Abstract
Can persons be held morally responsible for harmful consequences that result from the acts or omissions of their nation or society, even if they conscientiously avoid contributing toward those consequences qua individuals? What if those acts and omissions, together with a great many other similar ones committed against the backdrop of social norms that tolerate and even encourage such harmful behavior, contribute to a global environmental problem that gives rise to valid claims for compensation on the part of those harmed by it, but where discrete instances of harm cannot be attributed to any specific persons as directly causally responsible? Such is the case with global climate change, which results in part from social norms that are permissive of polluting activities and which often frustrate efforts to avoid them, rather than being caused by culpable individual choices alone, in which case individual fault and responsibility could more plausibly be assigned. Furthermore, the harm associated with climate change is caused by aggregated greenhouse pollution from a great many untraceable point sources rather than being the direct result of discrete emissions of heat-trapping gases by particular persons, undermining standard accounts of individual moral responsibility and thus giving rise to claims for assigning responsibility collectively instead. But holding nations and peoples collectively responsible for climate change raises objections from the perspective of individual moral responsibility, at least insofar as some persons may be implicated qua members of groups when they are faultless as individuals.
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Notes
- 1.
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “the impacts of climate change will fall disproportionately upon developing countries and poor persons within all countries, and thereby exacerbate inequities in health status and access to adequate food, clean water, and other resources.” (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2001).
- 2.
In contrast to the survival emissions that persons cannot avoid producing in the process of meeting basic needs and for which persons cannot be faulted, luxury emissions are associated with activities that are not necessary for survival and thus form the basis for fault-based liability for climate-related harm. See Vanderheiden (2008:especially chap. 5).
- 3.
I take this term from Hart (1968), but use it in a slightly different way. Hart argued that the “primary sense” of responsibility concerned charges that, if established, entail “liability to punishment or blame or other adverse treatment”, but focus especially on remedial or compensatory orders that issue from assessments of liability. That is, my focus is on how determinations of liability responsibility inform who should pay for resulting harm.
- 4.
Some claim that this sort of backward-looking attribution of responsibility is untenable in cases where individual persons lack non-polluting options or the resources to employ them instead of polluting ones, suggesting that responsibility for climate change be instead assessed in terms of forward-looking obligations to remedy. See, for example, Fahlquist (2009). My concern here is both backward-looking at causal responsibility and moral fault as well as forward-looking toward remedies, using the former to inform the latter. To the extent that better options are not available, as where persons have no mass transit options for commuting to work and so must drive personal automobiles, individual causation is at least partly the product of collective fault in failing to make more sustainable options available.
- 5.
Perhaps the best account of the disjuncture between assessments of moral responsibility and the consequences of an action can be found in Nagel (1979).
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Vanderheiden, S. (2011). Climate Change and Collective Responsibility. In: Vincent, N., van de Poel, I., van den Hoven, J. (eds) Moral Responsibility. Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy, vol 27. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1878-4_12
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