Abstract
This essay employs Heidegger’s philosophical analysis of the moodedness of human understanding of the world in order to evaluate the significance of the moods in and through which specifically philosophical understanding is achieved in the phenomenological tradition. First, Heidegger’s Being and Time is shown to be critically informed by the moods of anxiety and perplexity; then boredom is shown to be the determining mood of his Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics; and finally, the significance of shame as a topic within, and a mode of attunement of, Sartre’s Being and Nothingness is assessed.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
Heidegger, Martin. 1962. Being and Time. Trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson. Oxford: Blackwell.
Heidegger, Martin. 1995. The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. Trans. W. McNeill and N. Walker. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Mulhall, Stephen. 2005. Heidegger and Being and Time, 2nd ed. London: Routledge.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1958. Being and Nothingness. Trans. Hazel Barnes. London: Routledge.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2011 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Mulhall, S. (2011). Attunement and Disorientation: The Moods of Philosophy in Heidegger and Sartre. In: Kenaan, H., Ferber, I. (eds) Philosophy's Moods: The Affective Grounds of Thinking. Contributions To Phenomenology, vol 63. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1503-5_9
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1503-5_9
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-007-1502-8
Online ISBN: 978-94-007-1503-5
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPhilosophy and Religion (R0)