Abstract
Recently, it has been suggested that there is a need for a conceptual clarification of the relation between personal epistemology (PE) and philosophical epistemology. I attempt to do this in this chapter. First, I clarify the task of traditional epistemology as understood by philosophers and point out how it is different from epistemology as understood by PE researchers: epistemology is not postmodernist; it has a normative goal, which is different from empirical research; subfields of epistemology are briefly mentioned and implications for PE research suggested. Second, I point out the existence of several conceptual pitfalls that should be avoided by individuals working in this area: epistemic versus epistemological, 1st person versus 3rd person perspectives, and an important ambiguity in the concept of cognition. Third, the concept of cognitive flexibility in relation to epistemology needs to be carefully discussed, especially in relation to the issue of domain specificity and domain generality. This is discussed in the context of an epistemology of pragmatism. Finally, I mention the recent revolution produced by naturalistic epistemology and the implications of this challenge for understanding the relation between PE and traditional epistemology.
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Notes
- 1.
I can’t resist mentioning that in all of the PE articles I have read, there is a singular scarcity of references to standard textbooks in epistemology. Needless to say, I find this consistent absence puzzling and disquieting.
- 2.
Part of the confusion about a priori knowledge is due to the several ways in which Kant uses that term. Among most epistemologists, however, the preferred view is to interpret “a priori” as meaning independent of experience of and not temporally prior to experience (innate).
- 3.
A related question of the following: assuming there is a distinction between analytic propositions and synthetic propositions, with analytic propositions being a priori, do students grasp the difference between analytic and synthetic propositions and if so, how does this comprehension develop over time? Again, I have pretty much looked in vain for studies concerning this question.
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I wish to thank Karen Strohm Kitchener for reading and commenting on an earlier version of this manuscript.
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Kitchener, R.F. (2011). Personal Epistemology and Philosophical Epistemology: The View of a Philosopher. In: Elen, J., Stahl, E., Bromme, R., Clarebout, G. (eds) Links Between Beliefs and Cognitive Flexibility. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1793-0_5
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