Abstract
The future, for a long time, was a concept to which philosophers and jurists paid little attention. Barely any of the great thinkers of the past classed it as relevant to human action. Even Kant, who shows some signs of taking the problem of generational succession into consideration, bases his ethics on the presumption of the individual acting in the hic et nunc, for whom the future clearly remains a remote concern. The constant advancement of technology is now turning this conception upside down. The first to recognize the practical implications of this circumstance, and to suggest that the technological civilization called for a new ethics, was Hans Jonas. The following essay therefore begins with an appraisal of Hans Jonas, before proceeding to make a – prima facie – surprising comparison with Herbert Hart. Examination of the deficiencies of both perspectives opens up the avenue of transcendence which leads to a new orientation, at least an outline of which is put forward in conclusion.
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Notes
- 1.
Cf. von Savigny, pp. 42 f.
- 2.
Quoted as in Kant, Universal History, p. 13.
- 3.
Ibidem, p. 21.
- 4.
Ibidem, p. 14: “It remains strange that the earlier generations appear to carry through their toilsome labor only for the sake of the later, to prepare for them a foundation on which the later generations could erect the higher edifice which was Nature’s goal, and yet that only the latest of the generations should have the good fortune to inhabit the building on which a long line of their ancestors had (unintentionally) labored without being permitted to partake of the fortune they had prepared. However puzzling this may be, it is necessary if one assumes that a species of animals should have reason, and, as a class of rational beings each of whom dies while the species is immortal, should develop their capacities to perfection.”
- 5.
Cf. Kant, Conflict, p. 169.
- 6.
Cf. F. G. Jünger, p. 232 (own trans.): “Man no longer masters the mechanical law which he himself has set in train; this law masters him”. Certainly the greater influence on Heidegger was the work of Ernst Jünger. See E. Jünger, Mobilmachung and Arbeiter.
- 7.
Cf. Heidegger, ‘Technik’. For commentary, cf. Schirmacher; Seubold. Among recent publications: Luckner.
- 8.
Cf. Heidegger, Language, pp. 102 f.: “‘Physics and responsibility ’ – that is a good thing, and important in today’s crisis. But it remains double-entry accounting behind which there is concealed a breach that can be cured neither by science nor by morality, if indeed it is curable at all.”
- 9.
Of the recent literature, reference should at least be made to the comprehensive essay collection published by Bifulco and D’Aloia, to Birnbacher and Schicha, and to Schlothfeldt.
- 10.
One of the first writings in which Jonas anticipates the main thesis of the book for which he became renowned is ‘Technology’, pp. 35 ff. (later in the anthology Jonas , Philosophical Essays, pp. 3 ff.). For an extensive discussion of Imperative, Müller is still useful. For a historical contextualization cf. Gethmann-Siefert, pp. 171 ff. Jonas ’ significance has not escaped one of the first juristic monographs on the topic: Saladin and Zenger, pp. 26 ff.
- 11.
Cf. Weber. For a relevant discussion (in relation to Jonas ) cf. Nepi, pp. 95 ff.
- 12.
Jonas, Imperative, p. 11.
- 13.
Quoted as in Kant, Foundations, p. 47.
- 14.
Jonas’ criticism of Kant seems to me to go no further, in essence, than the critisicm levelled at Kant’s ethics by Hegel , who referred to it as “empty formalism”. On this, see: Hegel, ‘Glauben’, p. 89; ‘Jacobi’, pp. 24 ff.; ‘Grundlinien’, Vol. VII, §§ 133–137, pp. 250 ff.; ‘Enzyklopädie’, Vol. VIII, §§ 53–54 (and supplementary notes), pp. 138 f.; ‘Vorlesungen’, Vol. XX, pp. 366 ff.; secondary literature: Knox, pp. 70 ff.; Ritter, pp. 281 ff.; Cesa, pp. 149 ff.; Ameriks, pp. 179 ff.
- 15.
Cf. Jonas, ‘Technik’. On the complex relations between theory and practice in the Imperative, I refer to my essay ‘Diskrepanz’, pp. 239 ff.
- 16.
Jonas, Imperative, p. 43.
- 17.
Jonas, Imperative, pp. 43 f.
- 18.
As the most challenging of Jonas ’ works proves very well. Cf. Phenomenon.
- 19.
Jonas, Imperative, p. 81.
- 20.
Jonas, Imperative, p. 131. And Jonas continues: “I mean strictly, just this: that here the plain being of a de facto existent immanently and evidently contains an ought for others, and would do so even if nature would not succour this ought with powerful instincts or assume its job alone.”
- 21.
