Abstract
This chapter is about moral epistemology. The chapter begins with considerations the prospects of a priori or armchair ethics. Next, the nature of inductive reasoning is considered, attending to the role induction plays in morality. After some general discussion of the different types of induction in Aristotle’s work, we see that one specific type, what has been called “intuitive induction,” is helpful for seeing how we come to know basic moral principles. The final sections of this chapter focus on Aristotle’s foundationalism and how it might apply to his ethics.
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Notes
- 1.
Consider Kant’s influence in the work of Moore, Prichard, Donagan, Gewirth, Nagel, and Korsgaard, just to name a few.
- 2.
Of course, many do emphasize the importance of an empirical approach. Among them are Richard Boyd, Gilbert Harman, Nicholas Sturgeon, David Brink, and John Doris.
- 3.
Dancy (2004) calls the position “Humean Realism.”
- 4.
When I claim that this is an Aristotelian idea I have in mind the fact that Aristotle seems to be the first moral theorist to have placed importance on the idea of dispositions of an agent under ideal circumstances.
- 5.
The test is on the Web at http://https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/
- 6.
Laurence BonJour’s a priori solution to the problem of induction is among the most persuasive of the various solutions. BonJour (1998: chap. 7) presents an excellent overview of the problem of induction, proposed solutions, objections to proposed solution, and BonJour’s own a priori resolution.
- 7.
- 8.
BonJour’s a priori solution to the problem is a promising strategy to employ.
- 9.
Ibid., p.105.
- 10.
At Topics 105a11 it is suggested that induction is one kind of dialectic. One should keep in mind that any shortcomings or limitations that are inherent in dialectic might in some way apply to induction. At the heart of this issue is a question about whether or not dialectic is able to provide justification beyond mere coherence.
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Winter, M. (2012). How Are Ethical Principles Known?. In: Rethinking Virtue Ethics. Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy, vol 28. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2193-7_4
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