Abstract
In his final notebooks, published as On Certainty, Wittgenstein puts forward a radical picture regarding the structure of reasons. It is argued that this conception of the structure of reasons can be used to motivate a kind of restricted skepticism which shares some essential features with the classical Pyrrhonian skeptical stance. I christen the view that results, “Wittgensteinian Pyrrhonism.”
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Notes
- 1.
For example, as Williams (2004) persuasively points out, the earlier sections (§§1–65) of On Certainty are in fact concerned with a very different kind of skeptical problem than much of the rest of the text.
- 2.
See, for example, OC, §§341–3. Although the “hinge” metaphor is the dominant symbolism in the book, it is accompanied by various other metaphors, such as the following: that these propositions constitute the “scaffolding” of our thoughts (OC, §211); that they form the “foundations of our language-games” (OC, §§401–3); and also that they represent the implicit “world-picture” from within which we inquire, the “inherited background against which [we] distinguish between true and false” (OC, §§94–5).
- 3.
Note that I talk of believing/doubting “with good reason” here, rather than simply talking of rational belief/doubt. The reason for this is that while Wittgenstein certainly sees no distinction between a groundless doubt and an irrational doubt, there’s nothing in On Certainty to suggest that he would make a similar claim about belief. Indeed, it is consistent with Wittgenstein’s remarks on rational belief in On Certainty that a belief that has not been subject to a legitimate challenge may be rationally held even though the agent lacks any positive rational basis for that belief (see, e.g., OC, §550). As we will see, however, this asymmetry between doubt and belief does not affect Wittgenstein’s argument and so we may legitimately set this distinction to one side here. The reason for this is that Wittgenstein surely does hold that in order for a belief to be rationally held it should be possible for it to be grounded in reasons, and yet Wittgenstein’s claim is precisely that those propositions which we are most certain of can never be grounded in reasons, and so can never be rationally held. I am grateful to Diego Machuca for pressing me on this point.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
I discuss this argument in more detail in Pritchard (2010), where I also specifically consider the question of whether such an argument provides a basis for epistemic relativism (I contend that it does not). See also Pritchard (forthcoming).
- 7.
- 8.
Such is the defining feature of epistemic externalism. See Kornblith (2001) for a good collection of articles discussing the epistemic externalism/internalism distinction. Note, however, that one does not need to be an epistemic externalist in order to hold that knowledge can be possessed in the absence of appropriate positive rational support for the target belief, since even some prominent epistemic internalists, such as Williams (2001) and Wright (2004), maintain that a belief can amount to knowledge even in the absence of positive rational support (in both cases because they argue that at least some beliefs enjoy a default entitlement). For discussion of these proposals in light of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, see Pritchard (2005c).
- 9.
- 10.
This is certainly how Sextus Empiricus (Bury 1933, p. 3) characterizes Academic skepticism at the beginning of his Outlines of Pyrrhonism anyway, since he claims that they “have asserted that [knowledge] cannot be apprehended”, and others have followed him in this interpretation (see, e.g., Klein 2005, §§2–3). Still, there are grounds to suspect the reliability of Sextus’ interpretation of this form of skepticism. For a more subtle discussion of the nature of Academic skepticism, particularly with regard to its relation to Pyrrhonian skepticism, see Groarke (2008).
- 11.
- 12.
For an excellent recent discussion of the therapeutic function of Pyrrhonian skepticism, see Machuca (2009).
- 13.
For a recent discussion of Wittgenstein’s quietism, see McDowell (2009).
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Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Diego Machuca who offered detailed comments on an earlier version of this paper, and to an anonymous reviewer. My research into this area has been supported by the award of a Philip Leverhulme Prize.
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Pritchard, D. (2012). Wittgensteinian Pyrrhonism. In: Machuca, D. (eds) Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy. The New Synthese Historical Library, vol 70. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1991-0_10
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