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Is the Rationality of Judicial Judgements Jeopardized by Cognitive Biases and Empathy ?

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Efficiency, Sustainability, and Justice to Future Generations

Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 98))

Abstract

The introduction to this essay embarks on a discussion of the extent to which cognitive biases jeopardize the rationality of judicial judgements and, consequently, which interventions or institutional precautions are necessary to ensure that the judgements delivered by judges are nevertheless as rational as possible. The next question to be considered is whether a judge should necessarily possess empathy, or whether this might not undermine impartiality and ultimately, in a similar way as cognitive biases, jeopardize the rationality of court judgements. The results of these two lines of inquiry are summed up in the conclusion.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Mathis, p. 25.

  2. 2.

    See Herbert A. Simon, ‘Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations’.

  3. 3.

    See Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, ‘Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk’.

  4. 4.

    Tversky and Kahneman, p. 1124.

  5. 5.

    Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich, p. 780.

  6. 6.

    Tversky and Kahneman, p. 1124.

  7. 7.

    Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich, p. 778.

  8. 8.

    Tversky and Kahneman, p. 1127.

  9. 9.

    Jolls, p. 77.

  10. 10.

    Jungermann, Pfister and Fischer, p. 173.

  11. 11.

    Jungermann, Pfister and Fischer, p. 174.

  12. 12.

    Jungermann, Pfister and Fischer, p. 174.

  13. 13.

    Fischhoff, p. 292.

  14. 14.

    Fischhoff, p. 288.

  15. 15.

    See Jay J. Christensen-Szalanksi and Cynthia Fobian-Willham, ‘The Hindsight Bias: A Meta-Analysis’.

  16. 16.

    Rachlinski, p. 97.

  17. 17.

    Rachlinski, pp. 97 f.

  18. 18.

    Rachlinski, p. 99.

  19. 19.

    On this whole area see Rey, N 58 ff.

  20. 20.

    Rey, N 844.

  21. 21.

    Rey, N 810.

  22. 22.

    Oftinger and Stark, § 1 N 30 ff.

  23. 23.

    Oftinger and Stark, § 5 N 69.

  24. 24.

    Oftinger and Stark, § 5 N 48 ff.; Brehm, N 196 ff. on Art. 41, Swiss Code of Obligations.

  25. 25.

    Falk, pp. 10 ff.; Schweizer pp. 224 ff.

  26. 26.

    See Kim A. Kamin and Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, ‘Ex Post ≠ Ex Ante. Determining Liability in Hindsight’; LaBine Susan J. and LaBine Gary, ‘Determinations of Negligence and the Hindsight Bias’; Reid Hastie, David A. Schkade and John W. Payne, ‘Juror Judgements in Civil Cases: Hindsight Effects on Judgements of Liability for Punitive Damages’.

  27. 27.

    Rachlinski, pp. 99 f.

  28. 28.

    Oftinger and Stark, § 5 N 81.

  29. 29.

    Tversky and Kahneman, p. 1128; Jungermann, Pfister and Fischer, pp. 174 ff.

  30. 30.

    Tversky and Kahneman, p. 1128.

  31. 31.

    Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich, p. 788.

  32. 32.

    Cf. Jungermann, Pfister and Fischer, p. 175.

  33. 33.

    Chapman and Johnson, p. 134.

  34. 34.

    Cf. Falk, pp. 15 ff.

  35. 35.

    Schweizer, p. 178.

  36. 36.

    Schweizer, p. 273.

  37. 37.

    Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich, pp. 811 f.

  38. 38.

    Englerth, p. 95.

  39. 39.

    Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich, p. 814.

  40. 40.

    Schweizer, pp. 268 f.

  41. 41.

    Schweizer, p. 270.

  42. 42.

    Rachlinski, p. 98; Kamin and Rachlinski, p. 92.

  43. 43.

    Wilson, Houston, Etling and Breeke, p. 397.

  44. 44.

    Stahlberg, Eller, Maass and Frey, p. 56.

  45. 45.

    Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich, p. 822.

  46. 46.

    Chapman and Johnson, p. 134.

  47. 47.

    Kamin and Rachlinski, p. 100.

  48. 48.

    Wilson, Centerbar and Breeke, p. 191.

  49. 49.

    Schwarz and Vaughn, p. 113.

  50. 50.

    Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich, pp. 828 f.

  51. 51.

    Rachlinski, p. 105.

  52. 52.

    Rey, N 880 ff.

  53. 53.

    Schweizer, pp. 225 f.

  54. 54.

    Rey, N 872 ff.

  55. 55.

    “Die Sorgfalt, die man aufzuwenden hat, um den Vorwurf der Fahrlässigkeit zu vermeiden, ist keine besondere, durch die Rechtsordnung statuierte Pflicht, sondern der Ausfluss dieser generellen Verantwortung für den mindestens als möglich vorausgesehenen […] Erfolg.” Oftinger and Stark, § 5 N 56.

  56. 56.

    Oftinger and Stark, § 5 N 58.

  57. 57.

    Brehm, N 185 on Art. 41, Swiss Code of Obligations.

  58. 58.

    On the so-called bilateralism critique , see Mathis, pp. 100 f.

  59. 59.

    For a more extensive discussion, see Mathis, p. 97 ff.

  60. 60.

    Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler, pp. 38 f.

  61. 61.

    Senator Barack Obama, quoted after Bandes, p. 135.

  62. 62.

    Birnbacher, p. 414.

  63. 63.

    Lohmann, p. 447.

  64. 64.

    “Der Richter kann seine eigene Persönlichkeit nicht ausblenden, da er ja entscheiden muss. Könnte in der Bestimmung des Richtigen das Moment der persönlichen Entscheidung eliminiert werden, wäre also das Richtige in einem absoluten Sinne objektiv gegeben und zur Anwendung zu bringen, wäre die Forderung nach Unparteilichkeit sinnlos.” Lohmann, p. 448.

  65. 65.

    Lohmann, p. 454.

  66. 66.

    See Theodor Lipps, Grundlegung der Ästhetik, and id., ‘Einfühlung und ästhetischer Genuß’.

  67. 67.

    Curtis, p. 11.

  68. 68.

    Henderson, p. 1581.

  69. 69.

    Ekman, p. 249.

  70. 70.

    Breithaupt, p. 175.

  71. 71.

    Williams, p. 91.

  72. 72.

    Jessica Weisner, quoted after Bandes, p. 138.

  73. 73.

    Posner, p. 117 (author’s emphasis).

  74. 74.

    Henderson, p. 1576.

  75. 75.

    Bandes, p. 136.

  76. 76.

    Bandes, p. 135.

  77. 77.

    Henderson, p. 1584.

  78. 78.

    Hoffmann, pp. 206 ff.

  79. 79.

    McLane Wardlaw, pp. 119 f.

  80. 80.

    Henderson, p. 1576.

  81. 81.

    O’Grady, pp. 9 ff.

  82. 82.

    McLane Wardlaw, pp. 117 f.

  83. 83.

    Müller, pp. 131 f.

  84. 84.

    Müller, p. 132.

  85. 85.

    Müller, p. 151.

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  1. Faculty of Law, University of Lucerne, Frohburgstrasse 3, P.O. Box 4466, CH-6002, Lucerne, Switzerland

    Klaus Mathis

  2. Lucerne, Switzerland

    Fabian Diriwächter

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    Klaus Mathis

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Mathis, K., Diriwächter, F. (2012). Is the Rationality of Judicial Judgements Jeopardized by Cognitive Biases and Empathy ?. In: Mathis, K. (eds) Efficiency, Sustainability, and Justice to Future Generations. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 98. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1869-2_3

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