Abstract
In Section 3.4, we reviewed a number of prior interpretations of Bohr’s complementarity that concern themselves with its relation to the thought of various modern philosophers. These philosophers were mostly anterior to Bohr’s times, although I also briefly touched on the issue of his possible links with contemporaneous logical positivism. Some other studies on Bohr, not mentioned earlier, indeed point to the relevance of still other twentieth-century philosophical approaches, and yet few of them seem to me to have particular bearing on the thematic of the present study. Edward M. MacKinnon, for example, argues that Bohr anticipated “some of the key features [of philosophy] later developed in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations,” with its major thesis that “the meaning of a word is its use in the language” (MacKinnon 1985, 115; Wittgenstein 1958, §43). In my view, however, this account overlooks an important difference between the two thinkers’ ideas, namely the fact that, rather than reducing the analysis of a word to its use, Bohr sets the two – use and analysis – precisely in a complementary relationship in the sense of mutual exclusion and joint completion. Generally speaking, except for a few studies including Plotnitsky’s to be discussed in Chapter 6, prior research on the relation between Bohr’s thought and recent or contemporary philosophy has apparently failed to yield remarkable outcomes.
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Notes
- 1.
MacKinnon himself rather inaccurately renders this idea of Wittgenstein: “The meaning of a word is determined by its usage in language” (1985, 115). Here I do not, however, enter into the difference between ‘use’ and ‘usage’ or any other interpretive issues on Wittgenstein’s philosophy. See also MacKinnon (1982, esp. 357–60).
- 2.
Paul A. Komesaroff, in particular, has attempted to connect Bohr’s complementarity with structuralism, though apparently without much success (see 1986, 267ff.).
- 3.
A number of such studies are included in Fehér, Kiss, and Ropolyi (1999).
- 4.
Brock (2003), mentioned in Section 3.4 (note 54), points briefly to some conceptual “similarities” between Bohr’s complementarity and hermeneutic philosophy as represented by Gadamer’s work, and yet refrains from further attempting to connect the two (2003, 265).
- 5.
According to Gadamer, aesthetic consciousness, along with historical consciousness, represents an “alienation when compared to the authentic experience that confronts us in the form of art itself” (1967ff., 1:102; trans. 1976, 5).
- 6.
In Gadamer’s account, this is also connected with the Enlightenment’s negative view of “authority” as “a source of prejudices” (1972, 256/271; cf. 1976, 9).
- 7.
By contrast, in Gadamer’s account, Romanticism rightly opposed the Enlightenment’s rejection of prejudice and tradition. He criticizes Romanticism, however, insofar as it shares with the Enlightenment “the fundamental schema of the philosophy of history,” namely “the schema of the conquest of mythos by logos” (1972, 257/273). In an “abstract opposition to the principle of enlightenment,” Romanticism “conceives of tradition as an antithesis to the freedom of reason and regards it as something historically given, like nature” (1972, 265/281). In other words, Romanticism “shares the presupposition of the Enlightenment and only reverses its values” (1972, 258/273).
- 8.
In a related context, Gadamer argues also against the Enlightenment’s “antithesis between authority and reason” (1972, 261/277). In his account, authority has “nothing to do with blind obedience to commands,” but instead “rests on acknowledgment and hence on an act of reason itself” (1972, 264/279).
- 9.
To put it differently, “we cannot extricate ourselves from the historical process, so distance ourselves from it that the past becomes an object for us.” Rather, “[w]e are always situated in history” (1967ff., 1:158; see Ricoeur 1986, 346/281). In Gadamer’s account, this is epitomized by the case of what is called “classical”: “The classical is something that resists historical criticism because its historical dominion, the binding power of the validity that is preserved and handed down, precedes all historical reflection and continues in it” (1972, 271/287).
- 10.
Rejecting the modern dichotomy of subject and object, Heidegger characterizes Dasein’s fundamental mode of being as “being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-Sein),” which signifies the “unitary phenomenon” of one’s inhabiting the world (1927, 53/78). As he puts it, “[i]t is not the case that man ‘is’ and then has, by way of an extra, a relationship-of-Being towards the ‘world,’” but rather that taking up such a relationship “is possible only because Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, is as it is” (1927, 57/84). See also Ricoeur (1986, 46/30).
- 11.
Gadamer characterizes this belonging to a tradition even as the “natural relation to the past” (1972, 266/282).
- 12.
