Abstract
How can countries verify compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and detect and deter violations? The key conclusions in this book hinge on the fact that verification of compliance and non-compliance with the CTBT rests with the states parties. Verification is essentially a political process based on a broad range of verification tools that have improved over the last decade. The CTBT identifies three steps in the verification procedure: monitoring for evidence of clandestine tests, engaging in a consultation and clarification process to resolve issues of concern, and requesting and conducting on-site inspections (OSIs) to clarify whether a nuclear explosion has been conducted in violation of the treaty and to gather facts that might help to identify the possible violator. Should a clandestine activity be identified, the actions to be taken will be addressed on a case-by-case basis.
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© 2011 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
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Dahlman, O., Mackby, J., Mykkeltveit, S., Haak, H. (2011). Verifying the CTBT—A State Perspective. In: Detect and Deter: Can Countries Verify the Nuclear Test Ban?. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1676-6_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1676-6_7
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