Abstract
By examining the problem of climate change this paper develops (a) a substantial critique of the background assumptions that not only the formulation of economic theories but also, in parts, that of sociological/political theories is based upon, and (b) an approach to what should be understood by the term “ethics” with regard to the fifth IPCC Assessment Report 2014. However, ethics do not “supplement” “efficiency considerations” which up to now have dominated the practical results of the IPCC; they rather have to supersede them. It will be demonstrated that the supposed rationality behind the cost-benefit analysis used by economists and the IPCC – in correspondence to neo-classical economic theory – in order to more or less calculate mathematically the ideal climate policy, is only vaguely discernible, since both incorrect and incomplete normative and descriptive assumptions are incorporated into the calculation of what is supposed to be “efficient” climate policy. Accordingly, keywords are: predated and too optimistic climate data; problematic handling of prognosis uncertainty; missing important consequences of global warming such as wars over resources; not taking into account the limits of growth; improper quantification of what cannot be quantified; incorrect discounting of future events; and ethical and democratic deficiencies of “efficiency/preference theory” (to be clear, the problem lies within normative preference theory itself and not within the descriptive anthropology of the so called “homo economicus” which is often criticized in a rather misleading manner). The critique not only points at neoclassical environmental economics, Nicholas Stern, the IPPC, and, what is more, their “sceptical” critics, but also to some extent even at alternative economists. This paper also outlines an alternative to “efficiency thinking” which is not to be associated with “Rousseauian” or “Marxist” theories focusing on basic human needs or capabilities and Rawls’ critique of utilitarianism. It therefore goes beyond the prevalent critique of the neo-classical approach to economics. A possibly more moderate but, from a methodological standpoint, more coherent climate economics could be the objective that merges into a more general “climate social science” (Klimasozialwissenschaft) and a general balancing theory rather than focusing only on technicalities and natural sciences. Furthermore, the idea behind terms such as “ethics” and “theory of justice” that most social scientists have adopted will be corrected in the process of this review. These ideas are neither “vague”, when it comes to their justification, nor do they solely correspond to the “democratic will of the majority”. They are not even completely different from preference theories which have to be qualified as (less convincing) ethics themselves.
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Notes
- 1.
An alternative model to the neo-classical approach to economics would be ecological economics ; see Daly; Rogall, pp. 157 ff. However, some of the following critique is also valid for this alternative concept.
- 2.
What is meant here is the underlying economics of climate protection and not economy as such.
- 3.
See, e.g., Posner, pp. 85 ff.; Nordhaus, p. 5.
- 4.
Critically, (however, only with regards to factual uncertainties) also Stehr and von Storch, pp. 19 ff.
- 5.
This formulation goes back to Hänggi, p. 7.
- 6.
On the concept of sustainability (which means “more intergenerational and global justice”) see Ekardt, Theorie; Ott and Döring.
- 7.
Cf. Baumert, Herzog and Pershing, p. 22.
- 8.
Böhringer and Welsch, p. 265. Nordhaus, p. 6, is rejecting any kind of consequences – in contrast to Stern, Blueprint, p. 13.
- 9.
On the following see IPCC 2007, p. 15, table SPM.5.
- 10.
See Hänggi, pp. 31 f., who calculates that according to the data of the IPCC in 2007 and in case world population rises to 9 billion by 2050 the per head out-put of CO2-equivalents should be around 1.3–0.4 tons even without taking rebound-effects into account.
- 11.
Cf. the Copenhagen Synthesis from the beginning of 2009 (available at: http://climatecongress.ku.dk/pdf/synthesisreport); see also Hansen with regards to research conducted by NASA.
- 12.
See the conclusion of EU’s Council of Ministers (Environment) on 2nd of March, 2009 (available at: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/de/09/st07/st07128.de09.pdf) and the resolution of several managers of energy companies from April 2009, cited in TAZ on 10 April, 2009.
- 13.
It could, e.g., be feasible to combine bioenergy with CCS; cf. Ekardt, Cool Down, chapters 15 and 16.
- 14.
As an example for the following see only Lomborg. Climate sceptics ignore that some negative developments will occur with a delay of (at least) several decades as some greenhouse gases will stay in the atmosphere for a long time. Furthermore, because of the physical limits to growth the world will probably not for ever become richer and, therefore, we cannot assume that potential climate damages will simply be compensated by growing wealth. And, climate protection policy costs (in parts only alleged costs) are not better spend on the fight against Aids or malaria; we should do both, not only because climate change threatens to become the worst catastrophe developing countries have ever faced.
- 15.
Cf. Nordhaus, pp. 5 ff., but especially pp. 123 ff.
- 16.