In the earlier editions of Wahrheit und Methode, Gadamer remarks that “[i]t is only temporal distance that can solve the question of critique in hermeneutics, namely how to distinguish the true prejudices […] from the false ones” (1972, 282). As he himself comments in a later (the 5th) edition, however, Gadamer has “softened” this passage into: “Often temporal distance can solve […].” The reason he gives for this change is that “it is distance, not only temporal distance, that makes this hermeneutic problem solvable” (1986ff., 1:304). See the 1989 edition of the English translation, based on this fifth German edition, p. 298. As is suggested here, Gadamer extends the notion of distance from temporal and historical distance to all types of interpretive distance that serve the same function (see 1987, 125). See Johnson (2000, 30).
- 13.
Linked with this idea of effective-history, Gadamer discusses the concept of “application,” maintaining that “understanding always involves something like applying the text to be understood to the interpreter’s present situation” (1972, 291/308; cf. 381/403). In “legal hermeneutics” (1972, 307/324), for example, application lies in “concretiz[ing] the law in each specific case” (1972, 312/329). Further, for this reason, “the text, whether law or gospel, if it is to be understood properly […] must be understood at every moment, in every concrete situation, in a new and different way” (1972, 292/309).
- 14.
In this sense, Gadamer remarks, “historical research is not only research, but the handing down of tradition” (1972, 268/284).
- 15.
In Heidegger’s account, this “fore-structure” of understanding consists of three moments: “fore-having (Vorhabe),” “fore-sight (Vorsight),” and “fore-conception (Vorgriff)” (1927, 150/191, 152/194).
- 16.
Jean Grondin, however, points to differences between Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s views of the hermeneutic circle: One of the major differences is that while Heidegger avoids speaking of the circle of whole and part, Gadamer associates the idea of circularity with the idea of the coherence of whole and part, which he considers to be a “criterion of correct understanding” (Gadamer 1972, 275/291). Jean Grondin, “Gadamer’s Basic Understanding of Understanding,” in Dostal (2002, 36–51, esp. 47–50). Georg W. Bertram offers yet another reading of Gadamer’s conception of the circle and its differences from Heidegger’s (see Bertram 2002, 51–56).
- 17.
Gadamer also maintains that the two horizons are not truly “closed horizons,” but that “[e]verything contained in historical consciousness is in fact embraced by a single historical horizon” (1972, 288/304). As he comments himself, this might seem to be at odds with the idea of the fusion of horizons itself: If everything were already within a single horizon, no fusion would occur any longer. Gadamer appears to hold, however, that the two horizons are never completely separate, and yet that they may be fused insofar as the horizon of the past is experienced as other by the interpreter (1972, 290/306). It is also worth noting that, in Gadamer’s later account, the above “single horizon” is not “an abiding and identifiable ‘one’” (1987, 119).
- 18.
Gadamer renders this point by saying that “things bring themselves to expression in language” (1967ff., 1:69; trans. 1976, 81). See also 1972, 394/417.
- 19.
Gadamer at times, however, uses the term ‘text’ in a wider sense including “a picture, an architectural work, even a natural event” (1985, 111).
- 20.
As Mueller-Vollmer points out, the relation between the terms ‘understanding’ and ‘interpretation’ in Gadamer’s work is not unambiguous (Mueller-Vollmer 1985, 40). On the one hand, Gadamer tends to equate the two by saying that “understanding and interpretation are, in the final analysis, one and the same” (1972, 366/388, trans. mod.; cf. 380/403). On the other, he at times partially differentiates between them, maintaining that “interpretation is the explicit form of understanding” (1972, 291/307; cf. 376/398).
- 21.
It also follows that “the fusion of horizons that takes place in understanding is actually the achievement of language” (Gadamer 1972, 359/378).
- 22.
Gadamer even excludes writing from the very concept of language. This is illustrated by such remarks as: “the text can be transformed back into language (Sprache)” (1972, 368/391); “in relation to language (Sprachlichkeit), writing seems a secondary phenomenon” (1972, 370/392; cf. 382/404).
- 23.
Gadamer remarks most briefly that “language is conversation” (1985, 106; cf. 113).
- 24.
Admittedly, in Gadamer’s view, “[i]t is not only the written tradition that is estranged,” but “everything that is no longer immediately situated in a world” (1972, 157/165).
- 25.
For parallel passages, see Gadamer (1972, 156/163, 372/394, 449/474; 1981, 34, 41ff.).
