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Introduction: What Are Persons? What Is Valuable?

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Persons, Moral Worth, and Embryos

Part of the book series: Philosophy and Medicine ((CSBE,volume 111))

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Abstract

As of this writing, if one searches Philosophers Index© under the term “abortion” one will get back 1, 485 total entries. If one limits the search to the past 10 years (2001–2011), one will get back 427 entries (almost 30% of the literature produced has been in the last 10 years). Running the same search with JSTOR will deliver 3,491 and 735 entries respectively (about 20%).1 Clearly, abortion is hardly passé or philosophically banal. But it is because of this dense literature that one may ask why another contribution is being added to it. Has not most every line of argument been explored? This introduction aims to explain why the answer to this question is “no,” and in this regard, to explain briefly how the chapters herein truly contribute to the dialogue on this issue. I begin with a history of the abortion debate, which aims to highlight the main lines of inquiry and wherein significant contributions can be made.

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  1. National Catholic Bioethics Center, Philadelphia, PA, USA

    Stephen Napier

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  1. Stephen Napier
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Correspondence to Stephen Napier .

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  1. National Catholic Bioethics Center, 6399 Drexel Rd, Philadelphia, 19151, USA

    Stephen Napier

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Napier, S. (2011). Introduction: What Are Persons? What Is Valuable?. In: Napier, S. (eds) Persons, Moral Worth, and Embryos. Philosophy and Medicine(), vol 111. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1602-5_1

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