Abstract
In the course of explaining the relation of cause and effect and the notion of belief, Hume is often forced to appeal to “objects.” In fact, in just 1.3.6 he uses the word ‘object,’ or ‘objects’ or alternatively, ‘bodies’ at least 38 times. As a result, his account of cause and effect and belief cannot be exhaustively explained until we carefully develop Hume’s thoughts on objects. However, to even begin our discussion of objects, we need to have at least a general grasp of Hume’s notion of causality and belief at our disposal. In particular, we need to have a firm grasp on the natural relation of causality.
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- 1.
Granted, Hume hardly ever uses the term ‘induction.’ But, as pointed out by Millican (1995), although Hume tends to use the terms ‘moral reasoning,’ ‘probable reasoning’ and ‘reasoning concerning matters of facts’ instead, these terms can be misleading. So, for our general purposes, we will stick to the term ‘induction.’
- 2.
Keep in mind though, that all of Hume’s “principles” may admit of exceptions (recall Chap. 1).
- 3.
See Sect. 6 of this Chapter for more on Humean “certainty,” particularly, demonstrative and intuitive certainty.
- 4.
See Sect. 6 of this Chapter for more on Humean reason. For the time being, we may simply think of “reason” as the reflective comparison of ideas.
- 5.
De Pierris stresses that philosophical “reflection” can occur without having established any natural associative principles. However, we see in Parts II–IV of this book that is impossible; all reflective thought presupposes at least our ability to think in terms of the natural relation of causality (c.f. Schliesser 2007).
- 6.
This is somewhat misleading language, for as will be shown in Part II of this book, we never, according to Hume, have impressions of “objects” that admit of a perfect identity (i.e. are conceived of as invariable and uninterrupted). However, ideas of objects that we imagine to admit of perfect identity are, indeed, based on actual impressions, and so, as we see in Parts II–IV, Hume’s remarks noted above are not inconsistent with his general theory of objects.
- 7.
However, keep in mind, for reasons explained in Chap. 1, that Hume does not mean that memories are impressions. Rather, memories are ideas. However, in this case, a memory of an impression is as good as an actual impression in the respect that it is based on an impression, and so, could not, by definition, be imagined. Also, Hume is not claiming here that we must have an impression of a cause, and so, we must be careful to note that he is not contradicting himself. Rather, his claim is that we must have an impression of some “object” that we will later characterize as a cause.
- 8.
Or as Hume puts it: “All our arguments concerning causes and effects consist of both an impression of the memory or senses, and of the idea of that existence, which produces the object of the impression, or is produc’d by it. Here therefore we have three things to explain, viz. First, the original impression. Secondly, the transition to the idea of the connected cause or effect. Thirdly, the nature and qualities of the idea” (T 1.3.5.1; SBN 84). Note that although Hume does discuss (2) and (3) in 1.3.6 in terms of his account of how we come up with the idea of a necessary “constant conjunction,” namely, the idea of cause and effect, he does not fully explain what he has in mind by the “existence” of a cause motivated by the impression at hand, or alternatively, the “existence” of the effect motivated by the impression at hand, until he introduces what I refer to as causally-produced belief in 1.3.7–1.3.9. Moreover, we should also realize that (3) represents Hume’s somewhat implicit inclusion of thinking in terms of “necessary” conditions. For if, upon being presented with an impression of the effect, I am led to think of the cause, then the cause is generally thought of as a necessary condition for the effect.
- 9.
However, Hume explains, it certainly may be the case that after a long period of time, our memories fade, and as a result, lose their “vivacity.” At this point it would be difficult to determine if such perceptions are memories or are products of the imagination. Conversely, imagined ideas may, if put forth by particularly deft liars, become especially vivacious. As a result, such ideas would begin to seem like actual memories (T 1.3.5.6; SBN 86). But these are exceptions to the rule, and, as we saw in Chap. 1, Hume’s naturalism allows for a certain degree of exceptions, so long as they are irregular enough.
- 10.