- 26.
According to Gadamer, reading means essentially “reading aloud,” and even “silent reading” involves “an inner speaking” (1972, 153/160).
- 27.
In his article “The Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem,” Gadamer states that the hermeneutical dimension is not restricted to the humanities, but “encompasses the entire procedure of science” (1967ff., 1:107; trans. 1976, 11). The early Heidegger rather briefly discusses science, specifically “mathematical natural science,” in 1927, 356–64/408–15, esp. p. 362/413f. According to Joseph Rouse, this account by Heidegger still rests on “the traditional theory-dominant understanding of science,” which runs counter to his own overall practice-oriented hermeneutic philosophy (1987, 72–97, esp. 79).
- 28.
During his career, Ricoeur passed from the pre-hermeneutical phenomenology of the will to the hermeneutics of the symbol and then of the text, and further to hermeneutic investigations of human action, history, narrative, and other categories (see Ricoeur 1995, 38, 43). It should be noted that, even after his ‘hermeneutical turn,’ Ricoeur stresses “a profound affinity between phenomenology and hermeneutics” and claims “adherence to a sort of hermeneutical phenomenology,” while rejecting “the idealist interpretation that Husserl gave of [his phenomenology]” (1995, 34, 36).
- 29.
Du texte à l’action is a collection of papers published earlier, from 1970 until the mid-1980s. Some of the English versions of these articles can also be found in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences (1981).
- 30.
For parallel passages, see Ricoeur (1986, 28/15, 33f./19, 181/143; 1981, 294). At one point, Ricoeur even characterizes distanciation itself as “a moment of belonging” (1986, 330/268). As regards the relation between understanding and explanation, he holds that “explanation is not primary but secondary in relation to understanding” (1986, 22/10; cf. 123). See Lawlor (1992, 53f.).
- 31.
According to Ricoeur, this dichotomy between belonging and “alienating distanciation” prevents Gadamer from “recognizing the critical instance” (1986, 365/297).
- 32.
As Ricoeur acknowledges, however, Gadamer’s view of distanciation is not simply negative: Though insufficiently, Gadamer “put his finger on the central problem of distanciation, which is not only temporal distance […], but positive distancing; a consciousness exposed to the efficacy of history can understand only under the condition of distance.” Ricoeur considers his own approach as an effort to “push further in the same direction” (1986, 329/268). See Gadamer (1972, 281/297).
- 33.
Indeed, in Ricoeur’s view, hermeneutic philosophy itself carries out distanciation precisely in reflecting on our belonging to the world. As he puts it, “[h]ermeneutics begins when, not content to belong to the historical world considered in the mode of the transmission of tradition, we interrupt the relation of belonging in order to signify it” (1995, 36).
- 34.
Ricoeur also speaks of “the dialectic of participation and distanciation” (1986, 99/73; cf. 101/76).
- 35.
This point is related to the distinction Ricoeur draws (following Frege) between the “sense” and the “reference” of a proposition: While “the sense is the ideal object that the proposition intends and hence is purely immanent in discourse,” “[t]he reference is the truth value of the proposition, its claim to reach reality” (1986, 113/85).
- 36.
This is broadly in accordance with Ricoeur’s general fourfold formula of discourse: “someone says something to someone about something” (1986, 110/83; cf. 1995, 22, 24).
- 37.
What Ricoeur means here by the (Husserlian) relation between noesis and noema is more or less equivalent to the relation between the utterer’s meaning and the utterance meaning or between “the instance of discourse” and “the ‘intended’ of discourse,” which he mentions elsewhere (1975, 93/70). See also Lawlor (1992, 56).
- 38.
See Thompson (1981, 52).
- 39.
In this sense, according to Ricoeur, distanciation is not “something superfluous and parasitical,” but rather “is constitutive of the phenomenon of the text as writing” (1986, 112/84).
- 40.
Etsurō Makita points to what he sees as an ambiguity in Ricoeur’s account of the relation between the process of discourse and that of interpretation: On the one hand (as I have just noted in the text), Ricoeur designates interpretation as the third and last stage of the process of discourse. On the other, in different contexts, he supposes the circumstance that interpretation corresponds to the whole process of discourse, and, more specifically, that the three stages of interpretation (naïve grasp, explanation, critical understanding) correspond, respectively, to the three stages of discourse (event, meaning, new event) (see Makita 1997, 252ff.). See also Ricoeur (1976, 71f.).
