Abstract
Intellectualism about human virtue is the thesis that virtue is knowledge. Virtue intellectualists may be eliminative or reductive. If eliminative, they will eliminate our conventional vocabulary of virtue words—“virtue,” “piety,” “courage,” etc.—and speak only of knowledge or wisdom. If reductive, they will continue to use the conventional virtue words but understand each of them as denoting nothing but a kind of knowledge (as opposed to, say, a capacity of some other part of the soul than the intellect, such as the will or the appetites). Virtue intellectualists may be pluralists or monists. If pluralist, they identify the virtues with distinct kinds of knowledge. If monist, they identify all the virtues with one and the same kind of knowledge.1 In a number of dialogues—including the Euthyphro, Apology, Charmides, Euthydemus, Laches, Lysis, Protagoras, and Republic I—Socrates gives arguments that support Reductive Monist Intellectualism (RMI) about human virtue.
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Rudebusch, G. (2011). Socrates, Wisdom and Pedagogy. In: Anagnostopoulos, G. (eds) Socratic, Platonic and Aristotelian Studies: Essays in Honor of Gerasimos Santas. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 117. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1730-5_10
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