Abstract
A phenomenology of human action examines how agents apply knowledge of values to the realization of goods. Scheler’s efforts guide us here. Scheler first criticizes Kant’s concept of action for its too-narrow focus upon the will and for a false intellectualism that is rooted in Enlightenment psychology. Action, for Scheler, begins with conation and its differentiations; it is fundamental to the formation of purposes and ultimately to the performance of an action. The person, his Ordo amoris, his basic moral tenor, his intentions, and his will all condition the moral value of an action that is “teleological” in nature, i.e., intends to realize values. Goodness consists in a person’s efforts to realize values. Scheler insists that what is willed is the action, not its eventual outcome. Its moral value is imminent to it, and is not derived from its outcome. We apply this phenomenology an imaginary case in which an agent attempts to realize values, and then return to the theme of moral freedom, specifically to the question of whether knowledge of the values realizable in some situation determines the will to act.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsNotes
- 1.
Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, First Section.
- 2.
Cf. Bernard William’s and Thomas Nagel’s discussion of this concept in their separate articles entitled “Moral Luck,” which appeared in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary vol. 50, 115–35 and 137–55. Williams’ essay was reprinted in Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
- 3.
Max Scheler, “The Rehabilitation of Virtue,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 79, no. 1 (Winter 2005), 21–37.
- 4.
- 5.
Cf. Scheler’s “Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen,” op. cit.
- 6.
This is similar to Hartmann’s phenomenology of aesthetic experience, where, he claims, we see directly and immediately the emotional meaning of a work of art “through” its surface structure. Cf. Nicolai Hartmann’s Aesthetik (Berlin: Walther de Gruyter, 1966), especially Erster Teil, I Abschnitt.
- 7.
Scheler later developed the concept of “absolute time” to characterize lived experience. Cf. for example, “Idealismus-Realismus,” in Späte Schriften, Gesammelte Werke, Band 9, 235 f.
- 8.
This issue between Kant and Scheler may be undecidable. No doubt, the sense of physical capacity is derived in part from my experiences of what my body can do. Like a cat warily measuring the distance to a ledge to which it intends to jump, a human agent has experiential knowledge of what he can do, and not just an intuitive sense, of, say, how far he can throw an object.
- 9.
On the Eternal in Man, op. cit., 95.
- 10.
Nicomachean Ethics, VII, Chaps. 2.
- 11.
Ibid., Chap. 3.
- 12.
Juan-Miguel Palacios. “Vorziehen und Wählen bei Scheler,” in Vernunft und Gefühl: Schelers Phänomenologie des emotionalen Lebens. Bermes, Christian, Wolfhart Henckmann und Heinz Leonardy, eds. (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2003). The translations of the passages included here are by the present author.
- 13.
Ibid., 145.
- 14.
Palacios, ibid.
- 15.
Frühe Schriften, Gesammelte Werke, Band 1, 117fn.
- 16.
In Vom Umsturz der Werte, Gesammelte Werke, Band 3; English translation by William Holdheim, L. Coser, ed. (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961). For an excellent treatment of the phenomenology of ressentiment, which has no parallel in Hartmann, Cf. Manfred F. Frings, The Mind of Max Scheler, 143–66.
- 17.
Ibid.
References
Palacios, Juan Miguel. 2003. Vorziehen und Wählen bei Scheler. In Vernunft und Gefühl: Schelers Phänomenologie des emotionalen Lebens, ed. Christian Bermes et al. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.
Band 1: Frühe Schriften (1971). Edited M.S. Frings.
Band 3: Vom Umsturz der Werte (1955, 1972). Edited by M. Scheler
Band 9: Späte Schriften (1975). Edited by M.S. Frings.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2011 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Kelly, E. (2011). Action Theory and the Problem of Motivation. In: Material Ethics of Value: Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann. Phaenomenologica, vol 203. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1845-6_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1845-6_5
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-007-1844-9
Online ISBN: 978-94-007-1845-6
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)