- 41.
In his texts from 1971 onward, Ricoeur thus applies the term ‘interpretation’ “to the whole process that encompasses explanation and understanding” or, in other words, to the “dialectic of explanation and understanding” (1976, 74). Earlier, however, by interpretation he had meant a particular case of understanding, namely, the understanding of the text. See Makita (1997, 169f.).
- 42.
Ricoeur not only maintains that “the hermeneutical circle remains an unavoidable structure of interpretation” (1981, 178; cf. 171; 1976, 77; 1986, 200/158), but broadly follows Heidegger and Gadamer in displacing the hermeneutical circle “from a subjectivistic level to an ontological plane” (1981, 178). Closely linking the term ‘circle’ to the term ‘dialectic,’ Ricoeur generally considers “the correlation between explanation and understanding” to be “ultimately” the “hermeneutical circle” (1981, 221; cf. 1986, 211/167). More specifically, however, the circle appears at several junctures of the process of interpretation. For example, there is a circle “between my mode of being – beyond the knowledge which I may have of it – and the mode opened up and disclosed by the text as the world of the work” (1981, 178).
- 43.
According to Ricoeur, while the first move of the dialectic is “roughly the counterpart of the dialectic between event and meaning,” the second move “may be related to another polarity of the structure of discourse, that of sense and reference” (1976, 80).
- 44.
For Ricoeur’s critical engagement with structuralism during the 1960s, see Ricoeur (1969, 31ff./ 27ff.). See also 1995, 19.
- 45.
Ricoeur expresses the important role of explanation by means of the formula: “explaining more in order to understand better” (1995, 31). With regard to psychoanalysis, for instance, he holds that “an explanation by means of causes” is called for “in order to reach an understanding in terms of motives” (1981, 263).
- 46.
In his 1970 article “Qu’est-ce qu’un texte?” (included in 1986, 137–59/105–24), however, still retaining the narrow concept of interpretation, Ricoeur speaks of the complementarity between explanation and interpretation (rather than understanding) (1986, 142/110, 151/118, 154/120).
- 47.
Ricoeur warns also against some other misunderstandings of appropriation. In his account, appropriation does not imply “a direct congeniality of one soul with another” (1981, 191; cf. 1976, 92), but rather is “understanding at and through distance” (1986, 116/87). Nor is appropriation “governed by the original audience’s understanding,” but leaves the meaning of a text “open to anyone who can read” (1981, 192; cf. 1976, 93).
- 48.
In Ricoeur’s account, while the other is not altogether inaccessible, “the tension between the other and oneself is unsurpassable.” Therefore “[w]e exist neither in closed horizons, nor within a horizon that is unique.” Ricoeur is critical of Gadamer’s conception of the horizon insofar as the latter “seems to accept, at one stage, the idea of a single horizon encompassing all points of view” (Ricoeur 1986, 348/282). See Gadamer (1972, 288/304).
- 49.
It is worth touching on Ricoeur’s view of the limited “univocity” of interpretation. According to Ricoeur, interpretation “consists in recognising which relatively univocal message the speaker has constructed on the polysemic basis of the common lexicon” (1986, 77/55). While interpretation is “a struggle for univocity,” one cannot attain absolute univocity (1975, 383). For this reason, “the conflict of interpretations is insurmountable and inescapable,” and “absolute knowledge is impossible” (1981, 193). See also Lawlor (1992, 59ff.).
- 50.
See Thompson (1981, 63f.).
- 51.
In Section 2.3 (note 59), I commented on Bohr’s notions of analysis and synthesis in his complementarity argument.
- 52.
While concerned with the “subjective” conditions of our experience, Bohr’s thought may be called no more subjectivist than Gadamer’s or Ricoeur’s, despite misunderstandings in this regard among some commentators. See Section 3.2.
- 53.
This is not to say, however, that all theoretical elements of Bohr’s complementarity argument have exact counterparts in Gadamer’s hermeneutics or vice versa. Specifically, although the phenomenon in Bohr’s account of quantum theory seems to correspond broadly to Gadamer’s notion of the text, Bohr focuses on our involvement in individual phenomena, whereas Gadamer emphasizes our belonging to the whole tradition through which the text and its subject matter are handed down to us. Later in this section, I will discuss further conceptual differences between Bohr’s complementarity and hermeneutic philosophy.
- 54.