Stern, Review; Welzer; Ekardt, Theorie, § 1; Kemfert, pp. 63 ff. (for an overview of pandemic events that are likely to happen see pp. 54 ff.).
- 17.
Parry et al. speak of 500 billion Euro total costs per year instead of only about 100 billion Euro.
- 18.
Cf. Stern, Blueprint, p. 39 and passim.
- 19.
Cf. Kemfert, p. 135 et seq.
- 20.
Thus, amiss Knopp and Piroch, pp. 409 ff. and Frenz, § 1 no. 1 ff. and passim; for a correct analysis see Wustlich, pp. 515 ff.
- 21.
On the following, in more detail, see Byatt et al., pp. 199 ff.
- 22.
E.g. Stern, Blueprint, p. 11 or p. 92; cf. also Weimann, p. 26.
- 23.
Cf. Stern, Blueprint, pp. 11 ff.
- 24.
Cf. Nordhaus, pp. 32 ff. and passim.
- 25.
E.g. Stern, Blueprint, pp. 111 ff.
- 26.
The German Federal Environmental Agency found this effect to be true with regard to private energy consumption (cf. the underlying study available at: http://www.umweltdaten.de/publikationen/fpdf-l/3544.pdf.); even more pessimistic in this respect is the, albeit controversial, analysis by Garret.
- 27.
The question of whether it would be reasonable or not to build modern societies on a vague prospective like that, is controversially discussed within the framework of the new Network on Sustainable Economy (http://www.nachhaltige-oekonomie.de). Even the Austrian government has spurred a discourse about the paradigm of unlimited growth (http://www.wachstumimwandel.at).
- 28.
Cf., on the following, the contributions by Schmidt; Behrens and Giljum; Löhr; Ekardt, ‘Nachhaltigkeit’, pp. 223 ff.; Daly; Wuppertal-Institut.
- 29.
Psychological research, however, implies the opposite; cf. Wuppertal-Institut, pp. 282 ff.
- 30.
Rogall, pp. 157 ff., tries to find an unbiased and balanced answer.
- 31.
Cf. Daly, passim. This alone hints at the fact that the idea of growth has a cultural background – which is not only rooted in classical liberalism alone, but also (already) in Calvinistic Protestantism; cf., with additional references, Ekardt, Cool Down, chapter II.
- 32.
The classic national “policy for growth and jobs” is further pressured by globalization and, accordingly, makes regulatory efforts even more difficult; see Ekardt, Meyer-Mews, Schmeichel and Steffenhagen, chapters 1 and 3.
- 33.
Stern, Blueprint, pp. 86 ff. only hints at that problem and immediately forgets about it again.
- 34.
With regards to some of the possible misunderstandings that can arise in the context of the following Section see the controversy between Dilger, pp. 383 ff. and Ekardt and Kornack, ‘Embryonenschutz’, pp. 399 ff. (triggered by Ekardt, ‘Verengungen’).
- 35.
See, e.g., Wink; Nordhaus, pp. 175 ff.; Böhringer and Welsch, pp. 261 ff.
- 36.
Ethics is not only developing the principles of liberal democracies parallel to the law. In the following, it will be shown that it is also justifying them and, thereby, providing an ultimate basis for law; on the relation of law and ethics, see Ekardt, Information, § 1 A. (Law always combines normative and instrumental rationality).
- 37.
With regard to content, there is no further significance for this differentiation – apart from the idea that the constitutional lawmaker has in parts (pre-)structured the balancing of colliding freedoms (see Section 5) through deciding about their weight within the catalogue of fundamental rights.
- 38.
For the reasons to even include threatened damages (on a precautionary basis) that are not certain, see Section 2 above.
- 39.
For a detailed analysis of the theory of justice underlying Section 4 and with additional references, see Ekardt, Theorie, §§ 3–7; Ekardt, Cool Down, chapters 4–6; Ekardt ‘Schutzpflichten’; focusing on the intergenerational dimension, see Unnerstall.
- 40.
This is very unfortunate as it causes a tendency to see facts in a somewhat askew, wishful way and as it, then, builds the basis for certain “do’s and don’ts” – or, in contrast, as it prohibits to get through to the question whether solely normative statements can be justified at all. That is why, e.g., Heinig, pp. 330 ff. is missing the point.
- 41.
For references, see supra fn. 40. A slightly unsystematic list is offered in Rogall, pp. 63 ff. – who incorrectly assumes that sufficiency (i.e. “doing without” certain things and aspects of life) per se is voluntary, while instead it is much more often caused by (high) prices (see Section 6).
- 42.
A striking analysis from an economic perspective is provided by Gawel, pp. 9 ff. and pp. 43 ff.
