Abstract
In 1.3.9, Hume introduces two levels of reality. He does this to show why the relations of resemblance and/or contiguity cannot reflexively produce vivacious ideas in the manner that causation can (T 1.3.9.2; SBN 107). But the implications of Hume’s account of reality are far-reaching. In fact, if we don’t take his two systems of reality into account, we can’t understand his notion of an object, his many forms of belief, nor his notion of justification. Oddly though, Hume’s two systems of reality are largely overlooked in Hume scholarship, if not ignored altogether (with some exceptions, e.g. Kemp Smith 1941; Owen 1999; Loeb 2002).
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Notes
- 1.
- 2.
Note that Owen suggests that only Hume’s second system of reality entails beliefs, while the first does not (1999, pp. 166–8).
- 3.
The examples listed above comprise what Falkenstein (1997 b) calls analogies (p. 37). They comprise the fourth of four species of association identified in 1.3.12, “Of the Probability of Causes.” The first three, are, as Falkenstein puts it (pp. 35–36): “Imperfect Experience,” “Contrary Causes,” and “Instinctive and Statistically Guided Inferences Concerning Causes.” In all three cases, it is rather obvious that the resemblance set q’n−1 is not missing. And thus, Hume’s Rome example does not pertain to these three species of probability.
- 4.
Recall that in Chap. 2, we saw that the other four kinds of reasoning are: 1. Natural probable reasoning. 2. Philosophical probable reasoning. 3. Transcendental probable reasoning. 4. Demonstrative and intuitive reasoning.
- 5.
Hume presents his own examples here, but I find them rather obscure. They do not pertain to cases where the relations of resemblance and contiguity are taken alone, i.e. are “single,” but instead, when they work in conjunction with the relation of cause and effect. For instance, in regard to resemblance, he argues that the idea of a moving body α (the cause) resembles the idea of another moving body β (the effect). As a result, we tend to “bind … the objects in the closest and most intimate manner to each other, so as to make us imagine them to be absolutely inseperable” (T 1.3.9.10; SBN 112). And thus, we mistakenly conclude that the cause necessitates the effect in a demonstrative manner, where we can, it is alleged, derive the effect just upon consideration of the cause (without appealing to experience).
References
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Rocknak, S. (2013). The Two Systems of Reality. In: Imagined Causes: Hume's Conception of Objects. The New Synthese Historical Library, vol 71. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2187-6_3
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