Note: “every kind of opinion or judgment, which amounts not to knowledge, is deriv’d entirely from the force and vivacity of the perception, and that these qualities constitute in the mind, what we call the BELIEF of the existence of any object. This force and this vivacity are most conspicuous in the memory; and therefore our confidence in the veracity of that faculty is the greatest imaginable, and equals in many respects the assurance of a demonstration” (T 1.3.13.19; SBN 153–4).
- 11.
Falkenstein clearly acknowledges and discusses the role that memory and present impressions play in Hume’s many forms of belief. However, he suggests that only the ideas “produced by” (p. 33) and “derived from” (p. 34) memory and present impressions constitutes belief. Thus, he rules out impressions as constituting a form of belief.
- 12.
Garrett clearly emphasizes the role that memory plays in regard to belief (p. 213), but he consistently refers to beliefs as ideas, which are the products of belief forming mechanisms, rather than being impressions. As such, he rules out elementary beliefs.
- 13.
Throughout this book, I use lower case Greek letters to refer to variable objects, e.g. ‘δ’ in the example cited above, and upper case Greek letters to refer to particular objects, e.g. ‘Δ.’
- 14.
Note that Hume never demands that one’s impressions of Δ and Φ must be of the same nature, e.g. if one sees Δ, one must necessarily see Φ. Rather, he seems to imply that one’s experience of Δ and Φ could consist of any combination of different kinds of impressions, e.g. when one sees Δ, one could consistently hear Φ, and so on.
- 15.
We will also see that elementary beliefs play a fundamental role in Hume’s notion of a “justified” causal inference and a “justified” belief in an object. See Part IV of this book for more detail.
- 16.
Here, Hume seems to rule out memories of sense impressions, given that, as we saw in Chap. 1, all memories are ideas. However, in light of our preceding analysis of 1.3, we may conclude that this is not the case. Rather, Hume is ruling out any idea that is not directly related to an impression. That is, he is ruling out any idea that is not what we have defined as elementary belief. Moreover, it’s worth noting that Hume’s definition of the natural relation of causality on T 1.3.14.31; SBN 169–70 includes the association of two ideas, as well as the association of an impression and an idea. Doing so accommodates the association between a memory of an impression and the idea it reflexively produces. Moreover, as we will see above, further on in his analysis of the natural causal relation (particularly, in the course of giving his “negative account of induction”) he explicitly reintroduces a memory of impression into the natural causal equation (T 1.3.6.6; SBN 89).
- 17.
Owen discusses what I call causally-produced belief at some length in his book, Hume’s Reason (1999, p. 160). However, to avoid confusion, realize that Owen’s notion of simple belief corresponds to my notion of causally-produced belief, and Owen’s notion of complex belief roughly corresponds to what I will call “indirect belief” in Chap. 3. See also Falkenstein (2007b) for an account of different kinds of belief in Hume’s philosophy.
- 18.
Note: “The next degree of these qualities [of force and vivacity] is that deriv’d from the relation of cause and effect; and this too is very great, especially when the conjunction is found by experience to be perfectly constant, and when the object, which is present to us, exactly resembles those, of which we have had experience” (T 1.3.13.19; SBN 153–4; emphases added).
- 19.
As we will see in Parts II–III of this book, according to Hume, all objects are nothing more than ideas, regardless if they admit of a “perfect identity” (i.e. are conceived of as uninterrupted and invariable). Recognizing this sheds a bit of light on the otherwise obtuse passage cited above regarding the distinction between “demonstration” and “probable reasoning.” For without realizing as much, one might wonder how Hume could suddenly classify an “object” as an idea such that probable reasoning, which concerns the comparison of “objects,” must also be understood as the comparison of ideas.
- 20.
Exactly why this is the case (particularly, why this is “just”) is discussed at length in Part IV of this book.
- 21.