- 43.
That is why Nutzinger ‘Effizienz’, pp. 77 ff. and Grzeszick, pp. 647 ff. are, in my opinion, slightly misleading; see also Mathis, Efficiency Instead of Justice?.
- 44.
Unfortunately, the day-to-day and often even the scientific (if not philosophical) usage of the word “ethics” is rather arbitrary. It does not make any sense, however, to classify medically assisted suicide or the protection of embryonic stem cells as “ethical problems” and to leave out other societal questions that are normative as well (e.g. the scope of economic freedom).
- 45.
There are justification models that are (in parts) similar to the one we will develop here – yet, without the link to the questions of sustainability and climate protection . Cf. Alexy, Recht, pp. 127 ff.; Illies, pp. 129 ff.; Kuhlmann; Apel and Kettner; to some extent Habermas, pp. 56 ff.; implicit Ott and Döring, pp. 91 ff. The classics Immanuel Kant and John Rawls remain, in contrast, at least incomplete with regard to the theoretical basis of their substantiations although basic terms like rationality, human dignity , freedom, impartiality and separation of powers can be associated with them.
- 46.
Berger and Luckmann, p. 2 have shown and advocated this differentiation in their classical (and often misperceived) analysis.
- 47.
Often this is not expressed openly but presupposed implicitly; cf. only Stern, Blueprint, chapter 5; differing Ott and Döring, pp. 41 ff. and passim.
- 48.
See, despite their contrariness, Stern, Blueprint, chapters 3 and 5, and Nordhaus, pp. 38 ff. and pp. 59 ff.
- 49.
So called negative or transcendental pragmatic arguments of the following kind have been used by Alexy , Recht, pp. 127 ff.; Illies, pp. 129 ff.; Kuhlmann, passim; implicitly also Ott and Döring, pp. 91 ff. and passim. The structure of a negative (and not deductive) argument with which an infinite regress or a “randomly chosen axiom” can be prevented goes back to Plato , Augustine and Thomas Aquinas (as a logical figure but not referring to the issue at hand). For some misunderstandings that often occur in the “philosophy/economy” discourse, see the dispute between Dilger, pp. 383 ff. and Ekardt ‘Umweltpolitik’, pp. 399 ff.
- 50.
A whole set of fictive or real arguments against this justification of (1) the possibility of rationality and (2) of human dignity and impartiality as sole universal principles that can be deducted from rationality are discussed by Ekardt, Theorie, § 3; Ekardt, Demokratie, chapter 3.
- 51.
The principle of human dignity itself is not a freedom right or human right. It is not a norm at all that refers to any kind of singular case, either ethical or legal. Human dignity is rather the reason for human rights (in contrast to being a norm/a right on its own); it, therefore, guides the application of other norms – in our case, different types (realms) of freedom that belong to human beings – and proclaims autonomy as the central idea of our legal system. The “inviolability” of human dignity and its visible – in norms like Art. 1 par. 2–3 of the German constitution and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights – character as a “reason” shows that all this is not only philosophically but also legally correct. For the current state of discussion, see Ekardt and Kornack ‘Embryonenschutz’, pp. 349 ff.; Ekardt and Kornack ‘Gentechnik’; similarly, e.g., Enders; for a contrasting viewpoint, see Böckenförde, ‘Menschenwürde’, pp. 809 ff.; differentiating, Heinig, pp. 330 ff. and pp. 353 ff.
- 52.
That freedom exists because of dignity is, e.g., explicitly stated in Art. 1 par. 2 of the German constitution which says “darum” (= therefore) exists freedom, i.e. because of human dignity , and is also supported by the explanatory documents (Gesetzgebungsmaterialien) on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights; see Ekardt and Kornack, ‘Gentechnik’.
- 53.
Although following a different path, this is also the conclusion of Rothlin and Ott and Döring, pp. 78 ff. and pp. 91 ff.; rather a (in my opinion hardly to the point) critique of profit-oriented competition can be found in Hoffmann, pp. 23 ff.; see further, Nutzinger, ‘Effizienz’, pp. 7 ff. and pp. 51 ff.
- 54.
Cf. supra fn. 40; similarly Susnjar and Alexy , Grundrechte.
- 55.
The actual decision of a certain extent of climate protection policy based on the weighing and balancing of interests or efficiency thinking, is itself a normative statement and not a factual one. Facts alone can never deliver decisions as they are only possible if normative criteria are available.
- 56.
Furthermore, one can deduce that there should be a decision on the national or transnational level, whichever is suited best for it (the global level in case of climate protection policy); see Ekardt, Meyer-Mews, Schmeichel and Steffenhagen, chapters 1, 3 and 5.
