchmark for its actions. When Ford left the GCC a couple of years later, it stated that “over the course of time, membership in the Global Climate Coalition has become something of an impediment for Ford Motor Company to achieving our environmental objectives” (Earth Policy Institute, 2006). With this statement, Ford made it clear that it realized the impending threat to its credibility in the field of environmental responsibility if it kept its membership in the GCC alive. The GCC eventually disbanded in 2002 (Sourcewatch, 2007).
- 11.
A reaction to the professional NGOs’ disconnection from their constituencies can be seen in mass membership organizations of the poor and excluded in the southern half of the globe which typically focus on activist behaviour, such as the Landless Rural Workers Movement (MST) in Brazil (Fowler, 2000: 31).
References
Albrow, M., and H. Anheier. “Introduction.” In Global Civil Society 2006/7, edited by M. Glasius, M. Kaldor, and H. Anheier, 1–15. London: Sage, 2005.
Anderson, K. “The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, the Role of International Non-Governmental Organizations and the Idea of Civil Society”. European Journal of International Law 11 (1) (2000): 91–120.
Apollonio, D.E., and L.A. Bero. “The Creation of Industry Front Groups: The Tobacco Industry and ‘Get Government Off Our Back’”. American Journal of Public Health 97 (3) (2007): 419–27.
Bendell, J. “In Whose Name? The Accountability of Corporate Social Responsibility”. Development in Practice 15 (3) (2005): 362–74.
Bosso, C.J. “Rethinking the Concept of Membership in Nature Advocacy Organizations”. Policy Studies Journal 31 (3) (2003): 397–411.
Brinkerhoff, J.M. “Government-Nonprofit Partnership: A Defining Framework”. Public Administration and Development 22 (1) (2002): 19–30.
Carter, S.M. “Mongoven, Biscoe & Duchin: Destroying Tobacco Control Activism from the Inside”. Tobacco Control 11 (2) (2002): 112–8.
Chandhoke, N. “How Global is Global Civil Society?” Journal of World-Systems Research XI (2) (2005): 355–71.
Clark, J.D. “Ethical Globalization: The Dilemmas and Challenges of Internationalizing Civil Society”. In Global Citizen Action, edited by M. Edwards and G. John, 17–28. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001.
Den Hond, F., and F.G.A. De Bakker. Ideologically Motivated Activism: How Activist Groups Influence Corporate Social Change Behavior. Academy of Management Review 32 (3) (2007): 901–24.
Ebrahim, A. “Accountability in Practice: Mechanisms for NGOs”. World Development 31 (5) (2003): 813–29.
Edwards, M. NGO Rights and Responsibilities. A New Deal for Global Governance. London: The Foreign Policy Centre/NCVO, 2000.
Edwards, M. “Introduction”. In Global Citizen Action, edited by M. Edwards and J. Gaventa, 1–14. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001.
Edwards, M., and D. Hulme. “Too Close for Comfort? The Impact of Official Aid on Nongovernmental Organizations”. World Development 24 (6) (1996): 961–73.
Fowler, A. Civil Society, NGDOs and Social Development: Changing the Rules of the Game. Geneva: UNRISD, 2000.
Fries, R. “The Legal Environment of Civil Society”. In The Global Civil Society Yearbook 2003, edited by M. Kaldor, H. Anheier, and M. Glasius, 221–38. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Gray, R., J. Bebbington, and D. Collison. “NGOs, Civil Society and Accountability: Making the People Accountable to Capital”. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 19 (3) (2006): 319–48.
Haines, H.H. “Black Radicalization and the Funding of Civil Rights: 1957–1970”. Social Problems 32 (1) (1984): 31–43.
Hendriks, C.M. “Integrated Deliberation: Reconciling Civil Society’s Dual Role in Deliberative Democracy”. Political Studies 54 (3) (2006): 486–508.
Hertel, S. “The Paradox of Partnership: Assessing New Forms of NGO Advocacy on Labor Rights”. Ethics & International Affairs 24 (2) (2010): 171–89.
Hilhorst, D. The Real World of NGOs: Discourses, Diversity, and Development. London: Zed Books, 2003.
Kaldor, M. Global Civil Society: An Answer to War. Cambridge (UK): Polity Press, 2003b.
Kovach, H., C. Neligan, and S. Burall. Power Without Accountability? The One World Trust Global Accountability Report. London: One World Trust, 2003.
Le Ber, M.J., and O. Branzei. “Towards a Critical Theory of Value Creation in Cross-Sector Partnerships”. Organization 17 (5) (2010): 599–629.
Meadowcroft, J. “Democracy and Accountability: The Challenge for Cross-Sectoral Partnerships”. In Partnerships, Governance and Sustainable Development: Reflection on Theory and Practice, edited by P. Glasbergen, F. Biermann, and A.P.J. Mol, 194–213. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007.
Mitlin, D. “The NGO Sector and its Role in Strengthening Civil Society and Securing Good Governance”. In Civil Society and International Development, edited by A. Bernard, H. Helmich, and P.B. Lehning, 81–96. Paris: OECD, 1998.
