Abstract
When it comes to social aspects of our knowledge-generating practices, history and philosophy of science seem starkly opposed. I argue that this opposition stems from an assumption of normative/descriptive dualism. This dualism polarizes the study of scientific inquiry into two mutually exclusive, yet co-dependent, projects: description of our actual scientific practices and their results, or abstract examination of epistemic ideals detached from our practices. If we must choose between describing the historical unfolding of our scientific practices, or elaborating abstract epistemic ideals, an integrated history and philosophy of social epistemology of scientific inquiry is precluded. I show that this dualism can be overcome, by explicating a conception of the epistemic ideal of scientific objectivity from the social aspects of our scientific practices. This ideal of objectivity is both normative and engaged with the historical unfolding of experimental inquiry. It is thus a first step toward an integrated social epistemology of scientific inquiry, to be elaborated by further historical and philosophical study.
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Notes
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If an account fails to distinguish knowledge from opinion then it is outside the scope of epistemology, falling instead into another domain (e.g., social science, psychology, philosophy of mind). If an account fails to engage our scientific practices, then it does not concern scientific inquiry as we practice it, though it may address other epistemological issues (e.g., analysis of knowledge, dynamics of epistemic authority, characteristics of ideal or finished science). If an account fails to engage social aspects of our practices, then it is outside the scope of social studies of science.
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Neither can (2), though I shall not argue the point here, as the controversy over social aspects of scientific knowledge is more severe and entrenched.
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See, e.g. Barnes and Bloor (1982), Fleck (1979[1935]), Fuller (1988), Rouse (1996), Kusch (2002). Of course, there may be invariant epistemic standards common to all scientific contexts (though empirical evidence for this is not encouraging). But invariance merely partitions epistemic standards into “same” and “different” relative to contexts being compared. This distinction does not provide a basis for epistemic evaluation across socio-historical contexts. Generality as such does not clarify the distinction between scientific knowledge and opinion.
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This is not a merely theoretical worry. In recent sociology of science, attention has in fact shifted to science as policy, as regulation, as a strand of political economy, or as the epistemic face of the modern state (e.g., Knorr Cetina 1999; Drori et al. 2003; Jasanoff 2005; Frickel and Moore 2006). The work of scientists themselves has largely vanished from sociological discussion.
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For example: Collins (1975), Knorr-Cetina (1981), Latour and Woolgar (1979), Shapin and Schaffer (1985), Pickering (1995), Collins (1998), Knorr Cetina (1999). See Shapin (1982), Golinski (1998) for detailed surveys of the relevant literature; (Knorr Cetina 1999, 263 note 1; Bloor 2004, 919–20), for citation lists.
- 9.
Appeal to inquirers’ goals and means is explicit in Latour’s actor-network theory (1987) and Pickering’s mangle of practice (1995). In Shapin’s interest model (1975), the tie between broad socio-cultural interests and inquirers’ goals and means remains partly implicit, yet underwrites the explanatory force of these accounts. Several influential sociological accounts discuss the goals and means of individual inquirers in light of “the end of science” conceived as the telos of a social structure (Merton 1973) or the expression of a mood characteristic of a “thought-style” (Fleck 1979[1935]). Others (Collins 1975; Knorr Cetina 1981) focus on the social organizations and epistemic practices that structure scientists’ means-end reasoning; the latter provides the starting point for such laboratory studies, and is presupposed by them. Means-end reasoning underpins the philosophy of political naturalists like Rouse (1996) and Fuller (1988), as well as their accounts of scientific inquiry. The same goes for naturalistic epistemologists, such as Hull (1988), Goldman (1999), Kitcher (2001). The goals and means of scientific communities also figure in Solomon’s (2001) and Longino’s (2002) social accounts of scientific rationality and knowledge (respectively).
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For example, if my climbing partner and I share the goal of climbing Half Dome, then we are each committed to trying to get to the top as a duo. Accordingly, we plan and execute our climb by coordinating actions, e.g., taking turns to lead and belay. Each of us participates in social action aimed at the shared goal of reaching the top together. In contrast, everyone who plans to climb Half Dome has the same goal, in the sense that all plan to reach the same place. But would-be climbers do not all share this goal. We are not all trying to reach the top together. My partner and I aim to reach the top together, but whether or not any of the others also do so is not our concern. If their goals figure at all in our plans, it is only as a background condition, like inanimate objects or weather.
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Fagan (2007) includes a preliminary version of this study, as well as the social action framework.
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The acronym is for “hematopoietic”: literally, “blood-making”.
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For example, this episode is one of nineteen singled out by the editors of Immunological Reviews as “turning points in modern immunology” (Koretzky and Monroe 2002).
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This is why bone marrow transplants are clinically effective: to treat leukemias (for example), the entire immune system is ablated with radiation or chemotherapy, and then completely reconstituted by a bone marrow transplant containing a few HSC.
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Embryonic stem cells play an analogous role in understanding and explaining organismal development. This is not to say that HSC are foundational for immunology in the sense of providing first principles for theories (modern immunology arguably has no such principles), nor that HSC encapsulate the whole of the subject in a kind of “meta-preformation”.
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See Fagan (2007) for more detail on the origins of the search for HSC.