A brief comment may be in order on this table, with regard specifically to the section for Ricoeur. The two-column arrangement of Ricoeur’s paired terms expresses his idea that the relation between belonging and distanciation appears – in the process of discourse – as the relation between event and meaning, while, in interpretation, taking the form of the relation between understanding and explanation. It does not mean, however, that event and meaning correspond directly to understanding and explanation, respectively, in such a way, for example, that one understands the event while one explains the meaning. Admittedly, as noted in the previous section (note 40), Makita points out that Ricoeur’s account leaves a certain ambiguity as to the relationship among the above key terms.
- 55.
Bohr’s dynamic conception of complementarity may also be compared with Ricoeur’s account of interpretation in terms of the “complementarity” of understanding and explanation. Bohr’s notion of the ‘spectator’s’ detached reflection, which objectifies the meaning experienced by the ‘actor,’ more or less corresponds to what Ricoeur characterizes as the transition from naive understanding to explanation. Further, Bohr’s subsequent recomprehension of reflection as yet another involvement may be regarded provisionally as similar to Ricoeur’s notion that explanation leads to critical understanding or appropriation. There seems to arise a difference, however, between these ideas of the two thinkers – a difference parallel to the one pointed out subsequently in the text with regard to Ricoeur’s dialectic of event and meaning.
- 56.
Even as he remarks that “explanation and interpretation are indefinitely opposed and reconciled” (1986, 159/124), he does not seem to apply the term ‘complementary’ – in a manner similar to Bohr’s usage – to the double sense of “opposed and reconciled.”
- 57.
I cannot enter into the work of Jürgen Habermas, who started from a philosophical point of view close to Apel’s, and whose subsequent debate with Gadamer, in particular, has important bearing on contemporary hermeneutic philosophy and beyond. For a critical engagement with Habermas’s thought in the context of natural science, see Radder (1988).
- 58.
Apel designates his own theoretical approach, thus oriented to “a dialectical mediation of ‘explanation’ and ‘understanding,’” as “the critique of ideology” (1973, 2:101/50).
- 59.
At the first conference of the International Society for Hermeneutics and Science, held in Veszprém in September 1993, there arose an intense debate on the relevance of hermeneutics to natural science. As Dagfinn Føllesdal summarizes, Apel argued that hermeneutics applies to the studies of science but not studies in science, while Don Ihde and others contended that it does have a legitimate place in natural science itself. See Føllesdal’s “Introduction” to Fehér et al. (1999, vii–xi, on viif.). With reference to this debate, Ihde (1998, 40) critically comments on Apel’s view. See also Martin Eger, “Language and the Double Hermeneutic in Natural Science,” in Fehér et al. (1999, 265–80, on 276).
- 60.
Heelan defines scientific realism as “the belief that science has the power of uncovering the real uniquely,” and instrumentalism as “the contrary belief that science does not concern itself with the real, but only with extending human power over nature” (1983, 18; cf. 173).
- 61.
Heelan makes the qualifying remark, however, that Bohr “might have had reservations about the full implications of the position I am attributing to him because of conflicts with his epistemology” (1977, 18; cf. 1970). In his early work Quantum Mechanics and Objectivity, he characterizes Bohr’s philosophical position as “realist in the empiricist sense” (1965, 46).
- 62.
For a recent attempt to “expand the role of hermeneutics into technoscience,” see Ihde (1998, esp. 137). In this context, we can also refer to Hans Radder’s (1988) philosophical approach to physical science, specifically to quantum mechanics, which, by critically appropriating Jürgen Habermas’s views on natural science, discusses the theme of experimentation as “material realization.” In his more recent works (1996, 2002), notably in The World Observed/The World Conceived (2006), Radder focuses on the local realizations of observational processes and the nonlocal meanings of the results of such processes, which, taken together, may be compared with Ricoeur’s paired notions of belonging and distanciation. It is also noteworthy that this 2006 work by Radder contains a favorable but partly critical assessment of Heelan’s hermeneutics of natural science (2006, 57–70).
- 63.
This characterization of deconstruction as “radicalized hermeneutics” is Tetsuya Takahashi’s, based on his view that a radicalization of “the hermeneutics of the text” would lead to an abandonment of “all nostalgia for presence” (1992, 238).
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Katsumori, M. (2011). Intersections with Hermeneutic Philosophy. In: Niels Bohr's Complementarity. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 286. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1748-0_5
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