Murphy, D.F., and J. Bendell. Partners in Time? Business, NGOs and Sustainable Development. Geneva: UNRISD, 1999.
Nelson, P. “Information, Location, and Legitimacy: The Changing Bases of Civil Society Involvement in International Economic Policy”. In Global Citizen Action, edited by M. Edwards and J. Garaventa, 59–72. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001.
Palazzo, G., and A.G. Scherer. “Corporate Legitimacy as Deliberation: A Communicative Framework”. Journal of Business Ethics 66 (1) (2006): 71–88.
Parker, J. “Cooperation and Conflict: An Analysis of Political Legitimacy Claims in Lobbying for Education for Sustainable Development”. Contemporary Politics 11 (2) (2005): 169–77.
Scholte, J.A. “Civil Society and Democratically Accountable Global Governance”. Government and Opposition 39 (2) (2004): 211–33.
Shamir, R. “The De-radicalization of Corporate Social Responsibility”. Critical Sociology (Brill Academic Publishers) 30 (3) (2004): 669–89.
Snow, D.A., S.A. Soule, and H. Kriesi. “Mapping the Terrain”. In The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, edited by D.A. Snow, S.A. Soule, and H. Kriesi, 3–16. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004.
Suchman, M.C. “Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches”. Academy of Management Review 20 (3) (1995): 571–610.
SustainAbility. The 21st Century NGO. In the Market for Change. London: SustainAbility, 2003.
Teegen, H., J.P. Doh, and S. Vachani. “The Importance of Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) in Global Governance and Value Creation: An International Business Research Agenda. Journal of International Business Studies 35 (6) (2004): 463–83.
Trumpy, A.J. “Subject to Negotiation: The Mechanisms Behind Co-Optation and Corporate Reform”. Social Problems 55 (4) (2008): 480–500.
Uphoff, N.T. “Why NGOs Are Not a Third Sector: A Sectoral Analysis with Some Thoughts on Accountability, Sustainability and Evaluation. In Beyond the Magic Bullet: NGO Performance and Accountability in the Post-Cold War World, edited by M. Edwards and D. Hulme, 23–39. West Hartford: Kumarian Press, 1996.
van Huijstee, M., and P. Glasbergen. “NGOs Moving Business: An Analysis of Contrasting Strategies”. Business & Society 49 (4) (2010): 591–618.
Warren, M.E. Democracy and Association. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001.
Cater, N. “Oxfam to Shun Iraq Funds from Belligerent States.” 2003. First Accessed March 17, 2008. http://www.alertnet.org/thefacts/reliefresources/602345.htm.
Covey, J., and D.L. Brown. “Critical Cooperation: An Alternative Form of Civil Society-Business Engagement”. IDR Reports 17 (1) (2001).
Earth Policy Institute. “The Rise and Fall of the Global Climate Coalition.” 2006. First Accessed July 20, 2006. http://www.earth-policy.org/Alerts/Alert6.htm.
Hari, J. “The Wrong Kind of Green”. The Nation, March 22, 2010.
Hoffman, A.J. “Shades of Green”. Stanford Social Innovation Review Spring Issue (2009): 40–49.
Leggewie, C. “Transnational Movements and the Question of Democracy.” 2003. First Accessed May 20, 2007. http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2003-02-03-leggewie-en.html.
Multinational Monitor. “Untitled.” 2006. First Accessed August 20, 2006. http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/links/scat.php?scat_id=12.
Neuman, W. “Save the Children Breaks with Soda Tax Effort”. The New York Times, December 15, 2010.
Pauly, D. “Aquacalypse Now”. The New Republic, September 28, 2009.
Slim, H. “By What Authority? The Legitimacy and Accountability of NGOs”. The International Council on Human Rights Policy International Meeting on ‘Global Trends and Human Rights – Before and after September 11’, Geneva, January 10–12, 2002.
Sourcewatch. “Untitled.” 2007. Accessed May 2007http://www.sourcewatch.org.
United Nations Economic and Social Council. Consultative Relationship Between the United Nations and Non-governmental Organizations. Resolution 1996/31 (1996).
Brown, L.D., and Jagadananda. “Civil Society Legitimacy and Accountability: Issues and Challenges.” 2007. Hauser Center Working Paper (32). First Accessed January 27, 2008. http://www.civicusassembly.org/upload/File/Legitimacy%20%20Accountability%20Scoping%20Report%20-%20Final%20English%20..pdf.
Nijhof, A., T. de Bruijn, and H. Honders. “Partnerships for Corporate Social Responsibility: A Review of Concepts and Strategic Options”. Management Decision 46 (1) (2008): 152–67.
Simpson, D., K. Lefroy, and Y. Tsarenko. “Together and Apart: Exploring Structure of the Corporate–NPO Relationship”. Journal of Business Ethics 101 (2) (2011): 297–311.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2012 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Baur, D. (2012). Structural Characteristics of Legitimate Partner NGOs. In: NGOs as Legitimate Partners of Corporations. Issues in Business Ethics, vol 36. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2254-5_13
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2254-5_13
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-007-2253-8
Online ISBN: 978-94-007-2254-5
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)