Reproductive Autonomy as Self-Making

  • Catherine MillsEmail author
Part of the International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine book series (LIME, volume 49)


I mentioned in the previous chapter that liberal eugenics relies on two principles to distinguish itself from previous historical manifestations of eugenics, the first of which is value pluralism and the second of which is individual liberty. These two principles are fundamentally interrelated: value pluralism presupposes and relies on the political liberty of individuals. It requires that individuals have the liberty to live in accordance with one’s own values and conceptions of the good. The protection of individual liberty also requires value pluralism; the principle of value pluralism helps to ensure a wide domain in which individuals can act without unjustified constraint on their liberty.


Individual Liberty Genetic Enhancement Reproductive Choice Ethical Subject Negative Freedom 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Centre for Values, Ethics and Law in Medicine and Unit for History and Philosophy of ScienceUniversity of SydneyCamperdownAustralia

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