Reproducing Alterity: Ethical Subjectivity and Genetic Screening

  • Catherine MillsEmail author
Part of the International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine book series (LIME, volume 49)


To a large extent, reproductive decisions are decisions about who comes into the world. As the non-identity problem discussed in the previous chapter makes clear, this is true of more traditional forms of decision-making and contingencies such as when conception occurs. It is also true, and increasingly obvious, with decisions about preimplantation and prenatal screening. Rather than address issues of the obligations that parents may have to give birth to specific children – such as those with the best chance of the best life – in this chapter, I want to ask what the fundamental stakes are of decisions about who comes into the world, and how screening technologies may impact upon this decision.


Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis Genetic Selection Genetic Technology Genetic Intervention Life Plan 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Centre for Values, Ethics and Law in Medicine and Unit for History and Philosophy of ScienceUniversity of SydneyCamperdownAustralia

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