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By present estimates, well-supported by experimental and clinical data, the frequency is considerably lower, approximately 0.0005 in whole bone marrow.
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For example, annual meetings of the Midwest and Southern “Blood Clubs” (mid-1980s); annual symposia on Molecular Biology of Hematopoiesis (1985–1989). The main groups seeking HSC were in Toronto, Manchester, Melbourne, and more diffusely distributed in the Netherlands and the Eastern US (primarily NYC).
- 21.
See Fagan (2007) for further details on the Weissman group’s search and the 1988 result.
- 22.
FACS is a method for rapidly sorting cell populations, one cell at a time, according to level of surface expression of particular molecules, which are detected by specific binding of antibodies conjugated with fluorescent tags. The aim is to separate functionally distinct but morphologically similar cells without killing them, so purified cell populations can be used in further experiments. The first FACS apparatus was developed at Stanford University in collaboration with Becton Dickinson (Bonner et al. 1972; Herzenberg et al. 1976; Keating and Cambrosio 2003; Herzenberg and Herzenberg 2004).
- 23.
Though all agreed that HSC are pluripotent, self-renewing and responsible for radiation rescue, different groups took different aspects of HSC as primary. Responses to the 1988 result thus discriminated between experimental methods and emphases. Many hematologists conceived of HSC primarily in terms of spleen or in vitro colony formation, while the Weissman group defined HSC in terms of the correlation between in vitro colony formation and in vivo immune reconstitution. The dispute has not been resolved; within the Weissman lab, the 10-fold greater enrichment was and is recognized as success.
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“Model” is the term used by HSC researchers, and, increasingly, by philosophers of science as a generalization of “theory”, which admits non-linguistic representations as well as more traditional theories amenable to axiomatic presentation (e.g., Giere 1988; Longino 2002). Models in this sense are representations of subjects of inquiry, in which mathematical laws or idealized causal or formal relations are satisfied. Theories may be thought of as “families” of models and associated similarity claims. Models in science represent parts of the world under investigation in particular respects and degrees, which vary depending on available techniques and the purposes for which those models are constructed. Techniques and purposes, in turn, vary widely across disciplines, fields, and socio-historical contexts. Improvements to a model strengthen or extend the similarity claims associated with it, according to the standards of the relevant research community.
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Full results in (Fagan 2008, under review).
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- 28.
New interfaces between distinct lines of inquiry can arise in three ways: a single line of inquiry divides into two (or more) distinct branches; two distinct lines of inquiry merge to become one; and two distinct lines of inquiry remain distinct, but alter their relation to one another. All three are a means to (though not a guarantee of) greater consistency, coherence or unification of scientific knowledge. Division of a single line of inquiry into two disambiguates the goals and means at work within a line of inquiry, reconciling inconsistencies between apparently incompatible models and thereby organizing inquiry more efficiently. Merging of two distinct lines of inquiry to form a new, more inclusive group is, roughly speaking, the converse of division of labor. The subject matter of distinct lines of inquiry is seen to connect, such that models previously thought unrelated are seen as relevant to one another. Conflict and controversy ensue, precisely because of the new connection; coordination is achieved (at least in some cases) via these apparently antagonistic social interactions. Lines of inquiry are then seen as more coherently organized, contributing via different roles to a larger project with a more inclusive shared goal.
- 29.
This is not to say that scientific inquiry is instrumentally rational; only that it may be understood and evaluated in these terms (i.e., the fit between goals and means). This account is neutral regarding further requirements for instrumental rationality.
- 30.
For example, this minimal account could ground or warrant Longino’s social epistemic norms for reliable empirical knowledge (1990, 2002).
- 31.
I thank the editors for the opportunity to contribute to this collection. An earlier version of this paper was presented at &HPS1 (University of Pittsburgh, 10/12/08); I thank the participants, especially my co-presenters Hasok Chang and Theodore Arabatzis, for valuable questions and comments. This project has also benefited greatly from discussions with Colin Allen, Jordi Cat, Elihu Gerson, Tom Gieryn, Sander Gliboff, James Griesemer, Elisabeth Lloyd, Jutta Schickore, and Fred Schmitt, and from comment from audiences the University of California at Davis, the University of California at Santa Cruz, the University of Western Ontario, and the 2007 meeting of the International Society for the History, Philosophy, and Social Studies of Biology (ISHPSSB, University of Exeter, 7/29/07). The empirical portion of the study was made possible by the generous participation of Laurie Ailles, Arlene Bitmansour, Samuel Cheshier, Robert Coffman, Tony DeTomaso, George Gutman, Leonore and Leonard Herzenberg, Libuse Jerabek, Motonari Kondo, Sean Morrison, Jerry Spangrude, Christa Müller-Sieburg and Irving Weissman. Financial support was provided by a Doctoral Dissertation Improvement Grant from the National Science Foundation (SES-0620993) and a Dissertation Year Fellowship from the College of Arts and Sciences at Indiana University.
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Fagan, M.B. (2011). Social Epistemology of Stem Cell Research: Philosophy and Experiment. In: Mauskopf, S., Schmaltz, T. (eds) Integrating History and Philosophy of Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 263. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1745-9_13
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