Millican (2002c) refers to Hume’s discussion of powers in both the Treatise and the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding as a “coda;” i.e. a discussion that serves to illustrate, or round out the negative argument concerning induction. As such, in agreement with our discussion above, Millican argues that Hume meant to show that even if there were such things as “powers,” Hume’s skepticism regarding the rational basis for induction still holds. As a result, especially in the Enquiry, it is clear that Hume’s negative argument concerning induction does not presuppose his positive account of induction (which we discuss in more detail in Sects. 4.2 and 4.3 of this chapter). For even if we did suppose that causation is not a function of mere regularity, i.e. even if we did eschew Hume’s positive account of induction, and in its stead, adopt a causal power theory, such a theory could not be justified by reason (as shown above). Thus, Millican rightly concludes, although Hume’s negative account of induction occurs in the middle of his positive account of induction in the Treatise, the former does not presuppose the latter.
- 22.
- 23.
See Garrett (1997) for a more detailed rejection of this reading of Hume’s negative argument (pp. 83–88). In brief, Garrett argues that these commentators could not be right because 1. They do not correctly interpret Hume’s use of the word ‘reason’ in regard to the negative argument, where they claim that it only applies to deductive reasoning. 2. Hume seems to clearly disagree with this reading when he paraphrases the negative argument elsewhere, e.g. T 1.3.12.21; SBN 139 and T Abs. 21; SBN 653–4 (limiting ourselves to just the Treatise). 3. Hume clearly argues that probable reasoning cannot “found” the principle of uniformity (as I claim above).
- 24.
Or as Hume puts it: “We have already taken notice of certain relations, which make us pass from one object to another, even tho’ there be no reason to determine us to that transition; and this we may establish for a general rule, that wherever the mind constantly and uniformly makes a transition without any reason, it is influenc’d by these relations” (T 1.3.6.12; SBN 92; emphasis added). Here he seems to be referring to T 1.1.4 and T 1.1.5.1; SBN 13. In the latter portion of the text he writes: “The word relation is commonly us’d in two senses considerably different from each other. Either for that quality, by which two ideas are connected together in the imagination, and one naturally introduces the other, after the manner above-explained, or for that particular circumstance, in which, even upon the arbitrary union of two ideas in the fancy, we may think proper to compare them.” Granted, at first glance, Hume may seem to only be concerned with how we generally use the word ‘relation’ in this passage, and thus, he does not necessarily abide by this distinction himself. However, this could not be the case, for as we have seen, much of 1.3 is concerned with explicating the mechanism behind how we come to naturally associate perceptions in a causal manner, not how we say that we come to naturally associate perceptions in a causal manner. Meanwhile, he defines reason as a “comparing” process on at least T 1.3.2.2; SBN 73 (c.f. Sect. 6 of this chapter); this is not an account of how we say that we reason, it is an account of how we reason. Moreover, notice that in T 1.1.5.1; SBN 13, he refers to T 1.1.4; in this section he briefly explains how we naturally associate ideas, not how we say we associate ideas.
- 25.
- 26.
Hume is careful to point out that this “internal impression” is not a sense impression, and nor is it an ordinary impression of reflexion because it is not, ultimately, derived from a sense impression. Thus, it does not appear to admit of degrees of vivacity. Rather, as explained above, it is a conditioned reflex.
- 27.
Thus, after at least Stroud (19911993) and de Pierris (2002), I think that according to Hume, the idea of necessity is “projected” as a result of a psychological conditioning process. However, what this necessity is projected onto (i.e. “objects” or perceptions) cannot be effectively ascertained until we discover just what Hume means by an “object.”
- 28.
In 1.3.12, “Of the Probability of Causes,” Hume presents four “species” of probability, where we are not strictly determined to think q´ whenever we have an impression p. Falkenstein characterizes them as: imperfect experience, contrary causes, instinctive and statistically guided inferences concerning contrary causes and analogy (2007b, pp. 34–36). All but the first case involves some consideration of the ideas p´ and q,´ and thus, must be understood as philosophical relations of causality, i.e. relations that involve reflection.
- 29.
An account of Hume’s more nuanced understanding of the distinction between belief and knowledge falls outside the scope of our discussion.
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Rocknak, S. (2013). Elementary Belief, Causally-Produced Belief and the Natural Relation of Causality. In: Imagined Causes: Hume's Conception of Objects. The New Synthese Historical Library, vol 71. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2187-6_2
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