Abstract
This chapter considers objections to a deductive model of Aristotelian virtue ethics coming from various sources: from within virtue ethics, from social science, from ethical theory and from the philosophy of biology. Many have thought that Aristotle’s remarks about the lack of precision in ethics have implications that undermine the deductive approach developed in this book. An additional concern is that character-based ethics is wrong-headed based on some of the findings of behavioral psychology. Another objection arises from the long-standing tenet of virtue theory that moral virtue and knowledge are connected in some important way; having virtue seems to require having knowledge. Some have thought that certain virtues require ignorance, which challenges the long-standing assumption. Lastly, many understand Aristotle’s ethics as being based on a teleological conception of human nature to be a serious reason to dismiss the theory. Each of these objections is considered and responses are offered.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsNotes
- 1.
Some have drawn a distinction between strong and weak foundationalism. A strong foundationalist holds that foundational beliefs are self-justifying or self-certifying while a weak foundationalist claims that foundational beliefs are initially credible but subject to future revision. The picture of justification Aristotle presents in the Posterior Analytics is one the strong foundationalist would probably find appealing. If, however, dialectic provides justification for certain beliefs, then it is not so clear that Aristotle does not espouse a weaker version of foundationalism. BonJour’s (1998) moderate rationalism presents a contemporary defense of a type of weak foundationalism.
- 2.
An example of another approach is (Dancy 1985). Dancy first considers and subsequently rejects foundationalism for reasons similar to Brink’s. He favors a coherentist perspective but thinks that this position breaks down under the skeptic’s challenge.
- 3.
This issue will be addressed more thoroughly in Chapter 4.
- 4.
This is especially true with the stronger versions of foundationalism since subjective versions hold that foundational beliefs are indubitable while objective versions claim the foundational principles are infallible. There are ways of understanding Aristotelian nous that render it thoroughly empirical in nature (Lesher 1973). This empiricist approach is quite compatible with the weaker subjective and objective versions of foundationalism. It is not easy to see how the empiricist account of nous could be compatible with stronger versions of foundationalism.
- 5.
Early in Nicomachean Ethics I Aristotle clearly allows for some things to be pursued for their own sake and for the sake of other things, so that even if cognitive goals are subordinate to practical ones in the case of medicine and ethics, this does not mean that these disciplines don’t have cognitive goals that are also pursued for their own sake.
- 6.
Although the sort of method Aristotle employs in the Nicomachean Ethics might be called a “practical science,” the sense in which it would be a science under this construal would be loose and analogical at best. However, having made this acknowledgement, Aristotle’s elaborate and detailed discussion of criteria of preferability or desirability in Topics III indicates that Aristotle thought that there is more precision to be had in even this portion of ethics than many wish to acknowledge. More will be said about this in Chapter 3.
- 7.
Lennox (1993) does not formulate an argument in this particular way, but he does present and discuss the different types of teleology mentioned here.
- 8.
Lennox cites (Darwin 1964: 149, 152, 224, 237, 451).
- 9.
More will said about this point when for-the-most-part relations are discussed in detail in the next chapter.
References
Anagnostopoulos, Georgios. Aristotle on the Goals and Exactness of Ethics. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994.
Brink, David. Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
Chisholm, Roderick. Theory of Knowledge. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1966.
Dahl, Norman. Aristotle, Practical Reason, and Weakness of Will. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1984.
Dancy, Jonathan. Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985.
Doris, John. Lack of Character. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Driver, Julia. Uneasy Virtue. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Gladwell, Malcolm. Outliers: The Story of Success. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2008.
Hull, David. Philosophy of Biological Science in Foundations of Philosophy Series. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1974.
Lennox, James. “Darwin was a Teleologist.” Biology and Philosophy 8 (1993): 409–21.
Lesher, James. “The Meaning of Nous in the Posterior Analytics.” Phronesis 18 (1973): 44–68.
Mackie, J.L. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977.
Mayr, Ernst. Toward a New Philosophy of Biology: Observations of an Evolutionist. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988.
Moore, G.E. Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903.
Sidgwick, H. The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1907.
Audi, Robert. “Epistemic Virtue and Justified Belief.” In Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Darley, John M., and Daniel C. Batson. “From Jerusalem to Jericho: A Study of Situational and Dispositional Variables in Helping Behavior.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 27 (1973).
Flanagan, Owen. “Virtue and Ignorance.” Journal of Philosophy 87 (1990).
Kripke, Saul. “Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference.” In edited by Steven Davis, 1991.
Levine, Robert. A Geography of Time: The Temporal Misadventures of a Social Psychologist, or How Every Culture Keeps Time Just a Little Bit Differently. Basic Books, 1997.
Reid, Thomas. Essays on the Active Powers of Man. Reprinted in Raphael, D. The British Moralists. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969.
Schueler, G.F. “Why Modesty is a Virtue.” Ethics (April, 1997): 467–85.
Sober, Elliot. Darwin’s Universal Impact. Cambridge University Lecture, 2009.
Winter, Michael, and John Tauer.“Virtue Theory and Social Psychology.” The Journal of Value Inquiry Fall (2006).
BonJour, Laurence. In Defense of Pure Reason. London: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Isen, Alice, and Paula Levin. “Effect of Feeling Good on Helping: Cookies and kindness.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 21 (1972): 384–8.
Bennett, Jonathan. “The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn.” Philosophy 49 (1974): 123–34. Reprinted in Sommers, Christina, and Fred Sommers, eds. Vice and Virtue and Everyday Life, 2nd ed. San Diego, CA: Hartcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1989.
Darwin, Charles. On the Origin of Species: A Facsimile of the First Edition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2012 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Winter, M. (2012). Moral Realism and Virtue Ethics. In: Rethinking Virtue Ethics. Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy, vol 28. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2193-7_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2193-7_2
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-007-2192-0
Online ISBN: 978-94-007-2193-7
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)