Aristotle on Discovering and Desiring the Real Good

Abstract

Aristotle’s treatment of the type of desire he terms “wish” appears to be a rejection of the Socratic idea that the desire for the real good is universal, as it is the ultimate desire of virtuous and vicious alike. Indeed, in Plato’s Socratic arguments, the ultimate good and good things are the only objects of desire. At Nicomachean Ethics III.4 Aristotle considers the important question whether we desire what appears good, what is really good, or both, and concludes that an accurate account must include both objects. In denying that wish is exclusively for what is truly good, Aristotle would seem to commit himself in some way to the alternative, that wish is for what appears good. His conclusion, however, is that the object of wish is the apparent good only “to each,” while “in truth” it is the real good. I will attempt in what follows to render meaningful the contrast Aristotle takes there to be between the two views he rejects, in a way that leaves room for the third option he endorses.