Starting from the objection argued by Apel , which is certainly one of the most thorough: ‘Verantwortung’, pp. 179 ff. And from among the recent publications, cf. Hirsch Hadorn, pp. 218 ff.
- 22.
Cf. Jonas, ‘Grundlegung’, p. 140 (own trans.): “Yet ultimately my argument can do no more than rationally justify an option which it presents with its inherent persuasive force to the thinking individual. Unfortunately I have nothing better to offer. Perhaps a future metaphysics will be able to.”
- 23.
In a radio interview, Jonas finds himself forced to admit this. His interviewer (Eike Gebhardt) had asked him: “Do you consider pure survival to be a value in itself, the greatest good so to speak, quite irrespective of what survives? Since you only argue ex negativo: might we call your position an ‘ethics of avoidance’?” And Jonas replied: “I would accept your expression ‘ethics of avoidance’; not as the definitive formula for an ethics, but in the sense of a temporary priority […]. I do not say that there can or ought to be a definitive ethics; but the situation has made it imperative that the avoidance of extreme dangers and extreme evil be prioritized, while the search for the best, the ideal or the exemplary human life, both for the individual and for society, steps into the background for the time being.” (Own trans., cf. ‘Naturwissenschaft’, pp. 208 ff.).
- 24.
Cf. Hart, Concept, pp. 255 ff. In German-speaking legal philosophy, the argument of the minimum content of natural law has barely been discussed. (Cf. the brief presentation in the monograph by Eckmann, pp. 48 ff.). Among older publications, mention is made of Passerin d’Entrèves, pp. 312 ff., and Cattaneo, pp. 673 ff. Of the more recent publications, see: Rivaya, pp. 65 ff.; Orrego, pp. 287 ff. and Epstein, pp. 219 ff. In Italy two additional papers have been published on the theme: Ricciardi, pp. 221 ff. and Maestri, pp. 240 ff. Finally, mention is made of a work with a strong bearing on our problematique, Bifulco, pp. 61 ff.
- 25.
Cf. Hart, ‘Positivism’, pp. 593 ff.
- 26.
Cf. Kelsen, p. 56. Kelsen continues: “there is no human behaviour that would be excluded simply by virtue of its substance from becoming the content of a legal norm.”
- 27.
See Hart, Concept, p. 187. Based on a few purely biological facts like the primary human needs (food, rest, etc.) Hart draws the self-evident conclusion: “it is the tacit assumption that the proper end of human activity is survival , and this rests on the simple contingent fact that most men most of the time wish to continue in existence. The actions which we speak of as those which are naturally good to do, are those which are required for survival ; […].”
- 28.
Hart, Concept, p. 187. Here, Hart sets Hobbes and Hume against followers of the Aristotelian tradition because the latter did not confine themselves to survival as such but saw survival “as merely the lowest stratum in a much more complex and far more debatable concept of the human end or good for man”.
- 29.
Hart, Concept, p. 188.
- 30.
Hart, Concept, p. 188. See also p. 189: “In considering the simple truisms which we set forth here, and their connexion with law and morals, it is important to observe that in each case the facts mentioned afford a reason why, given survival as an aim, law and morals should include a specific content. The general form of the argument is simply that without such a content laws and morals could not forward the minimum purpose of survival which men have in associating with each other.”
- 31.
Cf. Hobbes, p. 66.
- 32.
Cf. Hume, p. 315.
- 33.
One critique of Hart in this point is delivered by Barry , but it does not strike at Hart ’s central point, cf. Barry, p. 158.
- 34.
Cf. Hume, p. 189.
- 35.
Cf. Hume, pp. 210 ff.
- 36.
Hart, Concept, p. 195.
- 37.
von Jhering.
- 38.
Hart, Concept, p. 195.
- 39.
In this regard, cf. Bifulco, pp. 61 ff.
- 40.
Cf. Hart, Concept, p. 195.
- 41.
Cf. Hart, ‘Ascription’, pp. 145 ff.
- 42.
Whether Hart is impermissibly deriving an “is” from an “ought” is a matter of controversy in the literature; see references in n. 24 above.
- 43.
Quoted as in Nietzsche, p. 155.
- 44.
Jonas, Imperative, p. 23. “It is moot whether, without restoring the category of the sacred, the category most thoroughly destroyed by the scientific enlightenment, we can have an ethics able to cope with the extreme powers which we possess today and constantly increase and are almost compelled to wield.”
- 45.
Cf. Becchi, ‘Puzzle’, pp. 157 ff., and now in greater depth, Becchi, Principio.
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Becchi, P. (2012). Our Responsibility Towards Future Generations. In: Mathis, K. (eds) Efficiency, Sustainability, and Justice to Future Generations. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 98. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1869-2_4
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