Goodness and Moral Obligation

Abstract

Goods, moral norms, and the virtues become functional as the a priori foundation of the will and the judgments of individuals and cultures. They vary with the social conditions in which they appear. This doctrine of the functionality of values is not intended to justify social value-relativism, for the values themselves are objective and invariant in their content. An ethics of obligation is insufficient as a moral theory, (1) because it fails to account for the variety of moral norms, the variety of goods and concepts of virtue that are preferred in different historical contexts, and (2) because of the derivative nature of obligation. Further, it cannot account for the being of the individual and his unique calling and fate. Obligation is merely negative or prohibitory; nonetheless, it is an important category in ethics. It is derived from the experienced disparity between what is and what ought to be, when the ought-to-be is directed at the will of someone. The relationship of obligations to an authority commanding them is considered, and pedagogical issues are raised in this context. If an agent acts only at the command of an authority and lacks insight into the higher values aimed at by the obligation, he loses autonomy. The insights of Dietrich von Hildebrand are invoked to compensate for the apparent lack of the absoluteness of obligation in Scheler and Hartmann. Husserl’s reworking of a notion of a Categorical Imperative reasserts the value of absolute obligation for material value-ethics. Scheler’s notion of love of the good, specifically for the highest values that are realizable in one’s situation, as the only proper motivation of action, is contrasted with the Kantian notion of a rational will that acts out of respect for its indefeasible obligations.