- 57.
Cf. Nordhaus, p. 4; critical also Burtraw and Sterner.
- 58.
Cf. Ekardt, Theorie, § 5 C.; Mathis, pp. 113 ff.; Otsuka, pp. 109 ff.; Meyer, pp. 136 ff.
- 59.
For a critique concerning this matter see Ekardt, Theorie, § 5; in parts also Mathis, pp. 113 ff.; Otsuka, pp. 109 ff.; Meyer, pp. 136 ff. On this issue, see in the present volume Balz Hammer, ‘Valuing the Invaluable?’.
- 60.
Conceding to this is Stern, Blueprint, p. 92.
- 61.
For a detailed and critical analysis of the problem of discounting , see Unnerstall, pp. 320 ff.; cf. also Rawls; supporting the method of discounting is Birnbacher . On this issue, see in this volume Klaus Mathis, ‘Discounting the Future?’.
- 62.
Cf. Stern, Blueprint, pp. 80 ff. and pp. 95 ff.
- 63.
On a legal and ethical level that also implies: in case of actions against lawmakers constitutional courts have (or had) to decide in favour of the plaintiff and force lawmakers to rethink and re-decide on their respective climate protection policy with the following aspects in mind. In more detail, cf. Ekardt ‘Schutzpflichten’.
- 64.
Focusing less on the preventive level and (in my opinion sub-optimally) more on the subsequent level of liability is Verheyen.
- 65.
With regards to ideas on a substantial climate change policy, including a (virtual) per-capita-distribution of emission-rights as the basic criterion for “climate justice” (with some modifications concerning the problem of the industrialized countries’ historical emissions), see Ekardt, Cool Down, Chapter 4 and 5; Ekardt and von Hövel, pp. 102 ff.; this is economically presupposed – and without any real normative justification – by Wicke, Spiegel and Wicke-Thüs, and (albeit without citing them and a number of other authors) WBGU 2009.
- 66.
The approach developed here, in contrast to Sen , has justified (and not only asserted) universal freedom and, therewith, the relevance of its preconditions (and, furthermore, a theory from which rules structuring the balancing process can be deduced). These advantages also exist compared to “theories concerning basic human needs” (inspired by Marxist or Rousseauian ideas); in addition, the latter also have the flaw of mixing descriptive anthropology and normative theory of justice . Also, they do not have a method to determine its basic categories (what is there a “need” for?) and they mingle justice and conceptions of what a “good life” is supposed to look like (with potentially authoritarian tendencies). Viewed against this background, Ott and Döring, pp. 78 ff. seems to be problematic.
- 67.
Stern, Review, p. 151, only very generally speaks about increasing “instability”.
- 68.
Many climate social scientists, however, favour working on merely factual descriptions of existing (and possibly incorrect) theories of justice, climate discourses, how climate is perceived and so on – cf., in this respect, some of the articles in Voss – which seems to be less important (unless it is helpful to elucidate the anthropology behind inadequate climate protection ).
- 69.
Cf. Stern, Review, pp. 149 ff.
- 70.
Cf. Rawls, p. 19. German legal scholars – e.g. Böckenförde , Staat, pp. 188 ff. – tend to make the same mistake and seem to think that rejecting quantifications would also include the dismissal of balancing procedures (in most cases). Thereby, they mistake the universality of values for their absoluteness. See also Heinig, pp. 353 ff., who does not distinguish precisely between the principles referring to justice and the subsequent balancing procedure.
- 71.
Based on what was demonstrated here, one could also try to give an answer to the question whether the often-repeated accusations that economic efficiency analysis turns a blind eye to questions regarding distributive justice are correct. This answer would probably be: yes and no. Because, there is no way to deduce a strict imperative that says we have to redistribute extensively. Certain “social elements” result from theory of justice with respect to the balancing procedure, like a right to a subsistence minimum; beyond that the lawmaker has a wide margin for questions of distributive justice. Cf. Ekardt, Heitmann and Hennig, and Ekardt, Demokratie, chapter V.
- 72.
For further details, see the references supra fn. 40.
- 73.
As an example for the following problems, see Becker, pp. 7 ff.; Davidson, pp. 22 ff.; Wieland; Suchanek and Lin-Hi, pp. 67 ff.
- 74.
In more detail and with further references, see Ekardt, Information, § 1 C. II.; Ekardt, Theorie, § 7.
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Ekardt, F. (2012). A Critical Review of “Efficiency Ethics”: The Case of Climate Economics. In: Mathis, K. (eds) Efficiency, Sustainability, and Justice to Future Generations. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 98. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1869-2_9
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