Abstract
The current debate on corporate governance can be characterised as a search for the perfect model. The academic discourse is polarised either on the shareholder paradigm, where the primary focus is on maximisation of shareholder wealth, or on the stakeholder paradigm, where a broader set of issues are presented as pertinent to best practice corporate governance. In the practitioner discourse, the debate is fundamentally focused on practical mechanisms to discipline directors and other actors where the emphasis is on developing regulation either in the form of law or codes. We argue that both discourses rely on a homeostatic view of the corporation and its governance structures. Further, we argue that both discourses pay inadequate attention to the underlying philosophical presuppositions resulting in a static approach to the understanding of corporate governance. We present an alternative, a processual approach, as a means of avoiding the traditional trap in corporate governance theorising. Using this approach, we argue that a collibrated mechanism is more likely to emerge and consequently a better understanding of the heterogeneity of corporate governance practice will follow, providing deeper insight into the fluxing nature of corporate bodies and their governance structures.
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Notes
- 1.
This paper extends work previously presented at the Academy of Management 2006 and 2007 conferences.
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The author is grateful for comments made by reviewers and those in attendance at the conferences.
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Letza, S., Smallman, C., Sun, X., Kirkbride, J. (2011). Philosophical Underpinnings to Corporate Governance: A Collibrational Approach. In: Brink, A. (eds) Corporate Governance and Business Ethics. Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy, vol 39. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1588-2_7
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