The Place: Where We See the World as  a  Limited Whole

Abstract

It is known that Wittgenstein read Heidegger and claimed that he could imagine his account of Being and Angst. It is not so surprising that it has been regarded as a scandal that admitting that Wittgenstein understood and even, to an extent, he combines it with his understanding of nonsense in the surprise of the existence of something, which also appears in his description of absolute sense of ethics. In this paper, rather than comparing Heidegger and Wittgenstein, there will be an analysis of our everyday moral acts by considering both Wittgenstein’s and Sartre’s examples, which will give us an opportunity to understand the phenomenological investigation of a moral dilemma. Later Wittgenstein’s “somewhat” phenomenological investigation of moral acts can only be understood by fully comprehending his early works. The focus on questions such as: “How we see the world as a limited whole?” “From where do we observe the world?” will be bound by the concept of “place”. By going back to Plato and investigating what “khora” means and whether it has some parallel to the place where we stand in the world in terms of Wittgenstein. Is it the everlasting place where we can see the world as a limited whole?